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Thread: The better general : Pyrrhus vs Hannibal and Alexander

  1. #561

    Default Re: The better general : Pyrrhus vs Hannibal and Alexander

    You'll find in the text everything necessary to picture what happened. Essentially, he was trapped.
    He scared away the men of the neighbouring king who came along and blocked the passes using an unconventional method.

  2. #562

    Default Re: The better general : Pyrrhus vs Hannibal and Alexander

    Quote Originally Posted by CatoTheYounger View Post
    I never knew about Alexabder and any of his dealing with the Romans. Thats juicy info. They might have actualy become allies?. ha what a thought. How long it would lasted is another thing.

    Yes, remarkable isn't it? In fact, Rome was probably worried by Alexander, because in the last stage of Alexander's life they sent ambassadors to Babylon, probably to congratulate him.

  3. #563

    Default Re: The better general : Pyrrhus vs Hannibal and Alexander

    I feel so tired debating his feats (there's really nothing to debate - he arguably remains the most fascinating leader, I think there's more books on him than on his rivals), I thought we'd turn a new leaf on a more recreational note...

    Enjoy!

    Here's some interesting trivia about Alexander:

    - they say he had a high complexion and a harsh voice.

    -His neck was in some way twisted, so that he appeared to be gazing upward at an angle.

    - some say Alexander was short by Macedonian standards but he’s stocky and tough.

    -Alexander had a great desire for knowledge, a love for philosophy and was an avid reader.

    -He had great charisma and force of personality

    - he had a dog named Peritas - I think it was a mastiff.

    -Pompey, Julius Caesar and Augustus all visited the tomb whilst in Alexandria.

    -Alexander liked drama, the flute and the lyre, poetry and hunting.

    -Alexander, when merely a boy (!) tamed Bucephalus (a horse that refused to be mounted by anyone) by turning it towards the sun because he detected that it was afraid of its own shadow.

    - It was Alexander's men who introduced bananas, cotton, and sugar to Europe. Also, the Alexandrine parakeet.
    Wow! What are the chances of a certain breed of parakeets being called Alexandrine, ha ha!! ;-)

    - The roman emperor Caracalla organized a macedonian phalanx.

    - To modern field-marshals Alexander's army has always seemed the most enviable force in history.
    Last edited by Pothos; October 20, 2012 at 01:13 PM.

  4. #564

    Default Re: The better general : Pyrrhus vs Hannibal and Alexander

    Ill give him a look. I usualy don't focus on conquerers but in his case his diversity of battles and strategies are interesting.

  5. #565
    |Sith|Galvanized Iron's Avatar Protector Domesticus
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    Default Re: The better general : Pyrrhus vs Hannibal and Alexander

    Well in all fairness, none of these gentlemen would be able to bring down an empire without the help of an army, therefore the greatest general is the man who could conquer an empire with a box of matches, a rubber band, a chewing gum, some steel wire and a paper clip: General Angus MacGyver!

    Last edited by |Sith|Galvanized Iron; October 23, 2012 at 05:21 PM.
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  6. #566

    Default Re: The better general : Pyrrhus vs Hannibal and Alexander

    Ha ha!

    I love Macgyver...

  7. #567
    St. Imperator's Avatar Civis
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    Default Re: The better general : Pyrrhus vs Hannibal and Alexander

    "Another such victory and I will be undone..." Pyrrhus never lost a battle against the Roman's, but he took horrendous causalities after each victory. While winning is one thing, and a great thing, by taking huge amounts of causalities you make the actual victory itself look very pointless.

    "Hannibal knew how to gain a victory, but not how to use it." Unlike Pyrrhus, Hannibal had devastating victories against the Roman's. He beat the Roman's so thoroughly in a single battle, that even to date, the modern world still has a model of this victory in question. The problem with Hannibal is, he didn't know how to use it. I'd say that's his only flaw as a commander.

    Alexander is a bit different than these two. He died at a relatively young age, but never suffered a military defeat, and had an empire that stretched to western India. Had he not died at thirty-three, I think he'd have been more important than Pyrrhus and Hannibal.

