What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

[RuleBritannia]

Britain would've still controlled the seas, Russia still would've had a better army, Austria/Prussia still would've fought, Napoleon still would've lost.

[Scamander]

What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that, and what would it be like in NTW, I remember Kieran saying if your win Waterloo, you can go on to conquer the world, but what does that mean? All other reviews say that at the END of the campaign, you can decide to play a Waterloo scenario, but thats it. Anyway, what would have happened in your opinion if Napoleon won Waterloo, and completely destoryed or captured Wellingtons army. Would he turn and try to destroy the Austria and Russians heading towards France in 1815 as he did in 1805. what do you think?

Hello,

The rhetorical force of Napoleon landing from Elba and re-securing France so quickly and easily should not be underestimated. This rocked England. If any of the following had happened the stage would have been set for a potential surviving Bonaparte France.

1) Had the French broken the back of the Prussians at Ligny, Wellington would have withdrawn to England. This would have quite possibly brought down the government. It is quite possible the new government would have sought peace. If the new government had remained committed to war, relations with their Allies would have been seriously strained.

2) Had Ligny played out as it did historically except that Blucher been killed/captured at Ligny (both of which were very real possibilities given the details of the battle), his Chief of Staff Gneisenau would have commanded the Prussian forces and retreated toward Berlin. Again Wellington would have retreated to England and a similar crises in Parliament would have occurred.

3) Had Waterloo been won by France, the remnant of the British coalition force would have retreated to England and the Prussian force would have been vulnerable to attack as it moved toward Berlin. Flanders would have been under French control providing more men for French rosters. Two quick victories would have played to French moral across the country: further securing Napoleon's political situation and diplomatic clout.

a) What is interesting to note is the Allied armies of Austria and Russia had taken little to no action since Napoleon had returned to power. A successful French Flanders Campaign would have put a further question on their taking aggressive action.

b) The most interesting figure in this is Austria. Austria at the Council of Vienna was beginning to see what a post-Napoleon Europe would look like. It was a world where Austria was facing an aggrandized Russia which had occupied Poland (taken from former Prussian holdings) and had actually told Austria if she didn't like it, she was free to try and push the Russian army out. A Prussia that had annexed Saxony and thereby acquired a substantial position vis-a-vis Austria's traditional claims/desire to be the power of German principalities. Austrian gains had increased its population but had done nothing to improve it's strategic situation. Rather, it was in a more dependent position contra Russia on its flank and a Prussian backed Prussia to its immediate North. England was not seen as a reliable counter or partner.

A Bonaparte France offered the following: a real threat and counter check facing Prussia. A France married to the Hapsburg court with a son and heir to the French Imperial throne of Hapsburg blood (as opposed to a returned Bourbon ruling France). A France desirous of allies and wanting peace: meaning any claims Austria may make regarding the Italian Peninsula France would likely not oppose. Italy would likely be seen as under the Austrian sphere. Murat, the King of Naples, had already been rebuffed by Napoleon for his abandoning Napoleon in the later stages of the 1813/14 Campaigns. A chastened Bonaparte France had much to offer Austria. Metternich may very well have worked for a negotiated peace with France.


If either a new government in England had made peace or Austria had made peace with France, any remaining anti-French Coalition would not have had the strength to unseat Napoleon. With a successful Flanders Campaign, there was a very real possibility of a surviving Bonaparte France.

[Khassaki]

1) Had the French broken the back of the Prussians at Ligny, Wellington would have withdrawn to England. This would have quite possibly brought down the government. It is quite possible the new government would have sought peace. If the new government had remained committed to war, relations with their Allies would have been seriously strained.

The English make peace with the French? Nah. They might have been sick of the war but they were more sick on Napoleon. He had the whole empire balanced on his head, and his generals were all idiots. Whatever he did would have ended with his death in a few years. The Russians and Austrians were only only frightened of Napoleon, they had beaten the rest of his generals all over the place in 1813 and 1814.

Austria allying with them would have been interesting, but only after Napoleon was dead. He was to distrusted and too disliked to be an acceptable leader to a recovering France.

