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Thread: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

  1. #41

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    I was surprised to see the battle at Corunna labelled a British defeat.The retreat was horrendous as you could imagine if you travelled that road even today. Even so the British held off the French at Corunna and were able to embark safely enough.All armies have to retreat sometimes and the British had the advantage of beong able to do so by sea.
    The relatively small British army in the Peninsular accomplished much more than merely beating the French in most battles.Crauford's training turned the Portuguese infantry into a splendid fighting force,equal to the British line.Eventually Wellington was able to persuade the Spanish to cooperate properly and incorporate them into his command.The result was a much improved Spanish army which was capable of defeating the French almost alone as at San Marcial. Ok,they had won at Bailen some years before but that was the French commander's fault for getting his army in such a ridiculous position.
    My argument is therefore that without British involvement in Spain and Portugal the French would have easily occupied Portugal and been able to defeat the various Spanish juntas in detail.The guerrilla war would have continued of course but needed less French troops to contain it.
    Last edited by Jihada; January 03, 2010 at 12:15 PM.

  2. #42

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    Juvenal,



    Indeed, Wellington's Army was an unknown quantity and Wellington himself did not trust it. In the event it too fought well, witness the Netherlanders holding out alone at Quatre Bras and the bravery of Bijlandt's brigade against d'Erlon's attack at Waterloo.
    How funny, your other post you said Ney was outnumbered!

    Napoleon's 1815 Army was not of mediocre quality. It had an unprecedented proportion of veterans thanks to the release of French POWs. The actual problem was loyalty. It was riven with fears of betrayal by Royalist sympathisers. Indeed, one of Gerard's division commanders defected to the Allies on the eve of Ligny with his whole staff!
    Not of mediocre quality?

    "
    The uniforms were in tatters. The 29th Line Infantry Regiment (in Durutte's division of d'Erlon's corps) served through the campaign with policemen's caps on their heads. The 14th Light Infantry had been wearing for the last two years (1813-1815) their old canvas trousers, regardless the time of year. In more than 20 infantry regiments the men were without shoes. "

    source: http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/BA...UATRE_BRAS.htm

    That is a silly quote. Wellington was extremely successful given the small size of his force and the distrust of the Spanish. Also there were many substantial battles. Most of the Peninsula campaign happened outside the time of the invasion of Russia anyway.
    Wellington was a medocre commander.

  3. #43

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    Jihada,

    I
    was surprised to see the battle at Corunna labelled a British defeat.The retreat was horrendous as you could imagine if you travelled that road even today
    And what of it? We are to comend them because the roads were tough?
    Are you jesting?!
    Napoleon faced much worse roads in the Friedland campaign! And remeber why the Britsh were retreating! Not because supplies, or a lost battle but merely because NAPOLEON WAS APPROACHING!

    And we are to commend these men for running like cowards instead of standing and fighting battle as their allies have done so many times?

    Even so the British held off the French at Corunna and were able to embark safely enough.All armies have to retreat sometimes and the British had the advantage of beong able to do so by sea.
    They were luck they had their ships or surely they would have been destroyed.

    The relatively small British army in the Peninsular accomplished much more than merely beating the French in most battles.
    While most of the French army was off in the East? And on top of that most of the Armies in Spain did not even cooperate with each other.

    And do not mix your words, the British army in Spain was small yes. But you convienantly leave out the fact that this small cohort was assisted by an entire country, and the average size French force was fighting a Insurgency the likes of which has not been seen before!


    This is rediculous! As if the Britsh actions during the Napoleonic wars deserve praise!

    HA!

    One who wishes to see the competence of British Infantry in the time period need only look at The engagment at Fuengirola.
    Last edited by Redalvilgeshki; January 03, 2010 at 12:22 PM.

  4. #44

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    Quote Originally Posted by Redalvilgeshki View Post
    Emp.P.;



    Do you mean the RETREAT at Corunna? Where Moore and his men fled to their ships and left thousands of dead behind?
    Yes that is exactly what I meant. It matters not that the British retreated, they outfought the numerically superior French and won a tactical victory.

    Quote Originally Posted by Redalvilgeshki View Post
    Wellington was a medocre commander.
    Yes, of course.....

    What is with the rash of Russian-named posters suddenly attacking Britain's part in the Napoleonic Wars?

  5. #45

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    Yes that is exactly what I meant. It matters not that the British retreated, they outfought the numerically superior French and won a tactical victory.
    It matters not!?
    Since when did it matter not?!? It has incredible importance!

    Even to our times its importance is great! Hitler tied down one of his most elite armies in the hell that was Stalingrad, rather then retreat! There are countless other instances!

    What is with the rash of Russian-named posters suddenly attacking Britain's part in the Napoleonic Wars?
    Hahaha I'm not Russian and that is not a Russian name, I acctually just randomly typed letters into line hahahaaaaaa I;m actually a Italian-Arab American.

  6. #46

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    Quote Originally Posted by Redalvilgeshki View Post
    Hahaha I'm not Russian and that is not a Russian name, I acctually just randomly typed letters into line hahahaaaaaa I;m actually a Italian-Arab American.
    I don't think you realise what I'm getting at. It seems a real coincidence that there are two Russian names slagging off Britain all of a sudden. My money says you're the same person (both posters have very few posts) and you sir are merely trolling.


  7. #47

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    1. Please stay on topic.

    2. It's not a Russian name....It's a bunch of random letters, and this is my only account and I am not bashing the British, I am merely bring the reality of their competence during the Napoleonic Wars up to light

    3. Stop saying I'm trolling because I'm not, there has not been a single word of my posts that has not been devouted to the argueing my valid points.

    When you say someone is trolling and they obviously are not it merely makes you look, how could I say it?

  8. #48
    Juvenal's Avatar love your noggin
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    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    Quote Originally Posted by Redalvilgeshki View Post
    Napoleon faced much worse roads in the Friedland campaign! And remeber why the Britsh were retreating! Not because supplies, or a lost battle but merely because NAPOLEON WAS APPROACHING!

