The Commanders of Military History - a Compilation

[Tacticalwithdrawal]

Hannibal lived entirely off the land. He ruined every area he entered,

So did Alexander and just about every army before or since. It is just a basic fact that an army marching through your land was at least on par with a plague of locusts, and the locusts wouldn't rape your women and steal your goods. For example, Wellington had to issue very specific orders to ensure his men didn't forage during the peninsular war, it was an accepted part of being in an army.

He was a kind conqueror.

Don't mistake intelligence for kindness, he was more than capable of being totally ruthless when he wanted to. Alexander was more than intelligent enough to realise that the only way to take and hold the Persian empire was to integrate with it, for example, he 'encouraged' his officers and men to marry local women (something they are on record as hating). It was a masterstroke and a major advance in diplomacy in those times.

-----------------------------------

Anyway, back more on topic - maneuvering of troops. Alexander was facing an idiot in Darius who did not use the basic advantages of the land to weaken Alexander's forces. Even as late as the run up to Guagamela Darius allowed Alexander to cross the Tigris unopposed (the same crossing where the Roman Emporer Julian had serious problems at). Darius also failed to carry out a scorched earth policy (which again caused julian real difficulties), allowing Alexander a leisurely march to the Tigris through very fertile lands. A good defensive general would have stopped Alexander, he would have failed the Wellington test. Hanibal was facing intelligent generals who would have pounced on a mistake.

Alexander's march was still a materpiece of logistics and planning, he went a long way with very few casualties. Hanibal, on the other hand lost 80% of his troops, which is pretty pathetic really. However, Hanibal then proved his worth by maneuvering in a very tight space and surviving, Alexander never had to do that (not to say he wouldn't have been able to, just that he didn't have to).

Genghis did both..........

Another factor against Alexander is the lack of reliable sources (we don't even know how he died). Alexander was a seriously good spin doctor when it came to his own legend. Even the great battles are contentious. For example, at Guagamela the huge dust cloud is only mentioned right at the end (as an excuse for Alexander not capturing Darius), but it must have been there throughout the whole battle. In that case, one of the reasons Alexander may have won is that he could better control a smaller army in poor visibility (particularly one with more professional troops and Captains) than Darius could control his whole unweildy and bloated army.

The control Alexander exerts over his legend is further illustrated by the end of the battle. I've already said that there is strong circumstantial evidence that the commander of Darius' right wing (Mazeus) had had previous contacts with Alexander. The history says that the only reason Alexander couldn't get Darius was that a messenger somehow managed to get from the left flank, through Darius' whole army and find Alexander (all in the middle of a dust cloud that reduced sight to a matter of feet at times) and tell him Parmenion needed his help. Pretty clever messenger to my mind.

An alternative scenario (that also fits the few known facts) is that Alexander couldn't find Darius (not surprising in the dust cloud and also because the masses of retreating persian cavalry in the way). Mazeus had engaged Parmenion but didn't fully commit due to his previous contacts. When Mazeus realised Darius had fled he too pulled back. Alexander, however, needed someone to blame for not getting Darius, and so invented the heroic radar guided messenger and could therefore say he had to rescue Parmenion. He also didn't mention his (to my mind brilliant) contacts with Mazeus as his legend would be lessened if you realise the right wing of Darius' army wasn't fully committed.

Doesn't take away Alexander's overall status, but does make you realise that he fits more closely into myth and legend than many might realise. Hanibal (although a lesser overall General to my mind) and Genghis are at least very well documented by enemies and neutrals, as well as themselves.

[conon394]

Tactical Withdrawl

he 'encouraged' his officers and men to marry local women (something they are on record as hating). It was a masterstroke and a major advance in diplomacy in those times.

How was it a masterstroke? The Policy undermined the loyalty of the Macedonians while doing little build any support amongst the Persians. The overwhelmingly negative picture of Alexander that is preserved in the Zoroastrian tradition is a good gauge of just how unsuccessful Alexander was at building Persian loyalty.

[Tacticalwithdrawal]

ok, maybe masterstroke was over-egging it a bit. All I was trying to show was that he understood that integration with the conqueredsubjects was the way to go, and that in turn gave them impression that he was a kind conqueror when in fact he was just a calculating conqueror.