[Scamander]

The English make peace with the French? Nah. They might have been sick of the war but they were more sick on Napoleon. He had the whole empire balanced on his head, and his generals were all idiots. Whatever he did would have ended with his death in a few years. The Russians and Austrians were only only frightened of Napoleon, they had beaten the rest of his generals all over the place in 1813 and 1814.

Hello,

In England, there was an opposition block to continued war with France. The brief interlude of peace while Napoleon was in exile had only strengthened this sentiment. Merchants and others wanted to be done with war and be about pursuing profit. Merchantile interests had no small impact on Parliment. Further, the two central foreign policy pegs that had guided England had changed. I am referring to A), the general stance England took (basically from 1689 forward) to oppose the strongest power in Europe in the hope of maintaining the concert of Europe (and thereby England's safety) and, B) the protection of England from direct invasion.

Russia had emerged from the Napoleonic Wars as both strong and aggressive. She had pushed ever westward, taking Poland and Finland: being placed to dictate affairs in Eastern and Central Europe directly. Sweden, Prussia and Austria were directly threatened by Russian power and in a appeasement mode. Further, Russia was expanding East during this time and moving toward India. England was becoming aware, The Great Game of Central Asia was beginning. In many ways, Russia was the new power to be dealt with.

Per B) keeping the channel ports via the Dutch from French control had been seen as pivotal to England's safety. They were the most direct route for any large scale invasion of England. This had guided English policy from War of Spanish Succession forward. The stunning victory at Trafalgar in 1805 had removed the threat of invasion from any Napoleonic France, even if it controlled the channel ports. With the loss of Spain as a French ally, there was no fear of any invasion at all. Therefore, the world in 1815 was not the same as when England suspended the Treaty of Amiens and resumed war in 1803 (Recall, England had already shown itself perectly willing to not only be at peace with France, but actually during the reign of George I (early 18th Century) the two states had been allies).

Despite attempts to personalize a renewed war by declaring Napoleon an outlaw, the reality was his quick return to power in France had shaken some of the larger rhetoric about him being a tyrant. Rather, what many English politicians were seeing was a France behind Bonaparte. Attempts to separate the man from the nation were seen to have failed. In the face of failure in the Flanders (per the assumption of Napoleon winning at Waterloo) a Seventh Coalition against France promised to be a nasty affair. In 1814 during the defense of France, a Napoleon at the end of his resources had very nearly fought the combined Coalition to a standstill. Since his return form exile, he had in short order been able to quadruple the number of the French Army. With time, France would only become more able to defend herself. Therefore, since Napoleon did not appear to be separable from France and France would not cease to exist, accommodation was a more and more likely reality.

Austria allying with them would have been interesting, but only after Napoleon was dead. He was to distrusted and too disliked to be an acceptable leader to a recovering France.

Austria from the conclusion of the war in 1809 had already shown itself the least willing to fight Napoleon. They were the last of the great powers to declare war on Napoleon in 1813. Metternich was not anti-France or anti-Napoleon at all and from the records of the Council of Vienna was very aware of the strategic tight spot Austria was in vis-a-vis an aggressive Russia. Allowing for a Bonaparte France had much to recommend itself to Austria.

[Khassaki]

Hello,

In England, there was an opposition block to continued war with France. The brief interlude of peace while Napoleon was in exile had only strengthened this sentiment..........Austria from the conclusion of the war in 1809 had already shown itself the least willing to fight Napoleon. They were the last of the great powers to declare war on Napoleon in 1813. Metternich was not anti-France or anti-Napoleon at all and from the records of the Council of Vienna was very aware of the strategic tight spot Austria was in vis-a-vis an aggressive Russia. Allowing for a Bonaparte France had much to recommend itself to Austria.

Hummm.......

I can see your point about Austria, and agree that the Brits were sick of the war. Within living memory though, Napoleon the self aggrandizing megalomaic nutcase, was the terror of Europe. It would be wrong to underestimate the level of loathing that he is spired by his own contempt for the rest of Europe. Governments that appeased him would not be popular at home.