    And we are to commend these men for running like cowards instead of standing and fighting battle as their allies have done so many times?

    They were luck they had their ships or surely they would have been destroyed.
    Moore had about 30,000 men and his mission was to support the Spanish armies massing along the river Ebro. Before he could reach them, the Spanish were defeated, leaving Moore facing Napoleon's 150,000 field army alone (out of 300,000 plus French troops in Spain at that time).

    Moore's error wasn't that he retreated, but rather that he didn't retreat until it was almost too late, perhaps not wanting to believe that the Spanish armed forces had fragmented into regional factions.

    Quote Originally Posted by Redalvilgeshki View Post
    Quote Originally Posted by Juvenal
    Ney's orders were to capture Quatre Bras and push north, he needed d'Erlon for this since Wellington actually outnumbered him on the day
    This is completely false, Ney even without d'Erlorns force outnumbered by a huge margin the tiny Dutch Force at the crossroads.
    Wellington did NOT deploy his force there untill very late in the day and Ney botched that operation with delay in attack.
    Ney started his attack at 2pm against Perponcher's Netherlands division (although he didn't know the strength of the Allied forces), advancing with three infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade.

    Picton's British division (and van Merlen's Dutch cavalry brigade) arrived at 3pm stopping the French attack. Ney resumed it when Jerome's division arrived, but the Allies received the Brunswick division around 4pm, then von Alten's division at 5pm and finally Cooke's division, giving them enough numerical superiority to counter-attack, ending the day in possession of the field.


    Quote Originally Posted by Redalvilgeshki View Post
    Quote Originally Posted by Juvenal
    At Waterloo, Napoleon detached Ney's horse artillery before the famous cavalry charges, and when asked for infantry reinforcements, actually gave Ney more cavalry instead.
    Napoleon did this to add potency to Ney's attack I thought? And Napoleon did eventually reinforce Ney with infantry as they captured La Haye Saint.
    Ney's cavalry attacks in the afternoon failed for lack of infantry and horse-artillery. Napoleon's release of the Guard cavalry instead of Bachelu's division seems ill-judged. He did indeed later release Bachelu's division and Tissot's regiment to Ney, but by this time the cavalry was largely spent and couldn't support the attack effectively.

    The capture of La Haye Sainte occurred later, and was undertaken by d'Erlon's Corps, with somewhat more support from Ney's cavalry who had had time to reform.

    Ney admittedly misjudged what he thought were signs of an Allied retreat in the centre, but it was Napoleon who decided what troops Ney could use, and when he could use them.

    Quote Originally Posted by Redalvilgeshki View Post
    Quote Originally Posted by Juvenal
    That is a silly quote. Wellington was extremely successful given the small size of his force and the distrust of the Spanish. Also there were many substantial battles. Most of the Peninsula campaign happened outside the time of the invasion of Russia anyway.
    Wellington was a medocre commander.
    Evidence?

    Wellington beat Junot, Massena, Marmont, Victor, Sebastiani, Jourdan, Soult, Ney and Napoleon. In what way was this mediocre?
    Last edited by Juvenal; January 03, 2010 at 05:14 PM.
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  9. #49

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    @Juvenal and Redalvilgeshki

    For what its worth my view on the success and failure of the 1815 campaign in Belgium is slightly different to yours.

    As far as I can see Napoleon did everything right, and if the campaign had taken place in 1808, 1812 or perhaps even 1813 he would probably have won. But this was 1815 and the world had changed, his enemies knew more about his techniques and were more capable of matching them.

    I also place a lot of weight on the arguement that Soult was not as effective as a Chief of Staff as Berthier had been in the earlier campaigns. Anyone who has actually read some of Napoleon's dispatches from the campaign will be able to vouch for the fact that many of them are unecessarily verbose, ambiguous and just downright vague. However, apparently this was not some new development in Napoleon's style of command, his orders and dispatches were always like this, he tended to dictate them verbally, sometimes several at a time using multiple clerks and consequently he tended to repeat himself, lose the thread of his intentions and even miss bits out. In effect they were more of a brain-dump than a structured set of instructions.

    The difference in 1815, was that Soult just dispatched them directly to the Corps commanders in their raw state, whereas Berthier used to sit a rewrite them, or add his over summary of Napoleon's intentions as a guidance note before they were dispatched. Napoleon's Corps commanders simply were not used to recieving such ambiguous instructions and being expected to interpret them themselves, and inevitably errors occured.

    The other big difference was undoubtely that the Prussian Army command was no longer the passive, bungling organisation that it had been in 1806, and its soldiers were no longer the inexperienced hoch-poch of new levies and men from newly acquired former French puppet states that it had fielded in 1813. The Prussian command staff were more than equal to Napoleon's by 1815, and understood his strategies and tactic's, and the German soldier was as resolute and committed as his French counter-part.

    Finally, I also believe that Napoleon expected his former Dutch troops, now forming part of the United Netherlands Army to defect en-masse to his colours, and indeed, its actually quite surprising that they didn't. Several of the Dutch regiments and many of the Dutch brigade and Corps commanders were former French Army officers and some Dutch Regiments were formed by men formerly serving in the Imperial Guard. Logic would have suggested that these men would have defected to the French as soon as opportunties arose, and I believe that much of the the dithering on the road to Quatre Bras, and in the early part of that battle, before the British began to arrive en-masse was deliberately intended to give the Dutch a chance to change sides before the fighting alienated them. Why else were the lancers of the Guard used as the spearhead of this advance, other than because Napoleon knew they would be recongised as the sister regiment of the former Dutch Lancers of the Guard and that the officers would be known personally by their Dutch counter-parts.

    In practice, of course there were no defections even amongst the former Imperial Guardsmen, and the delays simply gave the British time to get troops to Quatre Bras, but it was a worthwhile gamble which might have paid off.