[VandalCarthage]

I wouldn't even say he was calculating, just megalomaniacal. It did reconcile himself with Persians, as 30,000 of them arriving as regular troops in the West testifies, but this rapid ethnic class equalization disenfranchished his original supporters. How can a man claim to defend the autonomy of the Greeks, which was a major watchword in his diplomacy with the Greeks, while integrating an entire new ethnicity into what was a Greek styled empire? He might have been smart enough to realize that integration was essential for his empire's survival, but he was also stupid enough to think he could work it in not just within his lifetime - but within less then a decade of having created his empire.

[Tacticalwithdrawal]

well, if ou believe you are the son of Zeus (which he seems to have) then I suppose you believe anything is possible!

I don't think he ever had the intention of fighting for Greece, he always wanted the empire and the glory/legend he felt he deserved. The whole 'greek crusade' thing was just to keep his allies and key troops on board.

Very strange guy all in all, but extremely interesting.....

[Sidus Preclarum]

How much credit do monarchs merit in certain campaigns? Edward III and Henry V surely deserve all the credit.

actually, as far as their strategic talent goes, ie as far as their *campaigns* are concerned, their credit is VERY limited .
If the French hadn't each time sought to stupidly battle at Crecy/poitier/agincourt in order to proove their personal valour on the field, Edward III/the Black Prince/Henry's "chevauchee" would have been useless at best, a disaster at worst .If their tactics won the day once the battle was joined, it's the French stupidity that made their strategy succeed against all odds : all it would have taken to make them fail miserably, was to do ABSOLUTELY NOTHING. For the HYW, the most skilfull strategist is, undoutably, Du Guesclin.
nice list though.

[Freddie]

Henry V was one of best warrior kings Britain has ever had. It was his attics that lead to victory at Agincourt, against overwhelming odds. It also helped that the long bow was effective against the early plate armour that the French wore.

[Sidus Preclarum]

Good tactics, awful strategy .
Again, all it would have taken for the French for henry's expedition to end in disaster, was to do nothing .
To Henry's greatest luck, "doing nothing" was unacceptable to the French nobility's chivalric standards : on a Strategic pov, the French lost to themselves more than they lost to Henry .

[MaximiIian]

Becuse the frogs were stuck back in the age of chivalry and knights, and so was much of the continent at the time, not to say that they weren't modernising, though.
And the English/British/Whatever, were heading towards the more modernized technologies of the day: longbows, crossbows, large amounts of easily-trained soldiers in disciplined lines and rows, firing arrow after arrow after bolt after bolt into the French. At least, to my understanding.

[VandalCarthage]

And the English/British/Whatever, were heading towards the more modernized technologies of the day: longbows, crossbows, large amounts of easily-trained soldiers in disciplined lines and rows, firing arrow after arrow after bolt after bolt into the French. At least, to my understanding.

I've always understood that it was generally agreed upon that these developments were largely responsible for the success. I'd heard an old story that the French cut the thumbs and forefinger off of every Englishman they found to prevent them from fighting in such a fashion. Possibly romanticized, though indicative of the situation.

[avesta]

here is a good essay with many sources and details on the battle of Guagamela:

http://www.skidmore.edu/academics/cl.../ostrovsky.doc

[Spartan JKM]

Upon further review , I realize that Seleucus I Nicator and TacticalWithrawal are correct, in my opinion: I indeed understated Selecus I and William Slim. I have now placed them on TIER 2. I also added Memnon of Rhodes to TIER 3, as he was always supposed to be there.

One development that labels Alexander, for me, as a military genius is what he accomplished throughout his campaign in Bactria and Sogdiana. He faced and overcame unprecedented condistions of nature, vigorous nationalism from the locals. He succeeded where every would-be conqueror, from Cyrus the Great to the Soviets in 1979, failed. The hardships he imposed on his army finally took its toll, and they told him 'enough' after the Hydaspes, but he always attended their needs. His defeat of the intrepid Scythians at the Jaxartes was tremendous: he used catapults to bombard them as he forced the river after building about 12,000 rafts. Once on their side, he overwhelmed them with a calculated use of his weak cavalry, which he used to lure them in and encirle this unit, an infantry screen to obscure their vision as to what he had behind them, and charges of his heavier cavalry, who fell upon the Scythian flanks. The Scythinas were so impressed they apologized and submitted to him.