I think that all you say is possible, but not something that can be assumed to happen because Napoleon won at Waterloo. The Russians would still have come to put an end to him, and by themselves would have been a match for the decrepit French army of the time, though the Prussians could be expected to assist with some vigor anyway. French in 1815 would not have required a 4 way coalition to end it.

[Scamander]

Hummm.......

I can see your point about Austria, and agree that the Brits were sick of the war. Within living memory though, Napoleon the self aggrandizing megalomaic nutcase, was the terror of Europe. It would be wrong to underestimate the level of loathing that he is spired by his own contempt for the rest of Europe. Governments that appeased him would not be popular at home.

I think that all you say is possible, but not something that can be assumed to happen because Napoleon won at Waterloo. The Russians would still have come to put an end to him, and by themselves would have been a match for the decrepit French army of the time, though the Prussians could be expected to assist with some vigor anyway. French in 1815 would not have required a 4 way coalition to end it.

I don't think Napoleon was a "self aggrandizing megalomaniac nutcase". I think such ideas more reflect a certain British propaganda than reality. I do agree there was a real and sustained distain for him, including among the English hierarchy. Even so, England had a well established history of doing alliance about-faces. The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and the Treaty of Paris in 1763 were both widely seen across Europe as examples of England abandoning its allies for its own interests. Should a new government have come to power following failure in the Flanders, it would very likely be to end the war-without-end and finally allow the nation to turn the page.

Per Russia: the Russian Army was a study in the real toughness of its soldiery. This did not necessarily translate to its aristocratic leadership. Barclay de Tolly (who was in command of the Russian Army on the Niemen) was a better general than many of his Russian piers. Even so, at the time of Waterloo, that force was far away and had hardly advanced on France since Napoleon's return. Should one assume a sudden renewed vigor to prosecute the war against Napoleon, that army would not have arrived on the French frontier until at best early September leaving an approaching Fall/Winter and a French Army that would have only continued to grow and prepare. Also recall, French fighting on their own soil had as an impressive record as the Russians.

Minus Austria, the Prussian-Russian Axis had not faired well against the French. Prior to the Austrian intervention on the French rear in 1813, the French had turned the tide on the two powers chasing them back into Eastern Europe. It seems clear that in both the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen the Russo-Purssian forces were only saved from complete disaster due to the lack of French calvary able to properly pursue and envelope. The French Army of 1815 was far superior to the army France had put together in the wake of the 1812 disaster. All the prisoners of war France had lost over the years had been returned: including staff officers etc. Horses were no longer a scarcity. Finally, it was a force that was wildly supportive of Napoleon. Given the behavior of the Russian forces after Napoleon's return, they were likely all too aware that trying to fight a war against such, so far from their homeland/base would not be an easy affair or something they were keen to pursue. While it's certainly the case Czar Alexander tended to personalize politics and saw things as a battle between himself, as savior of the old order, against the revolutionary Napoleon: Russia had already made remarkable gains in territory and influence. Aside from a crusader like zeal to sustain it, a continued war in France offered little in direct benefits. If Austria did make a separate peace, Russian pursuit of war would have only been further complicated.

If either England or Austria made peace with France, I don't think any remaining forces could have successfully overturned France.

[Khassaki]

If either England or Austria made peace with France, I don't think any remaining forces could have successfully overturned France.

If Russia and Prussia went to war with France, England and Austria would join simply to have a say in the outcome if they won, and perhaps also to mitigate any gains that France might make in case it won.

Certainly the Russian army of 1815 would have been better trained and more cohesive than the the army of 1813-14 and better supplied as the countryside would have recovered from 1812. Being a fully professional army (or slave army if you want to be less kind) it was the only European army of any size that could stay in the field indefinitely.

Barclay De Tolly was not a particularly useful general according to any account I have read. His view that was lost command in 1812 because he wasn't a Russian, can be balanced against Kutuzov's view that he was initially passed over for the command because he knew that Alexander had his father executed, because he was commander of the St Petersburg garrison when it happened.