    Neys Cavalry attacks did not fail due to lack of artillery support, they had artillery support, and infantry support. The myth that they were unsupported is part of the English myth and completely false. Both British and German eyewitness accounts repeatedly refer to their squares coming under close range cannister and musketry fire between each cavalry attack. Even Mercer states that he was forced to parade back and forth in front of his guns between each cavalry attack to re-assure his men that the French skirmishers were incapable of hitting a barn door even at close range, and he gives a detailed account of one skirmisher with a large moustache grinning at him as he repeatedly reloaded and tried to shoot him off his horse.

    Indeed, Halketts brigade were so badly mauled by close range artillery and musketry fire that their squares began to fall apart and were only rallied and brought back under control by their officers after the timely arrive of Detmers Netherlanders who by then were mostly drunk on the gin they had been plied with all day by the locals villagers and rushed forward in column formation to fill the gaps in Halkets line and drive the French artillery and infantry back over the crest of the ridge.

    If there was a failure it was in the fact that Napoleon did not expliot the success of the French cavalry attacks in sufficient strength, with La Haye Sainte taken and the French infantry and artillery in command of the ridge line he should have thrown in the last of his reserves and smashed the British centre completely, instead he held them back, and eventually depleted them by detaching many to counter the Prussian advance on Plancenoit.

    The cavalry actually did their job, and did it rather well, effectively pinning the allied right and centre in position and preventing Wellington actively commanding his own army for several hours, but with only the dreg's of D'Erlons Corps to expliot the advantage there simple were not enough French troops on hand to punch through the allied line, and the Germans and Dutch simply refused to break even under close range cannister fire.
    Last edited by Didz; January 03, 2010 at 07:28 PM.

  10. #50

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    Quote Originally Posted by Ebusitanus View Post
    Neither the British, nor the Portuguese nor the Spaniards could have won the Peninsular Campaign on their own.
    Success of failure in peninsular war was decided on the fields of Borodino and Leipzig. It all depended in how much resources Napoleon could divert into Spain to fight British and how often he could come there himself. Fortunately for the British he could not. This is not no mention the fact that it is Spanish guerrillas who “held 350,000 French for years” – not British 30,000 coprs.
    Last edited by Kolyan; January 03, 2010 at 09:57 PM.

  11. #51

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    Quote Originally Posted by Didz View Post
    @Juvenal and Redalvilgeshki

    For what its worth my view on the success and failure of the 1815 campaign in Belgium is slightly different to yours.

    As far as I can see Napoleon did everything right, and if the campaign had taken place in 1808, 1812 or perhaps even 1813 he would probably have won. But this was 1815 and the world had changed, his enemies knew more about his techniques and were more capable of matching them.

    I also place a lot of weight on the arguement that Soult was not as effective as a Chief of Staff as Berthier had been in the earlier campaigns. Anyone who has actually read some of Napoleon's dispatches from the campaign will be able to vouch for the fact that many of them are unecessarily verbose, ambiguous and just downright vague. However, apparently this was not some new development in Napoleon's style of command, his orders and dispatches were always like this, he tended to dictate them verbally, sometimes several at a time using multiple clerks and consequently he tended to repeat himself, lose the thread of his intentions and even miss bits out. In effect they were more of a brain-dump than a structured set of instructions.

    The difference in 1815, was that Soult just dispatched them directly to the Corps commanders in their raw state, whereas Berthier used to sit a rewrite them, or add his over summary of Napoleon's intentions as a guidance note before they were dispatched. Napoleon's Corps commanders simply were not used to recieving such ambiguous instructions and being expected to interpret them themselves, and inevitably errors occured.

    The other big difference was undoubtely that the Prussian Army command was no longer the passive, bungling organisation that it had been in 1806, and its soldiers were no longer the inexperienced hoch-poch of new levies and men from newly acquired former French puppet states that it had fielded in 1813. The Prussian command staff were more than equal to Napoleon's by 1815, and understood his strategies and tactic's, and the German soldier was as resolute and committed as his French counter-part.

    Finally, I also believe that Napoleon expected his former Dutch troops, now forming part of the United Netherlands Army to defect en-masse to his colours, and indeed, its actually quite surprising that they didn't. Several of the Dutch regiments and many of the Dutch brigade and Corps commanders were former French Army officers and some Dutch Regiments were formed by men formerly serving in the Imperial Guard. Logic would have suggested that these men would have defected to the French as soon as opportunties arose, and I believe that much of the the dithering on the road to Quatre Bras, and in the early part of that battle, before the British began to arrive en-masse was deliberately intended to give the Dutch a chance to change sides before the fighting alienated them. Why else were the lancers of the Guard used as the spearhead of this advance, other than because Napoleon knew they would be recongised as the sister regiment of the former Dutch Lancers of the Guard and that the officers would be known personally by their Dutch counter-parts.

    In practice, of course there were no defections even amongst the former Imperial Guardsmen, and the delays simply gave the British time to get troops to Quatre Bras, but it was a worthwhile gamble which might have paid off.

    Neys Cavalry attacks did not fail due to lack of artillery support, they had artillery support, and infantry support. The myth that they were unsupported is part of the English myth and completely false. Both British and German eyewitness accounts repeatedly refer to their squares coming under close range cannister and musketry fire between each cavalry attack. Even Mercer states that he was forced to parade back and forth in front of his guns between each cavalry attack to re-assure his men that the French skirmishers were incapable of hitting a barn door even at close range, and he gives a detailed account of one skirmisher with a large moustache grinning at him as he repeatedly reloaded and tried to shoot him off his horse.

    Indeed, Halketts brigade were so badly mauled by close range artillery and musketry fire that their squares began to fall apart and were only rallied and brought back under control by their officers after the timely arrive of Detmers Netherlanders who by then were mostly drunk on the gin they had been plied with all day by the locals villagers and rushed forward in column formation to fill the gaps in Halkets line and drive the French artillery and infantry back over the crest of the ridge.