  8. #568
    Rex Basiliscus's Avatar Senator
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    Default Re: The better general : Pyrrhus vs Hannibal and Alexander

    Quote Originally Posted by St. Imperator View Post
    Alexander is a bit different than these two. He died at a relatively young age, but never suffered a military defeat, and had an empire that stretched to western India. Had he not died at thirty-three, I think he'd have been more important than Pyrrhus and Hannibal.
    I think he is more important than both of them.

  9. #569

    Default Re: The better general : Pyrrhus vs Hannibal and Alexander

    It really does confuse me how one could say Alexander faced tougher opposition than Hannibal. It took Darius two years to gather his army for Gaugamela, two years which left Alexander free to conquer coastal towns and cities - a luxury Hannibal never had - due to geography and political situation, Hannibal faced a much tougher opposition that could gather armies quickly and in large numbers. Alexander never had to deal with a strategy involving dozens of enemy armies marching to dozens of strategic places.

    People often suggest Hannibal was a poor strategist, because he remained in Italy whilst Spain and Africa were invaded, yet fail to realise just what Hannibal was doing on the Italian Peninsular, and what Hannibal was up against compared to the Romans in other quarters.

    You can read about Rome in Spain before Scipio Africanus arrived in my blogs here:

    http://www.historum.com/blogs/markdi...bal-barca.html

    http://www.historum.com/blogs/markdi...ago-barca.html

    Which clearly reveals the differences and variables in the campaigns.

    When you're in other theaters, you need to rely on your other generals. Scipio and the Republic were better suited for war, and he had the backup of an extremely competent veritable war cabinet that made few mistakes after the first few years, whereas everything Carthage did other than Hannibal was slow and labored. Even after four victories over the Romans and Italians (at Ticinus, Victumulae, Trebia and Trasimene) not one single ally on the Italian Peninsular joined Hannibal. The culture of the tribes in Spain dictated how they would react to such victories, and the Carthaginians lost most of their allies after a few victories by Scipio. Hannibal had no such luck, and had to continue to support himself for three years without a home base which speaks volumes on his abilities as a general. Sadly, all the other forces and commanders for Carthage were poor. In the words of Adrian Goldsworthy:

    It is difficult to see what more Hannibal could have done to attain victory. We can never know how close the Romans came to conceding defeat. Perhaps a march on Rome after Cannae would have broken the Roman's nerve, but we cannot be sure of this and such a move would have been a great gamble. One major problem for the Carthaginians was that they had one superb commander with an excellent army, whilst elsewhere they had poor commanders with average armies or average commanders with poor armies. From the beginning the Romans were able to produce in considerable quantity armies which were average in quality and the skill of their commanders, giving them an advantage over all but Hannibal. As the war progressed and Roman leaders and soldiers gained experience, their superiority over the other Punic armies became even more marked.
    The Fall of Carthage by Adrian Goldsworthy, p.314

    Roman armies were more homogenous than the various mixed nationalities of Carthaginian ones, hence the command structure would have been a lot better. Hannibal and his officers had a wonderful relationship with the soldiers, with great organization and discipline which is what made his army excellent.

    Perhaps he overestimated the abilities of his generals like his brother Hasdrubal, but then perhaps he had no choice and a Barcid family member had to remain in charge to retain the loyalty of the tribes. Hasdrubal Gisgo was determined but ultimately useless and probably only there as a political ally and had no choice but to appoint him as a general! I mean, there was only a certain area that could have been of any use in a campaigning season. Had Carthage generals in Spain not engaged in a direct battle, Scipio would have found it very hard going trying to get into the interior of Spain - with little food and would have been forced to remain on the coast to acquire supplies. But nope, their general strategy there was to be away from the key city of the region which was garrisoned by only 1000 men (New Carthage) and to be no where near the Roman enemy. I could understand them being split to relieve logistical considerations... but the generals in Spain really didn't help much. A letter written by Scipio Africanus himself to Philip of Macedon on the capture of New Carthage even revealed that the three generals in Spain were at loggerheads, and practically hated each other, which did not help the Carthaginian strategy in Spain at all. Hannibal prevented the invasion of Africa, which was a good start. However, I believe it may have been a mistake to have left the Scipio's access to march onto Spain - but perhaps he had hoped they would follow him to Italy or that his brother with the resources at hand would beat them... Sicily was subdued due to general misfortune of the Carthaginian army there dying from an epidemic (not in Hannibal's control). Plus, it was also betrayed by a small faction of discontents within the city (also not in Hannibal's control). There was also the betrayal of one of Hannibal's officers who was an integral part of winning over the island in Muttines, who fell out with the Carthaginian officers in Sicily due to his successes. The betrayal of such important officers in the Roman army would be unthinkable. Large parts of Sicily, particularly after Marcellus' grim tactics seemed to mainly side with Carthage. Sadly once the army was decimated by disease and Syracuse in the hands of the Romans, there was little Carthage could do.