Thank you for the debate, I will leave it at this point, as I would have to re-read my Lorane Petre and Clausewitz to keep up with you

[Scamander]

If Russia and Prussia went to war with France, England and Austria would join simply to have a say in the outcome if they won, and perhaps also to mitigate any gains that France might make in case it won.

Certainly the Russian army of 1815 would have been better trained and more cohesive than the the army of 1813-14 and better supplied as the countryside would have recovered from 1812. Being a fully professional army (or slave army if you want to be less kind) it was the only European army of any size that could stay in the field indefinitely.

Barclay De Tolly was not a particularly useful general according to any account I have read. His view that was lost command in 1812 because he wasn't a Russian, can be balanced against Kutuzov's view that he was initially passed over for the command because he knew that Alexander had his father executed, because he was commander of the St Petersburg garrison when it happened.

The outcome of any successful Seventh Coalition was already determined by the Council of Vienna; this was the reestablishment of the House of Bourbon to the French throne. It is precisely this conclusion I have argued that Austria was then facing when Napoleon returned: a Europe seeing a dominating Russia (the power center shifting to the East) and a strategically compromised Austria. It is because of this, that had the Flanders Campaign been successful Austria may very well have opted for a negotiated peace. I simply looked at the strategic situation to make the argument. Were one to consider Austria's economic affairs the case for peace only grows. Their economy was in a shambles and Vienna had long running complaints with London of promised monies that remained unseen. Finally, there was the behavior of their army. Despite a general agreement for a July First invasion of France to oust Bonaparte: the Austrian Army have basically not moved. It's unlikely when learning the French had bested two armies in the Flanders, they would have increased in their war fervor. Why spend treasure they didn't have and blood only to end up in the same state determined by the Council of Vienna that boxed Austria into a bad situation? It's hard to imagine Metternich not wanting to change a clear dismal future for one where Austria had options, all of which a Habsburg heir to the French throne provided.

There is no evidence the Russian army of 1815 was a markedly different creature than what had already existed. It was large, filled with hardy troops and controlled in large manner by lackluster officers. It's performance from 1812 through 1814 is not particularly impressive. The fact not a single French eagle was ever taken by the Russians through the disaster of 1812 is telling. The Campaigns of 1813 up to the Armistice show the Russian forces, with their Prussian allies, could not beat the French, despite having seasoned forces with full calvary mobility going up against new French recruits. Once Austria had joined the war, Russian forces are better seen as a force multiplier simply due to added numbers rather than any singular determining element.

In a scenario where Napoleon was successful in the Flanders: if Austria were not added to the fray, I see nothing the Russians (either alone or with a somewhat savaged Prussian ally) could seriously do to oust Bonaparte. I do not think anything short of the full Coalition including England and Austria could have been successful. If any one element were removed the necessary force/money would not have been there. I believe, assuming a successful Flanders Campaign, it is quite reasonable that either England or Austria may have opted for a separate peace.


As to Barclay de Tolly: he seems better than many of his Russian piers. His ouster in 1812 seems do to with St. Petersburg frustration that the French advance continued apace deeper and deeper into the Motherland and he had not really engaged them. This may have been partially due to the French moving at a much quicker speed than was expected such a larger force could move and/or partially do to his realizing the disadvantage any early action would have been for Russia. Whether the Russians were simply running to try and organize a viable counter force and locale to engage, or following a variant of Peter the Great's scorched earth policy is debatable. Whichever side one comes down on, Barclay de Tolly gets the credit for preserving the Russian Army through the early dangerous phase of the war or credit for pulling back ceding space for time.