    If there was a failure it was in the fact that Napoleon did not expliot the success of the French cavalry attacks in sufficient strength, with La Haye Sainte taken and the French infantry and artillery in command of the ridge line he should have thrown in the last of his reserves and smashed the British centre completely, instead he held them back, and eventually depleted them by detaching many to counter the Prussian advance on Plancenoit.

    The cavalry actually did their job, and did it rather well, effectively pinning the allied right and centre in position and preventing Wellington actively commanding his own army for several hours, but with only the dreg's of D'Erlons Corps to expliot the advantage there simple were not enough French troops on hand to punch through the allied line, and the Germans and Dutch simply refused to break even under close range cannister fire.

    An excellent post.

  12. #52

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    Quote Originally Posted by Juvenal View Post
    Indeed, Wellington's Army was an unknown quantity and Wellington himself did not trust it. In the event it too fought well, witness the Netherlanders holding out alone at Quatre Bras and the bravery of Bijlandt's brigade against d'Erlon's attack at Waterloo.
    Obviously there are individual units who perform well however having 20% overall losses was enough for Wellingot's army to turn it into "a near run thing". My original argument is that Wellington’s army was far inferior to Russian or Austrian and actually Prussian army and I demonstrated this by Waterloo-Borodino battle comparison.

    Being brave but dull like British cavalry officers is not enough. As I said earlier Wellington’s army had significant flaws and cannot be put in a line with Prussian, Russian and Austrian armies. Amongst the reasons are – weak artillery, slow manoeuvring, excessive dependency on supplies, rigid cavalry organisation and, inability to concentrate strategically.

    If Blucher would not be a talented general and after Ligny chose to retreat rather than saving Wellingt’s a… For Wellington the campaign would be over in the same way as it ended for British corps in Spain in 1809 as soon as Napoleon came there. Humiliating evacuation with out even a decisive battle! He would refuse to fight against Napoleon one on one – would retreat towards Antwerpen and evacuate to England leaving Prussians, Russians and Austrians to spill their blood for England as they did in 1814.


    Quote Originally Posted by Juvenal View Post
    Purchasing of commissions appears ludicrous to modern eyes, but the system did work. It ensured that the British class system was replicated in the Army, the officer class already being accustomed to command in civilian life. Don't forget also that the British retained a small professional army with no conscription, so the weakness of little promotion "from the ranks" was not overwhelming.
    - You are missing the qualitative measure of this practice. It may have been worked but it was far inferior system to promotion thought merit or exam and cadets training.
    Quote Originally Posted by Juvenal View Post
    The "vast experience" of the Austrian's and Russians did not prevent them being beaten as late as 1814.
    - the same way it didn’t prevent Red Army and US / British to taste occasional set backs and defeats in 1944 and 1945. However all that matters is strategic perspective. And we all now that the result of 1814 - the birth of Bistro cafes in around the world due to Cossacks having lunch in Paris.

    Quote Originally Posted by Juvenal View Post
    Napoleon's 1815 Army was not of mediocre quality. It had an unprecedented proportion of veterans thanks to the release of French POWs. The actual problem was loyalty. It was riven with fears of betrayal by Royalist sympathisers. Indeed, one of Gerard's division commanders defected to the Allies on the eve of Ligny with his whole staff!.
    "Digby Smith is of the opinion that it's impossible to know the number of Guard survivors from Russia still present in its ranks in 1815, but points out that of the 400-600 officers and other ranks who'd got back, many must have succumbed in Germany. The Grenadiers' and Chasseurs' composition in 1815 is perhaps relevant to the fiasco of the last fatal charge at Waterloo." (Austin - "1815: the return of Napoleon" p 314)

    In the ranks of Young Guard served volunteers, Corsicans, and even deserters. Some went out with girls and/or got drunk. Several battalions of Young Guard were under general Lamarque serving in Vendee. He complained that they were filled with recruits and deserters who neither knew how to maneuver nor shoot. (Lasserre - "Les Cent jours en Vendйe: le gйnйral Lamarque et l'insurrection royaliste, d'aprиs les papiers inйdits du gйnйral Lamarque." published in 1906.)
    The state of the Guard gives you the idea about the rest of the French army.

    Quote Originally Posted by Juvenal View Post

    Originally Posted by Kolyan
    The campaign in Spain "was to the Napoleonic wars what North Africa was to the WW2, an arena of British failure, redeemed by victory only when the enemy broke one of the great laws of war: NEVER INVADE RUSSIA."
    - 'The Economist' Oct 3rd 2002, London

    Originally Posted by Juvenal

    That is a silly quote. Wellington was extremely successful given the small size of his force and the distrust of the Spanish. Also there were many substantial battles. Most of the Peninsula campaign happened outside the time of the invasion of Russia anyway.
    It is a silly quote if you take it literally. Don’t! Looking at the broader perspective Wellington’s coprs in Spain is a mere 20,000 troops on the field with excellent supply system, and superb intelligence thanks to Spanish delivering info from intercepted French couriers. This doesn’t stand the comparison with conditions which French faced in Spain. And again this was due to Spanish guerillas.

    To me one of the most important quality factors is determined by ability of the Army to take significant losses and carry on fighting. Historically there were only two armies who could do that in Napoleonic Wars – French and Russian. The most bloodied battles in terms of percentage lost involved these two armies and defiantly not British.

    In terms of casualties ratio and overall troops involved British-French Peninsular war battles are pitiable skirmishes compared to horrors of French-Russian battles of 1807 and 1812. I can also mention that Eilau and Borodino were the bloodiest battles of Napoleon wars with the least gains.

    Many Peninsular war “substantial battles» were with a losses expressed in few hundreds. These are skirmishes in 1807, 1809, 1812 or 1813 war terms. These types of “substantial battles” are not even described and documented in 1812 war in Russia history as there was a constant daily rearguard action through the war with casualties mounting to hundreds of KIA, MIA, WIA.
    Last edited by Kolyan; January 04, 2010 at 02:10 AM.