    Hannibal's strategy was the only one available, and he was correct in bringing the war to Italy, it was the only way to win. What other options was there? The war wouldn't be won simply fighting in Spain. Had he stayed in Spain, both Africa and Spain were targets for invasion (which we know from the sources) and which Hannibal prepared for, and we know how well other Carthaginian generals did, and it may not change the outcome of the war. Staying in Spain and Africa would not be striking at Rome, and the only way to do it was by invading. In fact, Lazenby has suggested it was the idea of a long drawn out war on their doorstep which would eventually bring the Roman's to negotiate, with his Generals in Spain told to hold the line and not let the Romans in (which they sort of did for some years!) Had he stayed and beaten Roman armies in Spain or Africa, the only thing that would achieve would be a momentary peace, and who knew how long that would last? The other option is not going to war, but then that's taking the statement that Hannibal alone was responsible for it at face value, and I for one (not to mention Polybius), believe the Romans were pretty much opportunistic in their dealings with the Marmetines to start the first war, their capture of Sardinia, and they certainly played their part in starting the second. In fact it's quite possible that Rome made a treaty with Saguntum to escalate the trouble into conflict, one in which no Roman believed would be fought in Italy.

    Strategically speaking it was a great design, and as late as 209 BC Italy was still in trouble with 12 of the thirty Latin colonies refusing to supply troops, whilst according to Livy many other allies were equally disgruntled. Hannibal sadly wasn't backed up by decent generals, pretty much every other pitched battle fought in the war was a Carthaginian loss regardless of say facing Scipio Africanus. In fact, had a few things favoured Carthage it may have helped aid Hannibal's strategy, but he can't be blamed for the loss of Sicily (he had chosen two great agents which had convinced Syracuse to join Hannibal) for the army there was decimated by an epidemic - whilst the Battle of Dertosa in 215 BC won by the Scipio brothers against Hasdrubal Barca's army he was bringing to Italy really dealt Hannibal's efforts a terrible blow. Not only did he lose a large contingent of men coming to support him from Spain, but massive reinforcements from Africa were sent to replace those men lost to the Scipios to defend Spain.

    Essentially, this victory prevented Carthage using up to four armies in Italy. Hasdrubal in the north would have applied pressure on the allies there, while Hannibal would have had new troops to defend his allies better while allowing him to take back the initiative lost due to not being able to be in two or more places at once, while Spain would have been fairly secure as the Romans may well have been concerned with the large Carthaginian forces in Italy.

    At such a critical time, with Rome on the back foot after Cannae, this could well have been what Hannibal needed to win the war... but of course, some things were not in Hannibal's control.Yes, Carthage lost, and some of the blame falls squarly on Hannibal's shoulders, but his strategy was a sound one.