Thank you for the debate, I will leave it at this point, as I would have to re-read my Lorane Petre and Clausewitz to keep up with you

My pleasure. I hope I provided some interesting ideas to consider. Cheers

[Leon_aditzu]

Napoleon should ally with USA who is in 1812 war with UK for Canada, and with new states of america who are in indepedence wars with Spain, making a war between European nation vs France and Americas. It is known that many people in american countries want to help Napoleon to escape Sf Elena after Waterloo

[Emilio Aguinaldo]

Napoleon should ally with USA who is in 1812 war with UK for Canada, and with new states of america who are in indepedence wars with Spain, making a war between European nation vs France and Americas. It is known that many people in american countries want to help Napoleon to escape Sf Elena after Waterloo

Heh? Why'd you think the United States followed a policy of non-interference in Europe during the Napoleonic Wars? Well, because they didn't want to lose their new found independence. Do you know how close the U.S came to losing the War of 1812?

[Didz]

Napoleon should ally with USA who is in 1812 war with UK for Canada, and with new states of america who are in indepedence wars with Spain, making a war between European nation vs France and Americas. It is known that many people in american countries want to help Napoleon to escape Sf Elena after Waterloo

The War of 1812 was over before Napoleon escaped from Elba.

The war ended on the 18th February 1815, and Napoleon escaped on the 26th of the same month.
[Note: mistyped date corrected after being pointed out by the Rt Hon. Daniel Ryan]

As for the idea of the US siding with the French, this was pretty impractical. Despite the fact that Royalist France had supported the American Rebelion, when the French Rebelion occured the US government decided that they no longer needed to repay their national debt to the French as it was a debt to the French King not the French nation.

This incensed the French Republican government who immediately decided to recover this money in kind if not in cash and began hiring privateers to seize and impound US merchant ships. This led to a prolonged and vicious 'Quasi-War' between the French Republic and the USA from 1798-1805 and was the main reason why the USA began to invest in large frigates to try and protect their merchant fleet.

Over the course of this quasi-war French privateers captured or destroyed over 316 US merchant ships, siezing and selling their cargoes and imprisoning their crews. Doing far more damage to US trade than the British ever did in the entire period prior to the war of 1812.

Over the same period the USA and Britain were operating in accordance with a properly sanctioned set of treaties limiting trade with France to non-war related material. The only ships impounded by the British were those found to be carrying contraband in breach of US law, and the British actually didn't keep the ships or imprison the crews, and paid the owner compensation for the cargo even if it was contraband. Whereas, the French took everything and sold it, paying nothing in compensation, they even tried to demand that the US Government pay for the right to talk to them about it.

So, the idea that Napoleon would consider an alliance with the US, or that the US would consider an alliance with him is a bit of joke.

[The Rt Hon. Daniel Ryan]

Napoleon lost Leipzig because his enemies were more capable ? 200000 French vs 400000-1mil troops and French held city for 10 hours then they retreated because situation didnt look very well ... so it was a draw not a defeat.
Up to topic tho... like said above even if Napoleon won waterloo it wouldnt mean anything because his enemies would regroup and fight him again and again ... His only chance would be to make peace with his enemies or maybe even aliance with US (very unlikely tho ...) to fight British in america.

It wasn't anything near 1 million allied troops, don't be absurd. Even the Russian army had only an army of 500,000 troops, and of course not all of those would be commited. And neither would any of the other monarchs have commited their entire strength, as it was needed elsewhere too.
An army of one million troops did not exist in that period.

[The Rt Hon. Daniel Ryan]

The War of 1812 was over before Napoleon escaped from Elba.

The war ended on the 18th February 1812, and Napoleon escaped on the 26th of the same month.

As for the idea of the US siding with the French, this was pretty impractical. Despite the fact that Royalist France had supported the American Rebelion, when the French Rebelion occured the US government decided that they no longer needed to repay their national debt to the French as it was a debt to the French King not the French nation.

This incensed the French Republican government who immediately decided to recover this money in kind if not in cash and began hiring privateers to seize and impound US merchant ships. This led to a prolonged and vicious 'Quasi-War' between the French Republic and the USA from 1798-1805 and was the main reason why the USA began to invest in large frigates to try and protect their merchant fleet.

Over the course of this quasi-war French privateers captured or destroyed over 316 US merchant ships, siezing and selling their cargoes and imprisoning their crews. Doing far more damage to US trade than the British ever did in the entire period prior to the war of 1812.