Sidas Priclarum, your argument regarding the English kings is credible and you are not alone with this assessment, but I like to give credit to the victor more so than discredit to an obtuse loser. At least in this situation. Edward III and Henry V were more than just Crecy and Agincourt. I love this chapter of history, so please forgive me if this is too long winded. Let's take a look:

This is just my view, and I can appreciate any debates.

The successes of Edward III and Henry V had no strategic far-reaching effect for the fact that their ambition outweighed their resources. France did ultimately have the better of it in the 100 Years War, and England began to develop as a seapower. FYI, I believe it was in 1707, in which the kingdoms of Scotland and England united (Union Act?), that the name 'Great Britain' became official. That might be worth looking into.

Bertrand Du Guesclin was the greatest French soldier of his time, and was surely a more prudent commander than the ones at Crecy and Agincourt. He would have undertook smarter marches with a more favorable position etc., but there is no guarantee he could have fared any better against the English in a battle, unless he refused to fight. That could be a long discussion.

Edward I was a terrific king, in terms of legal and parliamentary reforms. He put in place the tactics used by them, and the conditions which contributed to their success.

Edward, as Prince Edward fought for his father, Henry III, in the Second Barons' War. Against the able Simon V de Montfort, he commanded an army twice the size of de Montfort's. Having led his men out from the castle to meet the enemy, he gained early success, but foolishly pursued a retreating force, thus sacrificing the chance of overall victory. Meanwhile, de Montfort defeated the remainder of the royal army, led by the king's brother, and as a result Prince Edward's returning force was defeated and captured. he was relatively the same age as the subsequent kings. Montfort, a terrific commander, showed a sharp eye for the ground. Nevertheless, Edward, with a larger army that day, didn't seem to possess a raw ability to command, an attribute of all greats. He escaped and vastly improved his skills as a commander, gaining revenge on the Barons with superb strategy. But he had every advantage in manpower and strategic positionings, created because of the manpower edge. His cruelty and policy of vengeance was very impolitic, and prolonged all rebel resistance. He then destroyed the autonomous principality of Wales, as well as uprisings there. His strategy of building and fortifying castles at specific points was excellent, thus the hardy, fierce fighters of the hilly terrains became more limited.

Edward I ushered in the three centuries of bitter hatred and savage warfare that would ensued between Scotland and England. he did conquer Scotland by the end of the 13th century but, again, his cruelty (hardly a novelty in these times) fostered an uprising. I'm sure you know it - William Wallace's revolution. At Falkirk, the only battle in which he personally commanded (as king), he charged with his armored knights and was completely thrown back by Wallace's schiltrons (circles of spearmen). But he rained arrows, from longbows, down on the Scots, and cut gaps in their lines. Now he routed them with his mounted knights by exploiting the openings. He had been rash 33 years earlier against Montfort, and he seemingly displayed that impetuosity again here. Inexperience was no excuse. He won the battle; surely considerable, but I didn't see him as a great military commander. He certainly left some strategic lessons, that of his castle fortifications to subdue fierce, tribal peoples. This was actually a legacy of Charlemagne. Edward never subdued Scotland, despite continued campaigning, completely by his death in 1307. Edward III came closer.

Edward I took advantage of the longbow at Falkirk, but he never elaborated with the weapon to the degree Edward III did. Maybe he would have, though.

Edward III, after routing the Scots at Halidon Hill, was diverted to laying claim to France in around 1337, and invaded in 1340. This wasn't Wales or Scotland; he was invading a country that had more men, more money, and controlled the Channel. They would face Edward III on their own soil. In all practicality, and even by the laws of averages and physics, the English ought to have lost immediately. Yet some, including B.H. Liddell Hart, accuse the French knights of overconfidence. Mmmmm.