    To be honest, if he was a poor strategist, the war wouldn't have lasted the better part of two decades. That it was a failure there is no doubt, but in the words of Lazenby:

    but when after seven years a strategy has resulted in the defection of the two largest cities in the enemy's country, after the capital itself, along with over 40% percent of her allies, and when the enemy army has been comprehensibly defeated three times, on the last occasion perhaps suffering worse casualties, in a single day of fighting, than any other army in European history, it can hardly be regarded as a 'complete failure'. (Was Maharbal Right?, p.47 in The Second Punic War A Reappraisal, ed Cornell)

    He continued to win field victories also

    In 212 BC came First Herdonia, which, if historical - and it is difficult to account for the charge of perduellio allegedly brought against the Roman commander, if it is not - cost the Romans 16,000 casualties. In 210 came Second Herdonia, which cost the Roman commander and eleven of his twelve military tribunes their lives, as well as those of either 13,000 or 7000 of their men. Also in 210 came Numistro, which Livy regards as a Roman victory but Frontinus as a defeat. In 209 Marcellus was twice defeated in Canusium, and, finally, in 208 although it was of no ultimate importance, both consuls, Marcellus and Crispinus, recieved mortal wounds in an ambush. (The Second Punic War A Reappraisal, ed Cornell, John Lazeny, Was Maharbal Right?, p.46) That's not to mention his swift movements to defeat other armies though admittedly smaller ones of about a legion on several occasions, and the battle of Silarus river where he destroyed a fuirther Roman force of 15,000 men. Not only did 12 of 30 Latin colonies no longer had the men and goods to supply Rome, but other areas like Etruria were wavering and required swift action from the senate to take hostages from the major city there.

    Rome was suffering badly, but had the armies and commanders to send to other theaters who were above the skill of the armies and commanders of Carthage, all but Hannibal and his excellent army, and we know Hannibal could not be everywhere at once. What doomed Carthage was the fortunes of war, not Hannibal's strategy, which was really the only viable one for victory and one in which he may have came agonizingly close to succeeding. People seem to think Scipio's campaigns were near perfect, but on closer inspection, he also made plenty of errors, errors which weren't punished by the slow reactions of the Carthaginians. Had the Carthaginian navy not dallied by waiting a whole day in a bay after leaving Carthage to attack Scipio's fleet which had been converted to siege engines thus were incapable of fighting a naval action he would have been in dire straights, but their slowness allowed Scipio time to return and save his fleet and campaign. Scipio also failed to capture cities in Africa, spending two years and many failed attempts trying to capture Utica (there he didn't have the information of a weakness in defense or a small garrison to contend with like his success at New Carthage - which goes to show how difficult assaulting and capturing cities really was).




    Had Hannibal faced a state whose control of the country was like Carthage in Spain, Hannibal would have won. Italy was a much tougher nut to crack than Spain and Africa. As I mentioned above, Hannibal broke away over 40 percent of Rome's allies within seven years of campaigning, but that wasn't enough and those that joined him did not coordinate operations with him, striking out on their own, only asking Hannibal for help when they messed up ... clearly they faced very different challenges, local conditions and military responses and I'm surprised people ignore this and claim Scipio is a better strategist, and Alexander for that matter.


    Scipio was a superb commander - I'm just saying it wasn't quite like attacking Rome and her allies. Carthage's position in Spain was always tenuous and certainly less solid than the relationship Rome had with lots of her allies (something Rome would find out afterwards - it would take nearly two-hundred years to subdue it), even during the siege of Saguntum Hannibal had to leave Maharbal in charge to go deal with the Tagus barbarians, and throughout the campaigns one reason why the armies were spread out was the fact that they were trying to sort out massive uprisings amongst the Spanish. They simply didn't have the manpower to contend with that and the legions like the Romans did in Italy. Even their most important ally Syphax was contemplating joining Rome before Rome had invaded Africa... which reveals how tenuous their relationship was with even the closest of allies. The armies he faced in Spain and Africa were worse than anything Hannibal faced in Italy whose general's and armies proved to be defeated by Roman armies led by any Roman commander (not just Scipio). I recall old DIVIUS referring to them as scarecrows in an old post, and as for Zama, Scipio clearly had the advantage in cavalry, and had a better organized and disciplined infantry than the low morale and disparate armies that made up Hannibal's, and even then it was a close run thing thanks to the core troops Hannibal brought back from his Italian army which probably numbered as few as 12,000 men and his tactics to exhaust Scipio's infantry.