Over the same period the USA and Britain were operating in accordance with a properly sanctioned set of treaties limiting trade with France to non-war related material. The only ships impounded by the British were those found to be carrying contraband in breach of US law, and the British actually didn't keep the ships or imprison the crews, and paid the owner compensation for the cargo even if it was contraband. Whereas, the French took everything and sold it, paying nothing in compensation, they even tried to demand that the US Government pay for the right to talk to them about it.

So, the idea that Napoleon would consider an alliance with the US, or that the US would consider an alliance with him is a bit of joke.

The war of 1812 started in 1812, and finished 1815.

[The Rt Hon. Daniel Ryan]

And he escaped in 1815, not 1812. Please, before you comment get your facts right.

[The Rt Hon. Daniel Ryan]

But, everything is possible
I think it was still possible, it would be like 1805 all over again, but the enemy was much more capable of war then what France was, the Grand army was full of new recruits.

Napoleon was nothing like the commander of 1805. I doubt he would have had the same sort of sharp judgement to pull of his campaigns of 1805-1809.

[Jean-Roch Coignet]

And he escaped in 1815, not 1812. Please, before you comment get your facts right.

Omg he obviously misstyped the date, as far as i know Didz's knowledge on this timeframe, he is among those who knows this era well...

[Didz]

Omg he obviously misstyped the date, as far as i know Didz's knowledge on this timeframe, he is among those who knows this era well...

Yeah! my bad I mis-typed the year it should have read.

The war ended on the 18th February 1815, and Napoleon escaped on the 26th of the same month.

On December 24, 1814 the diplomats in Ghent signed the Treaty of Ghent. The treaty was ratified by the British three days later on December 27[109][110][111] and arrived in Washington on February 17 where it was quickly ratified and went into effect, thus finally ending the war.

Napoleon managed to sneak past his guards and escape from Elba of the 26th February 1815. Just over a week later.

[realmrover]

Napoleon lost many of his veteran soldiers and horses at Waterloo. Even if he had pulled off a victory, he would have had little left to fight with that could defeat the entire coalition. Keep in mind, many veteran British units were still overseas and due to arrive as reinforcements, the same goes for the Prussian army- their quality units were still largely in Prussia. Many of the units in the armies of Wellington and Blucher that Napoleon faced were militias and non-veterans.

The Rt Hon. Daniel Ryan
The war ended on the 18th February 1812, and Napoleon escaped on the 26th of the same month.

As for the idea of the US siding with the French, this was pretty impractical. Despite the fact that Royalist France had supported the American Rebelion, when the French Rebelion occured the US government decided that they no longer needed to repay their national debt to the French as it was a debt to the French King not the French nation.

Don't forget the Louisiana Purchase..... the huge swathe of French territory that Napoleon had sold to the United States- as a result of the successful Haitian rebellion immense impact on French finances.

Also- the War of 1812 had been provoked particularly due to the British Royal Navy's aggression against American sea shipping for years. This included terrorizing American crews and kidnapping some to force them to be crew members in the British Navy. 'Press Gangs' were of course running rampant in British ports at this time.

The Rt Hon. Daniel Ryan
Napoleon was nothing like the commander of 1805. I doubt he would have had the same sort of sharp judgement to pull of his campaigns of 1805-1809.

Napoleon's summer offensive of 1815 was probably one of his most dynamic strategic master strokes in his career.
It was typical Napoleonic genius.
- Split an opposing force and defeat each in detail by using a small force to pin one split opponent, and bringing massive weight to crush the other- and thereafter bring all remaining weight to destroy the pinned opponent.
- In the summer 1815 campaign, Napoleon struck first at the Prussians and sent Ney to hold off Wellington.

The plan was brilliant, but destroyed in its first stages for several reasons.
- A French divisional General deserted to the Prussians on the first day of the offensive. This made Napoleon readjust his plans - fearing betrayal of his original plan.