Edward III led an expedition to the Low Countries that was costly and abortive, and he smartly didn't hang around. But he crushed the French fleet at Sluys, who numbered some fifty more ships than Edward, wherein the longbow proved what he suspected. Edward III knew he held a tactical advantage which the French would not fully appreciate until it was too late. It was Edward III, not the I, who perfected the system of indenture (one working for another). Edward I introduced the system, but I am more impressed by one who elaborates and showcases the potential introduced by a precursor. Thus, the army became professionals, and he recruited them based on talent with arms rather than levying from the masses. Edward I indeed, basically, showed the potential efficacy of the longbow. Edward III required by law for the longbowmen to practice every weekend (football was even banned!), thus he proved that very efficiency on a much higher scale. He would have a vast pool of talent to draw from, and local recruiting meant solid cohesion.

After the sound naval victory at Sluys, Edward III arrived in Normandy 15,000 men, and he immediately launched an effective but brutal chevauchee (scorched-earth policy). His intent was to spread terror and tremble the locals. It worked. Nothing was ill-conceived about any of this. He set up his defensive position across the River Somme and destroyed the French mounted knights at Crecy. He was outnumbered almost two to one (some records say more, but I'll be conservative). The French were indeed of poorer quality and taken by surprise by this new innovation, almost a 'machine gun' of Medieval times, but Edward III's troop dispositions and built-up strategy since he left England five years earlier was indivicative of a supreme military commander. His subsequent capture of Calais secured an invaluable strategic stronghold, which would remain in English hands until the 1580s (?) (I'll look that up; I'm not sure).

The economic problems thereafter were a result, basically, of the Black Death. No significant gains by the end of Edward III's reign was due in large part the decimation of the populations caused by this horrible plague. This terrible epidemic possibly halved the number of people in Europe, and resulted in major economic and social upheavals.

The Black Death was also a major factor in prevented the forwarding of English hegemony into the French interior. This extended his problem of want of money. Nothing he did militarily was desultory whatsover. He was a brilliant warrior-king, but it is because the longbow was such an advantage I didn't place him on TIER 1. The same applies to the other famous and, in my opinion, great, chivalric monarch of this age: Henry V.

In my opinion, there was nothing ill-conceived about Henry V's campaign, either. Contrarily, his planning and execution of the Agincourt campaign reveals him to be an outstanding miltary leader. He invaded France for several reasons. These reasons would probably have been that a popular foreign war, which he was guaranteed this would be, would strengthen his position at home, where civil strife was brewing. The other was he could improve his financial situation, something not ameliorated since Edward III a half century earlier. Despite the outbreak of dysentary, he still captured Harfleur. He then systematically and swiftly reduced the fortresses of northern France. By using garrisoning these fortresses, his soldiers could administer and enforce the collection of taxes etc. Thus, the war would pay for itself. It worked, though it took longer than he expected. The French, who had been following a Fabian strategy implemented by the late, able Bertrand du Guesclin, astutely blocked Henry's path of crossing the Somme (Henry wasn't planning to fight yet). They elected not to continue the attritional policy. I think Hart says this was a 'lucky' escape for Henry? I disagree, as do others in his class, but to each his own, eh? Henry had to fight. He didn't plan on this in the manner Edward III had. The French outnumbered him by possibly a margin of more than three to one (propaganda considered). Henry, exploiting the terrian and conditions hampered by rain, disposed his troops very sagaciously, and the stubborn, confident, and proud French knights were crushed again. Yes, Agincourt was similar to Crecy (except for the mud), and my first inclination would be to ask how in the heck did the French not learn from the debacle 69 years earlier. Well, my guess is the same as almost everyone else's - the 'Mad King' Charles VI was a poor commander (maybe worse), but they could have easily considered Crecy an abberation and this time, with even a larger numerical advantage than their predecessors at Crecy, they wouldn't lose. Remember, criticism always, obviously, comes via retrospect. I think it was a remarkable win. How much can an advantage be with the advantaged on foreign soil and outnumbered so heavily. The longbow required great skill and training to master. Only a terrrific leader, such as these two kings, can implement it into his army and utilize it to be the decisive weapon. But it wasn't a howitzer. But, as with Edward III, the availed longbow keeps Henry V off TIER 1.