  13. #53

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    Quote Originally Posted by emperorpenguin View Post
    First of all the British army did a lot more than skirmish in the Iberian peninsula.
    -For this see my post above.

    Quote Originally Posted by emperorpenguin View Post
    secondly they did, under Moore, face Napoleon and performed well at Corunna.
    I recommend this website http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/battle_of_corunna.htm for the decryption of the events.

    To summarise as well put by Redalvilgeshki:
    “….why the Britsh were retreating! Not because supplies, or a lost battle but merely because NAPOLEON WAS APPROACHING!”
    Not sure what you mean that they faced Napoleon - they did not:

    “The retreat was more properly a flight.”
    - C. Robinson

    And mind you this without a battle (not to mention a few minor cavalry clashes). By the time the “battle” of Corunna itself Napoleon was not in Spain but British stil continued to run outnumbering Soult 4 to 3. Crunna itself cannot even be called a battle with around 900 losses for the Brits and similar or slightly more for the French.

    The expedition reached England having lost some 8,800 men. "The people of Portsmouth looked on in horror at the spectacle that was emerging from the harbour. The British expeditionary force had returned home, but there was no grand parade through the streets, no pomp or colour, no tale of victory. What appeared seemed rather to be the mere wreckage of an army." (Esdaile - "The Peninsular War" p 140)

  14. #54

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    Quote Originally Posted by emperorpenguin View Post
    Next point is your figures for Waterloo are very wrong.

    Wellington had 53580 infantry, 13350 cavalry and 157 guns for a force of 73200.
    Napoleon had 53400 infantry, 15600 cavalry and 246 guns for a force of 77500.
    Grouchy was detached with 24000 infantry, 3500 cavalry and 96 guns, for 30000 men.
    So Napoleon did (barely) outnumber Wellington.
    My source is http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/BATTLE_OF_WATERLOO.htm
    which mentions 75,000 (including staff and medical) has 9 references and as far I know Adkin, Mark (2001). The Waterloo Companion. Aurum which mentions 72,000 for the French. I have never come across 77,000 especially from Mark Adkin. Anyhow taking the average of (77+73 (excluding staff and medical+72)/3 =74,000 French versus 72,500 (or 73,200 as per your source) Wellington’s.

    After the detachment of around 15,000 (or more?) to Palnaceloit French would have 74-15= 59,000 french versus 72,500 for Wellington. So who is outnumbered?


    Quote Originally Posted by emperorpenguin View Post
    Oh and Ney DID commit infantry to support the cavalry attack, just he ordered them in too late. Bachelu's division and Tissot's brigade numbering 6500 men were sent in.

    Didz put a detailed post about these events. There was simply not enough infantry because it was fighting Prussians at Planceloit.

  15. #55

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    Quote Originally Posted by emperorpenguin View Post
    Yes that is exactly what I meant. It matters not that the British retreated, they outfought the numerically superior French and won a tactical victory.
    British tactical victory you say? Numerically superior? huh?


    In contrast to the media, politicians, and many military men in 1809, today some British historians consider Corunna as victory. They like to portray hard-fought retreats and withdrawals like Corunna or Dunkirk as triumphs. For example Summerville writes: "In short the British ... were not in a position to exploit their success with an offensive, the redcoats secured their embarkation, and thus claimed the Battle of Corunna as a victory."
    The truth is Moore choose to get out, and do it very very fast. This is not a victory in battle, they just succeeded in a hasty retreat. They ran away. When the dust settled, it was the French army that held the battlefield and Corunna itself, not the British. According to napoleon-series.org (2005) > it was a French victory.

    In list of battles they write: "Here in this list rance is mentioned as victor because it occupied the place at the end. In February 1998 there was quite a dispute in the discussion forum about who's victory this was (most voted for France). "
    For the French it was their victory. They sent the redcoats skulking off to the sea.

    After the victory at Corunna, Soult took the great naval base of El Ferrol. He captured 8 battle-ships, 3 frigates, several hundred prisoners and enormous equipment stockpiles, incl. 20,000 British muskets.

    http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/battle_of_corunna.htm

  16. #56

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    Quote Originally Posted by emperorpenguin View Post
    My money says you're the same person (both posters have very few posts) and you sir are merely trolling.
    Keep your money in the pocket. If you look closely you will see that to be the same person that "person" should operate here on the forum 24 hour non-stop with out sleeping. I am acutally on the other side of the Wolrd to Redalvilgeshki.


    Quote Originally Posted by emperorpenguin View Post
    It seems a real coincidence that there are two Russian names slagging off Britain all of a sudden.
    What is intresting to me is really the argument itself and not the nationality of the author. I hope its the same to you.

  17. #57
    Ebusitanus's Avatar Senator
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    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    Quote Originally Posted by Kolyan View Post
    Success of failure in peninsular war was decided on the fields of Borodino and Leipzig. It all depended in how much resources Napoleon could divert into Spain to fight British and how often he could come there himself. Fortunately for the British he could not. This is not no mention the fact that it is Spanish guerrillas who “held 350,000 French for years” – not British 30,000 coprs.
    Destinies of the various allied nations were very much intertied during these years. Spain fought on alone many times during these years when either the British left the Peninsula (La Coruña) or where in Portugal close to Lisbon. Victories on Spanish soil gave more than once courage to open hostilities for other nations that had signed peace before.
    You like to focus on your Russians and I will not be the one to say they were not momentuos in taking down Napoleon but without the other nations involved Russia would not have made it on its own either. Those 350.000 soldiers in Spain were not in Russia, Prussia or Austria, right? We can turn this as easily around.
    When I say that neither of the Spanish, British or Portuguese could have won the Peninsular Campaign on its own I mean it. Without Brtish support Spain could never have sustained itself all these years, being able to set up field army after field army, give hope to the guerrilas due to the field battles won by Wellington, etc, etc...