- The staff of Perponcher's division which was holding the outlying sector on Wellington's front disobeyed Wellington's initial general orders to fall back to the main force in the event the French showed up in force. Perponcher and his officer -Rebecque- recognized the extreme importance of holding Quatre Bras as the key link to the Prussians-> reading Napoleon's intent to split Wellington and Blucher there.

-Napoleon's hideous choice in commanders for his dynamic plan that required competent army 'wing' commanders.
From the outset -at the Battle of Gilly June 15th- Napoleon saw that Grouchy was a plodding and lumbering commander; but he kept him on as the right wing commander.
Ney on the other hand had supreme dash in command of the Left wing; but he had zero concept of Napoleon's strategy; perhaps this was largely Napoleon's fault for summoning Ney to command an army wing at the very last moment. As a result, Ney did not comprehend that he did not have to beat Wellington at Quatre-Bras; just keep him pinned and unable to help Blucher. He accomplished the task, but unfortunately for Napoleon, Ney in his zeal to try and capture Quatre Bras, stole D'Erlon's corps [ which didn't end up helping Ney or Napoleon on the 16th ] from its flanking movement towards the battle of Ligny which would surely have knocked Blucher out of the campaign, and thus send Wellington in full retreat to the Belgian coast to re-embark his army to evade Napoleon's sword in his back.

[Didz]

Napoleon lost many of his veteran soldiers and horses at Waterloo. Even if he had pulled off a victory, he would have had little left to fight with that could defeat the entire coalition. Keep in mind, many veteran British units were still overseas and due to arrive as reinforcements, the same goes for the Prussian army- their quality units were still largely in Prussia. Many of the units in the armies of Wellington and Blucher that Napoleon faced were militias and non-veterans.

That’s point is probably overstated. The reality is that most of the veteran soldiers from the Peninsula and 1814 campaigns in Europe were no longer fit to be under arms, and those that were would have been unfit for any sort of prolonged campaign.

Mark Urban paints a clear picture not only of the physical, but also the mental issues that oppressed the minds of those veteran soldiers who were forced to fight in the 1815 campaign, and quite honestly the image is not very positive. These guys had seen enough already and didn’t want to put it on the line again in 1815.

It was the same attitude that striped the British army of most of its veteran officers and soldiers for the 1814 campaign in America and led to disasters like the battle of New Orleans. Most of the veteran officers and soldiers used every trick in the book to avoid being shipped abroad again, even if their battalion was tagged to go, and particularly if the location was a war zone.

Don't forget the Louisiana Purchase..... the huge swathe of French territory that Napoleon had sold to the United States- as a result of the successful Haitian rebellion immense impact on French finances.

True, the USA did hand over 60 million Franc’s to the French Imperial government, but we have no idea what that money was actually spent on.

However, it was only a fraction of the expense that France had gone to in order to support the American Revolution. Estimates suggest that King Louis spent over 1 Billion Franc’s helping the revolutionaries defeat the British in America, and much of that money had been raised by loans at extremely high interest rates that still had to be paid by Imperial France.

Indeed it was this debt and those incurred during the Seven Years War that were the underlying cause of the French Revolution, just as it was the similar debts incurred by Britain that triggered the causes of the American one.

So, the 60 million Franc’s that France got for Louisiana was only a drop in the ocean, as far as the French national debt was concerned, especially as the USA had already refused to repay the money it owed France from before the French revolution.

Also- the War of 1812 had been provoked particularly due to the British Royal Navy's aggression against American sea shipping for years. This included terrorizing American crews and kidnapping some to force them to be crew members in the British Navy. 'Press Gangs' were of course running rampant in British ports at this time.

No, that’s just part of the American Creation Myth. I appreciate that it’s in all the US school boy history books and it’s still the official government propaganda version of history but it’s wasn’t the cause of the war of 1812.

If you check the historical facts you will see that the Royal Navy was acting to enforce the Jay Treaty, which was originally signed in 1794. This treaty had been supported by George Washington and was basically a mutually beneficial agreement, which secured British withdrawal from American territory and established the USA as a primary trading partner with Britain in return for an undertaking that US merchants would not trade certain ‘war related items’ with France.