Henry subsequently captured every city he besieged, incuding Caen and Rouen. He made the best of the rapidly evolving artillery at this time, In around 1420, he imposed a treaty (I forget - Torres ?) upon France. He showed just about every quality a great commander has. Henry V died at the age of 34 while furthuring his position against more French opposition. He had achieved all his campaign goals. His premature death didn't allow for his country's hoped prosperity and peace to germinate. His successor, Henry VI was unstable and weak. I am also quite aware that Agincourt has been greatly romanticized by William Shakespeare. That influence can be discarded when debating the objective history (as best we can judge) of this period.

The campaigns of these two did not stand the test of time. But they hardly merit all the blame. Food for thought.

Thanks, Spartan JKM :original:

[Arcaliea]

Tactical Withdrawal falls into the common flaw of historical analysis: faced with a wealth of conflicting and not altogether absolutely reliable evidences on Alexander, he chooses, unconsciously, an arbitrary selection that agrees with his final analysis. Like Plutarch, this is simply an artificial creation of a coherent analysis on Alexander: good but not great. For example, Alexander COULD have had contact with Mazaeus. Or he might not have. Just because it is possible, doesn't mean that it's plausible. (hm. or is that the other way round?) Now, on a number of other points: Darius was not an idiot (give me REASONS why he was, why don't you? Oh, he did oppose Alexander's crossings, by the way. It's also sort of hard to cover 4 crossings simultaneously.).

Your argument on the dust cloud is flawed. It is mentioned throughout the battle that the dust-cloud obscured everyone's view, including Alexander, who could make no on-spot decisions for any unit of his army other than the hetairoi's, except by rough estimate. Also, the dust cloud would have intensified as the battle progressed.

What else? Yes, Alexander did have to maneuvre his army in very tricky places, like the obscure hill path to capture the Persepolis Gate (gah. forgot the actual name), the maneuvering prior to Issus, the rushing down to Greece at the beginning of his reign, his parade-maneuvres and everything around that time in Illyria, the march up to Aornos, the navigation at Hydaspes, etc. Alexander had lots of difficult tasks.

Basically, be careful about dismissing the accepted version as a unified, glorified legend: it is more complex than the level up to which you have concerned yourself with, and you ignore facts and theories to triumph ones that support your belief - a basic failing of moralistic historians, we note.

[Tacticalwithdrawal]

Tactical Withdrawal falls into the common flaw of historical analysis: faced with a wealth of conflicting and not altogether absolutely reliable evidences on Alexander, he chooses, unconsciously, an arbitrary selection that agrees with his final analysis.

Another, equally valid, way of looking at it is that I am open to all interpretations of the little 'evidence' we have on Alexander and am willing to question the established view. Why is your interpretation of the few facts any more valid than mine? Neither of us were there and there are no documents that exist from that time, in fact even the books by authors that copied directly from his contemporaries' books do not exist. There is no reliable evidence for Alexander, just suposition.

The whole point of being a historian (even an amateur one) is keeping an open mind and realising that what was written down as 'fact' was often done so to make the winner look better or to support his viewpoint/justify his actions. Not to blindly follow the accepted path.

Alexander is fasintating not just because he did what he did, but also because there are no facts about him (at least not beyond the 'Alexander was here' level). It is all open territory for us to discuss, argue and counter-argue, without having to worry about those tricky facts

However, if you accept there must be some truth there somewhere (if only by taking the consensus), then;

For example, Alexander COULD have had contact with Mazaeus. Or he might not have. Just because it is possible, doesn't mean that it's plausible.

Agreed, however it opens up an intriguing side of Alexander's brilliance if it did happen, shows how he was willing to use diplomacy to help win his battles and that he understood how to use every method possible to reduce Darius' advantage of numbers. It would also explain why Mazeus' command singularly failed to destroy the much, much smaller command of Parmenion (and Mazeus was acknowledged to be a good general).