    You talk about Borodino and Leipzig like some self contained events in a vacum. We can all start playing what-if games. Had Napoleon not been tied down significantly in Spain how many more troops could he have used against Russia?
    Read a napoleonic first hand account of a Hessian serving under the french flag

    Athenians: For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretenses - either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us- and make a long speech which would not be believed;.......... since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.

    Part of the Melian Dialogue in The History of the Pelopenessian War by Thucydides.

  18. #58
    Juvenal's Avatar love your noggin
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    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    Quote Originally Posted by Didz View Post
    As far as I can see Napoleon did everything right, and if the campaign had taken place in 1808, 1812 or perhaps even 1813 he would probably have won. But this was 1815 and the world had changed, his enemies knew more about his techniques and were more capable of matching them.
    Yes, Napoleon's plan was good, but it was also very risky and from what he is recorded as saying during the campaign, he seemed unwilling to believe the Allies could stand against him... for example the famous "petit dejeuner" remark to Soult. Was he just trying to increase morale, or was he actively deluding himself?

    Quote Originally Posted by Didz View Post
    I also place a lot of weight on the arguement that Soult was not as effective as a Chief of Staff as Berthier had been in the earlier campaigns. ...many of them are unecessarily verbose, ambiguous and just downright vague. ...this was not some new development in Napoleon's style of command, his orders and dispatches were always like this, he tended to dictate them verbally, sometimes several at a time using multiple clerks and consequently he tended to repeat himself, lose the thread of his intentions and even miss bits out. In effect they were more of a brain-dump than a structured set of instructions.

    The difference in 1815, was that Soult just dispatched them directly to the Corps commanders in their raw state, whereas Berthier used to sit a rewrite them, or add his over summary of Napoleon's intentions as a guidance note before they were dispatched. Napoleon's Corps commanders simply were not used to recieving such ambiguous instructions and being expected to interpret them themselves, and inevitably errors occured.
    Yes, an excellent point, Soult was not effective as Chief of Staff to Napoleon. He would have been much better as a wing commander, perhaps instead of Grouchy. But the problem was that there was no good candidate for Chief of Staff, someone who knew Napoleon intimately was needed.

    Quote Originally Posted by Didz View Post
    The other big difference was undoubtely that the Prussian Army command was no longer the passive, bungling organisation that it had been in 1806, and its soldiers were no longer the inexperienced hoch-poch of new levies and men from newly acquired former French puppet states that it had fielded in 1813. The Prussian command staff were more than equal to Napoleon's by 1815, and understood his strategies and tactic's, and the German soldier was as resolute and committed as his French counter-part.
    Yes, they were definitely resolute, but they were not the equal of the French in battle as Ligny and Plancenoit demonstrated. But they had been equally resolute in 1814 recovering from the Six Days campaign, and in 1813 attacking Möckern outside Leipzig. Just because Peter Hofschröer admires them doesn't make them supermen. By the way, I'm not being jingoistic here, I just think that, thanks to their meritocratic system, the French had the advantage of a more experienced and effective officer corps, with more scope to show individual initiative.

    Quote Originally Posted by Didz View Post
    Finally, I also believe that Napoleon expected his former Dutch troops, now forming part of the United Netherlands Army to defect en-masse to his colours, and indeed, its actually quite surprising that they didn't. Several of the Dutch regiments and many of the Dutch brigade and Corps commanders were former French Army officers and some Dutch Regiments were formed by men formerly serving in the Imperial Guard. Logic would have suggested that these men would have defected to the French as soon as opportunities arose, and I believe that much of the the dithering on the road to Quatre Bras, and in the early part of that battle, before the British began to arrive en-masse was deliberately intended to give the Dutch a chance to change sides before the fighting alienated them. Why else were the lancers of the Guard used as the spearhead of this advance, other than because Napoleon knew they would be recongised as the sister regiment of the former Dutch Lancers of the Guard and that the officers would be known personally by their Dutch counter-parts.

    In practice, of course there were no defections even amongst the former Imperial Guardsmen, and the delays simply gave the British time to get troops to Quatre Bras, but it was a worthwhile gamble which might have paid off.
    That is absolutely fascinating, but is there any evidence for it at all? Don't forget that the Netherlanders were at Quatre Bras in contravention of Wellington's orders and Napoleon didn't know Wellington's dispositions anyway, he merely knew Wellington's habits and expected him to concentrate to the rear, allowing Ney to march to Brussels while this was occurring.

    Quote Originally Posted by Didz View Post
    Neys Cavalry attacks did not fail due to lack of artillery support, they had artillery support, and infantry support. The myth that they were unsupported is part of the English myth and completely false. Both British and German eyewitness accounts repeatedly refer to their squares coming under close range cannister and musketry fire between each cavalry attack. Even Mercer states that he was forced to parade back and forth in front of his guns between each cavalry attack to re-assure his men that the French skirmishers were incapable of hitting a barn door even at close range, and he gives a detailed account of one skirmisher with a large moustache grinning at him as he repeatedly reloaded and tried to shoot him off his horse.

    Indeed, Halketts brigade were so badly mauled by close range artillery and musketry fire that their squares began to fall apart and were only rallied and brought back under control by their officers after the timely arrive of Detmers Netherlanders who by then were mostly drunk on the gin they had been plied with all day by the locals villagers and rushed forward in column formation to fill the gaps in Halkets line and drive the French artillery and infantry back over the crest of the ridge.
    Ney's first attack was with Milhaud's Corps and the Heavy Guard cavalry. There was no horse artillery, but the French foot artillery on the ridge did manage to bombard the British at long range between charges.

    For Ney's second attack, Napoleon released Kellermann's corps and the light cavalry of the Guard. Was there any horse artillery? I can't find any references to its use at this point.

    For Ney's third attack, Napoleon released Bachelu's division and Tissot's regiment (presumably because d'Erlon's Corps had partly reformed), Pire's horse artillery also took part and this was I believe the first time the French were able to use canister, firing at the British Guards from the hollow way behind Hougomont. Bachelu then decided to withdraw in the face of fire from duPlat's and Adam's brigades and because the French cavalry in the valley, although spent, restricted the frontage on which he could advance.