The Royal Navy were therefore perfectly entitled under the terms of the Jay Treaty to stop and search US vessels which were believed to be carrying goods in violation of this treaty, and even when American ship owners were found to be carrying contraband goods, and those goods were confiscated, the American owners were allowed to keep their ships and actually paid compensation for the value of the confiscated shipment by the British government. In fact, over $10M of compensation had been paid by the British Government to US merchants for confiscated cargoes by the end of 1802, and that was only the contraband cargo that the Royal Navy had intercepted, so god knows how much was being successfully smuggled through to the French in violation of not only the treaty, but also of US government legislation.

The problem was that not everyone in the US government was happy with the Jay Treaty, or with spirit of co-operation between Britain and the United States. Thomas Jefferson and his supporters were opposed to the situation and lobbied hard to undermine the treaty and it’s co-operative stance towards Britain.

This despite the fact that the navy of revolutionary France was actually inflicting far more damage on US trade and merchant shipping than the Royal Navy. Indeed it was the attacks on US ships by the French navy that prompted congress to invest in a Continental Navy, not the interceptions by ships of the Royal Navy.

It was the Jeffersonian party that first began the political spin against the Jay Treaty and it’s clauses and began to create the myths that are now part of the American Creation story. In order to undermine the treaty and the pro-British lobby in the American government they started a major propaganda campaign against it and the British in general, whilst ignoring the ongoing aggression of the French Navy against US shipping.

The issue of British deserters being offered sanctuary on US ships was just a part of this propaganda, and whilst no-one is suggesting that the Royal Naval officers on the scene handled the situation with any real degree of political savvy. The fact, is that the British deserters were being offered sanctuary on American ships, and the Royal Navy at least in theory had the legal right to demand that they be returned to stand trial.

In practice, of course what was legal and what was prudent were two very different things, and its clear that the Royal Naval Officers involved were politically naïve to force the issue, when the situation was clearly being engineered to support Thomas Jefferson’s anti-British propaganda campaign.

Nevertheless, they were legally entitled to recover their deserters, and the US ships were knowingly harbouring these men with the intention of provoking a confrontation.

If you actually read the primary accounts of the most famous confrontation between the USS Chesapeake and HMS Leopard you begin to realise just how stupidly contrived these confrontations actually were and how incompetent and badly managed the situations were by both sides.

Simple logic and the law played no part in the process in the case of the Chesapeake and Leopard. Captain Humphrey’s of the Leopard actually followed all of correct protocol’s and recovered the deserter he was seeking, but badly misread both the political situation, and the readiness of the Chesapeake to fight.

Whilst Commodore Barron of the Chesapeake just behaved like an idiot throughout, vacillating between indecision and complete incompetence and eventually even trying to surrender his ship to the British. An offer which Captain Humphrey’s sensibly refused despite the loss of an enormous amount of prize money.

The blame for this incident was squarely placed on Commodore Barron who was suspended from service in the US Navy for five years as punishment for his stupidity.

Subsequent testimony by the deserter recovered from the Chesapeake just prior to his execution confirmed that he had indeed been recruited by the Captain of the Chesapeake knowing that he was a British deserter, and that not only that but to the knowledge of the traitor there were at least thirty more British deserters amongst the Chesapeake's crew at the time of the incident who had escaped capture by being hidden below decks. Apparently, Barron only handed over the deserters who Humphrey's asked for by name.

It's also worth noting that whilst Ratcliffe was hung as a traitor because he was a British citizen, the crime was 'desertion' which applies to anyone of any nationality serving in the ranks who deserts his post. Both the Royal Name and the British Army contained large numbers of foriegn volunteers including American's and even Frenchmen, and having volunteered they were covered by the same rules regarding desertion as anyone else. Therefore, even if the deserters were American they were still deserters and legally required to stand trial for their crime.

[Ragelust]

Eventually he would've been stopped. But only at the expense of millions of more lives.