Basically, you can't have it both ways, either Parmenion faught brilliantly and beat of Mazeus (in which case why did he need the radar equiped messenger to Alexander for help), or Mazeus held back to see where his interest lay. Either way, Mazeus withdrew his command pretty much intact, retreated to Babylon where he amazingly became Alexander's satrap of the city. It would explain a lot about the battle and, as I have consistantly said, would paint Alexander in an even better light if he had managed to pull something like that off.

he did oppose Alexander's crossings, by the way

He didn't, Alexander crossed the Tigris totaly unaposed. Darius knew exactly where Alexander was (Alexander even captured some of his scouts) but did not choose to oppose him at the crossing. And this was after Alexander had spent a very leisurly 5-7 weeks marching to the Tigris (something he could have done in 2 weeks). Only after Alexander had crossed (several days after) did a small force of cavalry turn up. You maybe can excuse Darius because he had such a huge army and was feeling confident, but he could have easily defeated Alexander by using tried and tested method of scorched earth policy to starve his army, followed by using natural advantages (as happened to Julian 700 years later). Darius did neither. However, that doesn't take away from Alexander's brilliance, as SpartanJKM has said about Henry V, the fact that your enemy are stupid enough to fall in with your plans is not your fault. It is a sign of brilliance that you can use their stupidity against them effectively.

Basically, be careful about dismissing the accepted version as a unified, glorified legend: it is more complex than the level up to which you have concerned yourself with, and you ignore facts and theories to triumph ones that support your belief - a basic failing of moralistic historians, we note.

Please don't patronise me, you have no way of knowing what the level of my knowledge on this subject is so don't lower yourself to trying to rubbish my views by labeling them. We are not in Acedemia here

Please do challenge them and argue against them, the free and frank exchange of opinions is what makes history so much fun.

[Ummon]

Tactical Withdrawal falls into the common flaw of historical analysis: faced with a wealth of conflicting and not altogether absolutely reliable evidences on Alexander, he chooses, unconsciously, an arbitrary selection that agrees with his final analysis. Like Plutarch, this is simply an artificial creation of a coherent analysis on Alexander: good but not great. For example, Alexander COULD have had contact with Mazaeus. Or he might not have. Just because it is possible, doesn't mean that it's plausible. (hm. or is that the other way round?) Now, on a number of other points: Darius was not an idiot (give me REASONS why he was, why don't you? Oh, he did oppose Alexander's crossings, by the way. It's also sort of hard to cover 4 crossings simultaneously.).

Your argument on the dust cloud is flawed. It is mentioned throughout the battle that the dust-cloud obscured everyone's view, including Alexander, who could make no on-spot decisions for any unit of his army other than the hetairoi's, except by rough estimate. Also, the dust cloud would have intensified as the battle progressed.

What else? Yes, Alexander did have to maneuvre his army in very tricky places, like the obscure hill path to capture the Persepolis Gate (gah. forgot the actual name), the maneuvering prior to Issus, the rushing down to Greece at the beginning of his reign, his parade-maneuvres and everything around that time in Illyria, the march up to Aornos, the navigation at Hydaspes, etc. Alexander had lots of difficult tasks.

Basically, be careful about dismissing the accepted version as a unified, glorified legend: it is more complex than the level up to which you have concerned yourself with, and you ignore facts and theories to triumph ones that support your belief - a basic failing of moralistic historians, we note.

My thought on this post is: huh? Deep, ain't it.

We should respect Alexander's legend more than evidence? I don't think so. Apart from the dust cloud argument, most of what you state is arbitrary. Alexander faced an inept opponent: this is clear to many historians, even supporters of Alexander.

[Sidus Preclarum]

Becuse the frogs were stuck back in the age of chivalry and knights, and so was much of the continent at the time, not to say that they weren't modernising, though.
And the English/British/Whatever, were heading towards the more modernized technologies of the day: longbows, crossbows, large amounts of easily-trained soldiers in disciplined lines and rows, firing arrow after arrow after bolt after bolt into the French. At least, to my understanding.

tactical inovation, and I agree they were major factor for all 3 of their most well-known tactical victories: Crecy, Poitier, Agincourt (I don't know Cravant well, so I can't tell what led to that particular victory) (btw, by the end of the war, the situation was reversed: France had not only standing corps of longbowmen, but also standing corps of *disciplined* heavy cavalry, and the biggest and most modern artillery train -field and siege- of the whole Europe ...)
But again, that those victories led to the strategical quasi-collapse of France was almost accidental: per se, the campaign, or mrope accurately "chevauchees" that lead to those victory cannot be even said to be the result of bad strategy, they were entirely *devoid* of strategical purpose.