    Notice that not a single British square was broken, and more importantly no British gun was spiked, a clear sign that French horse artillery didn't make it to the plateau since they carried the special headless nails used for this purpose.

    Quote Originally Posted by Didz View Post
    If there was a failure it was in the fact that Napoleon did not expliot the success of the French cavalry attacks in sufficient strength, with La Haye Sainte taken and the French infantry and artillery in command of the ridge line he should have thrown in the last of his reserves and smashed the British centre completely, instead he held them back, and eventually depleted them by detaching many to counter the Prussian advance on Plancenoit.

    The cavalry actually did their job, and did it rather well, effectively pinning the allied right and centre in position and preventing Wellington actively commanding his own army for several hours, but with only the dreg's of D'Erlons Corps to expliot the advantage there simple were not enough French troops on hand to punch through the allied line, and the Germans and Dutch simply refused to break even under close range cannister fire.
    As you have said yourself in other threads, cavalry rely on the psychological effect of their presence to break formed infantry. The British squares never broke, so there was therefore no success. Yes, Wellington was prevented from manoeuvring, but I don't think he had any intention of doing so at that time. He was compensating for the perceived unreliability of his army by keeping it concentrated behind the ridge. He was certainly not about to emulate Harold at Hastings.

    It was perfectly possible for the French cavalry to pin Wellington's centre without suffering heavy casualties had that been their intention.

    EDIT: After La Haye Sainte was taken, Napoleon waited until Plancenoit was recaptured before throwing in his last reserve to support Ney. This was the gamble that lost him his army. Wellington's reserves were still sufficient to stop the Guard, while Napoleon had nothing left with which to prevent the collapse that occurred when Ziethen's Corps broke through d'Erlon's line.

    You might argue that Napoleon should have used the Guard earlier, but how could he leave Plancenoit in Prussian hands in his rear?
    Last edited by Juvenal; January 04, 2010 at 05:08 AM.
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  19. #59

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    Quote Originally Posted by Juvenal View Post
    Yes, Napoleon's plan was good, but it was also very risky and from what he is recorded as saying during the campaign, he seemed unwilling to believe the Allies could stand against him... for example the famous "petit dejeuner" remark to Soult. Was he just trying to increase morale, or was he actively deluding himself?
    Well over the entire campaign he conducted two maneouvres from a central position. The first pinned the Wellington's army at Quatre Bras whilst he defeated the Prussians at Ligny, the second pinned the Prussian's at Wavre whilst he attacked the Wellington at Waterloo.

    Either could have given him victory, but neither actually did, and on both occassions victory was denied him by the Prussian Army staff and soldiers who pulled a miracle out of the hat to negate the benefits he should have gained.
    Quote Originally Posted by Juvenal View Post
    Yes, an excellent point, Soult was not effective as Chief of Staff to Napoleon. He would have been much better as a wing commander, perhaps instead of Grouchy. But the problem was that there was no good candidate for Chief of Staff, someone who knew Napoleon intimately was needed.
    Yep! that was the crux of the problem. Berthier was gone and there was nobody to replace his skills.
    Quote Originally Posted by Juvenal View Post
    Yes, they were definitely resolute, but they were not the equal of the French in battle as Ligny and Plancenoit demonstrated. But they had been equally resolute in 1814 recovering from the Six Days campaign, and in 1813 attacking Möckern outside Leipzig. Just because Peter Hofschröer admires them doesn't make them supermen. By the way, I'm not being jingoistic here, I just think that, thanks to their meritocratic system, the French had the advantage of a more experienced and effective officer corps, with more scope to show individual initiative.
    Never mind what Hofschoer thinks, he's just a historian trying to sell a book. The thing that I admired about the Prussian soldiers in 1815 is what they actually did, and if you read Hofschoers books you can see that the Prussian Army in the 1815 campaign pulled off some amazing feats of military skill, which quite honestly I don't think either Wellington's or Napoleon's armies were capable of matching in that campaign. They may have lost the battle of Ligny for example, but they denied Napoleon the fruits of that victory.
    Quote Originally Posted by Juvenal View Post
    That is absolutely fascinating, but is there any evidence for it at all? Don't forget that the Netherlanders were at Quatre Bras in contravention of Wellington's orders and Napoleon didn't know Wellington's dispositions anyway, he merely knew Wellington's habits and expected him to concentrate to the rear, allowing Ney to march to Brussels while this was occurring.
    Actually, Napoleon probably knew Wellingtons dispositions in detail well before he planned his campaign. By some quirk of political expediency all the village prefects in Belgium were still ex-French soldiers who had been appointed to their positions by Napoleon as a reward for their years of loyal service in the French Imperial Guard.

    These men were actually responsible, amongst other things, for allocating billets, food and fodder to regiments of the Allied Army.

    Mercer gives a detailed account of the hostile attitude of the prefect he had to deal with in his billet area. These men were in constant touch with the French authorities reporting on the cantonments and strengths of the Allied Army in the Netherlands, so Napoleon had an almost complete map of the dispersal of Wellington's Army. Ironically, these reports were delivered to the very same Frenchman, that Wellington was relying upon to betray the positions of the French Army prior to the campaign, and the excuses given by this guy for not providing Wellington with the information succeeded in leaving Wellington completely in the dark about where and when Napoleon would strike.

    Fortunately, Wellington had refused to allow any of the Prussian Army to cross the Belgium border and occupy cantonments inside the United Netherlands, as he was suspicious that they might not be willing to leave again after the campaign. Consequently, French intelligence on the French army was less detailed and Napoleon failed to realise that Zeitens Corps was deployed across the French line of advance.