Bertrand Du Guesclin was the greatest French soldier of his time, and was surely a more prudent commander than the ones at Crecy and Agincourt. He would have undertook smarter marches with a more favorable position etc., but there is no guarantee he could have fared any better against the English in a battle, unless he refused to fight.

that is excacly why Liddel Hart _ I and wholehearteadly agree with him_ considers him to be the best strategist of the HYW.

*edit* I agree about Slim btw : one of the most overlooked commanders of WWII

[Tacticalwithdrawal]

Upon further review , I realize that Seleucus I Nicator and TacticalWithrawal are correct, in my opinion: I indeed understated Selecus I and William Slim. I placed them on TIER 2.

Thanks, this topic has made me go back and look at his campaign again, truly amazing piece of generalship.

I believe it was in 1707, in which the kingdoms of Scotland and England united (Union Act?), that the name 'Great Britain' became official.

yup, act of union (the parlaiments of England and Scotland) was 1707, union of the crowns (ie. one king for both) was 1603. Great Britain was used as a term occasionally before that. (Wales and England somewhere around late 1530's. )

In my opinion, there was nothing ill-conceived about Henry V's campaign, either. Contrarily, his planning and execution of the Agincourt campaign reveals him to be an outstanding miltary leader.

It's not a time I know more than the headline details about by I always understood that the march North was a disaster and he only escaped by the skin of his teeth (ie. good use of longbows and the suicidal over-confidence of the French knights). I seem to remember his army nearly starved to death and/or died of disease? (by the by, not challenging, just interested )

his subsequent capture of Calais secured an invaluable strategic stronghold, which would remain in English hands until the 1580s

Calais was recaptured by the French (Francis Duke of Guise I think) in 1558, basically because the English hadn't kept the fortifications in a good condition. Mary I always said if you looked at her heart you would see Calais inscribed on it.

[VandalCarthage]

You maybe can excuse Darius because he had such a huge army and was feeling confident, but he could have easily defeated Alexander by using tried and tested method of scorched earth policy to starve his army, followed by using natural advantages (as happened to Julian 700 years later).

Yes, but do we fault Darius for not taking advantage of the situation, or Alexander for not anticipating and taking action to prevet it? Alexander was fortunate he didn't, but I personally (I stress personally) believe that he acted boldly out of personal megalomania and self-assurance, rather then out of an intelligently informed expectation that he would not suffer such an attack.

Upon further review , I realize that Seleucus I Nicator and TacticalWithrawal are correct, in my opinion: I indeed understated Selecus I and William Slim. I placed them on TIER 2.

Seleucus is oten seemingly under-credited as a general, but even more so as a leader in my opinion. Despite having to flee his original province with no more then 50 companions, and returning with only a token force lent him by Ptolemy, his province rose up in favor of him. That this was the response to the arrival of a former governor and no more then a thousand soldiers, which speaks highly of his conduct before Antigonid's betrayel; just as many cities outside of Babylon went over to him voluntarily afterwards/

If Ptolemy Keraunos hadn't killed him, I believe he would have swiftly brought Alexander's empire back together.

[Shawkhan]

...Darius' army was huge for the same reason that a cat arches its back, a dog raises its hackles or a blowfish swells up. The size was simply for intimidation purposes. The number of well-trained, well-armed troops he had available really didn't outnumber Alexander's army much at all at Gaugamela. Once the sheer spectacle of his army's size failed to dissuade Alexander from attacking, Darius was done.

[avesta]

...Darius' army was huge for the same reason that a cat arches its back, a dog raises its hackles or a blowfish swells up. The size was simply for intimidation purposes. The number of well-trained, well-armed troops he had available really didn't outnumber Alexander's army much at all at Gaugamela. Once the sheer spectacle of his army's size failed to dissuade Alexander from attacking, Darius was done.

that's a good point. Many Persian conquests were battle-free, the sheer size of their army would often intimidate their opponents into surrending before any swords or spears were drawn. Alexander and his army decided to be hardcore and fight them.