    As for the Dutch conspiracy theory, it is just that, a conspiracy theory. However, if you actually plot the movements of the French Army north along the road from Charlerio to Quatre Bras, there are some really weird goings on along that road. Not least the fact that for some reason the advance was led by the Lancers of the Imperial Guard, with explict orders to Ney not to commit them to battle, and the fact that the French halted and camped for an entire night in front of the first Dutch troops they met, and that even after Zietens Corps appeared on the scene the battle that ensued was little more than a sporadic skirmish that allowed the Prussians to simply march across the line of the French advance screened by the Dutch.
    Quote Originally Posted by Juvenal View Post
    Ney's first attack was with Milhaud's Corps and the Heavy Guard cavalry. There was no horse artillery, but the French foot artillery on the ridge did manage to bombard the British at long range between charges.
    That actually doesn't make sense, if you think about it. The French artillery on the opposite ridge would not have been able to bombard the Allied squares between their own cavalry charges. Even if the gunners had been able to see through the opposite ridge to know when specific squares were not being attacked, artillery at this period used richocet fire and would have being bouncing shot through their own cavalry to get them over the crest into the target. As Mercer and several other officers relate the French cavalry were reforming for each attack less than 50 paces from their positions, so lobbing shot over them was hardly an option either.

    Incidently, your point about the guns being spiked might have been a valid one had they been there. But the whole abandon the guns and run to the squares thing is just another bit of the English Myth. Its true that Wellington ordered this to happen, but in practice the gunners ignored his orders and limbered up and withdrew their guns to the rear as soon and the French cavalry attacks begun. Only Mercer's battery stood its ground, and they refused to leave their guns at all. Wellignton was livid about this after the battle, even attempting to prevent the Royal Artillery Officers being issued with Waterloo medals and pensions, however, he was not prepared to admit that his orders were opening disobeyed and so the myth persists that the artillery did as they were told. To be honest, I have some sympathy for the Royal Artillery on this point as Wellignton's order may have been sensible form a tactical viewpoint, but it wasn't very practical from an artillery viewpoint. Quite apart from the obvious risk that the artillery could have their guns spiked if they left them behind, the fact is that the guns are not the most vulnerable part of a battery, the limbers are and there is no drill for withdrawing and recalling the limbers without the guns. Certainly the limbers could not have been withdrawn inside the squares, and as evidenced by the carnage inflicted on the boys of the French batteries by the Union brigade leaving them standing in the path of the French cavalry would have led to a massacre. I suspect that most battery commanders assumed that Wellington's suggestion (he was not entitled to issue orders to the artillery) was a dumb idea and did what they thought was best to preserve their batteries.

    Quote Originally Posted by Juvenal View Post
    For Ney's second attack, Napoleon released Kellermann's corps and the light cavalry of the Guard. Was there any horse artillery? I can't find any references to its use at this point.
    All French cavalry divisions had attached Horse Artillery, even the attack by the Imperial Guard later in the day was accompanied by horse artillery which advanced between its columns. The main source of the unsupported cavalry myth, is actually based upon evidence from the British brigades deployed to the west of the spur overlooking the area the French refer to in their accounts as 'the valley'. I've walked this area of the battlefield and I'm not surprised to hear that the French guns had trouble reaching the crest of the ridge at this point. Its deceptively steep, in fact when we climbed it we needed to use our hands to support ourselves. I'm sure the horse artillery could have mounted it had they been allowed to do so without hinderance, but in fact, there is an area of dead ground at the foot of the slope which was being used by the French cavalry as a rallying area between attacks and was crammed with men and horses, plus the slope itself was rendered even more formidable by the piles of dead horses brought down by the grapeshot fired from Mercers battery. No French artillery was going to mount that slope, and so most did so to the east of the spur (presumably avoiding the sunken road, which was occupied by French skirmishers) and ended up facing the German and Dutch squares rather than the British. The only support the troops to the west of the spur had to deal with were the French skirmishers sent forward from Hougoumont.

    The other thing to bear in mind is the the main strength of the French cavalry attacks west of the spur followed the line of the valley rather than mounting the ridge directly and so this section of the line was under much less pressure than that between the spur and La Haye Sainte.
    Last edited by Didz; January 04, 2010 at 07:06 AM.

  20. #60

    Default Re: What if Napoleon won Waterloo and the battles after that...

    this has turned out to be a very vicious and bloody discussion. Most of whats going on here seems to be Britain-Bashing! Let me give you some simple and accurate points:

    -BRITISH MONEY was the only reason Austria, Russia, Portugal, Spain, Prussia and all the other countries stayed in the war afetr their numerous humiliating defeats.

    -Napoleon was turned back in Russia due to the Russian Winter, and his stretched and attacked supply lines failing, not so much the Russian army.

    -Wellesly was by all means not a mediocre commander, in fact only Boney himself could be suprerior. He beat all that was sent agianst him in India and in the Penninsula, was the only one who actually beat Napoleon, and he himself was NEVER DEFEATED.

    -British troops played the largest part in the Penninsula. Spanish troops were usually cowardly, ill-led, and turned up late, disorganised or not at all for battles. Nor were they grateful to the liberating British. There actually were Spanish atempts to make Britain pay tolls for the supplies and weapons they were shipping into spain. Britain supplied the Spanish troops with their much pay, supplies, powder and weapons. The Spanish guerillas achieved far more than the Spanish soldiers ever did, and they were given weapons and supplies by the British as well.
    Although the Portugeese troops were quite good after being trained by the British, they to were supplied by Britain, and British officers sometimes commanded them. So the British played a bigger part in the Penninsula then anyone else.

    -British troops were the best trained and equipped, and they could fire and reload their muskets faster than anyone else. British soldiers were the only ones that could defeat and break French column attacks, and they were the only ones that beat the old Guard.

    -British troops were usually outnumbered by the French, but still managed to beat them. Other nations armies outnumbered Napoleon, but were still completely beaten by him.

    -The Royal Navy.

    -Thus we can conclude that Gret Britain played the biggest part in defeating the French, and Napoleon could not have been beaten without the British.
    .


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