    Right from the beginning of the war invasion of both Spain and Africa was on the cards - Scipio's father and uncle were sent and kept in Spain to do exactly this - and spent many years garnering Spanish support and causing trouble amongst those tribes still allied to Carthage, and beating Carthaginian armies. The Senate's handling of the war was superb, and from 211 onwards, it is hard to find much fault with anything they did. Scipio's invasion of Africa is often credited to Scipio's strategic genius... but it was, ultimately sanctioned by the Senate and was no more than a reversion to the strategy originally adopted by that body in 218. People forget to that Scipio arrived years into the war, when his father and uncle had already operated with a lot of success (despite their recent deaths) had had turned many tribes against Carthage, whilst Carthaginian armies had suffered many defeats. Scipio's victories were great but broke the camels back and came at a time when Spanish resistance was lower than that of Rome's allies. People mention New Carthage in terms of Scipio's siege superiority, yet they fail to realise that he had knowledge of a defensive weakness, the place was poorly defended, and he had a navy to aid with the capture. Once captured, Carthage lost many political prisoners and money and supplies – there was no such vital place in Italy for Hannibal to capture that was so poorly defended.



    Between Scipio and Hannibal:


    As strategists too, both men were clear-sighted and bold, but it is astonishing that anyone should rate Scipio higher in this respect, for although his strategy in Spain was skillful and successful, the problems he faced there were as nothing compared to the problems Hannibal had to face in Italy: Scipio' task, essentially, was to defeat the forces of an alien power, and he could rely on the actual or potential support of most of the indigenous population, once he had won some successes. But Hannibal not only had to contend with the immense manpower resources of the Roman commonwealth itself, but had to win over a population all of which had been under Roman control for some two generations, and much of which no longer regarded the Romans as alien in the sense that he and his soldiers were. As for Scipio's invasion of Africa, it appears obvious and pedestrian compared to Hannibal's breathtaking boldness in invading Italy: the Roman's had, after all, already invaded Africa during the First Punic War, and it had been their original plan in 218, as Polybius makes clear (3.40.2), but no one, least of all the Romans, had imagined that the war could be carried into Italy. Scipio's slowness in implementing his plan is also in marked contrast to Hannibal's speed: assuming that Scipio eventually landed in Africa in the late spring or early summer of 204, he had already been planning the invasion for over a year, and it took him nearly another year even to break out of his original bridgehead to win the battle of the Great plains, whereas within just over two years of his departure from Cartagena, Hannibal had marched thousands of kilometres, to carry the war into the heart of enemy territory, had shattered three Roman armies, and was on the point of overrunning much of Southern Italy. Again, the success of Scipio's strategy in Spain and Africa as compared to the ultimate failure of Hannibal's in Italy, is not the only criterion one should adopt in assessing their relative merits as strategists: no other strategy could have brought Carthage as near success, and it is this that is the measure of Hannibal's quality, not his ultimate failure.
    Nothing, finally, Scipio ever did can compare with Hannibal's ability to maintain himself in a hostile land for fifteen years, faced with overwhelming resources in manpower. (Hannibal's War, pp.226-7)


    Now this can of course, relate to the current discussion. Hannibal was a great general - far better than Pyrrhus, and perhaps just as talented as Alexander. One thing is clear to me though, Hannibal faced tougher opposition in an enemy that was, for the most part, politically united, who had the materials and manpower and put up better resistance than any of Alexander's opponents. For Alexander, I'm very impressed by his energetic leadership (Hydaspes is simply stunning on a tactical level - probably the most impressive ancient battle tactically), but really, they faced very different things - Hannibal himself proved quite capable at dealing with tribal groups used to guerrilla warfare throughout his wars in Spain and Italy, such as Alexander often faced.
    Last edited by HannibalB; February 28, 2013 at 05:10 AM.
    "Hannibal was like a boxer faced by a heavier opponent; he feinted, weaved and dodged, and kept out of range - but his punch was devastating when he saw the chance."

    -Professor John F. Lazenby


  10. #570

    Default Re: The better general : Pyrrhus vs Hannibal and Alexander

    Quote Originally Posted by St. Imperator View Post
    "Another such victory and I will be undone..." Pyrrhus never lost a battle against the Roman's, but he took horrendous causalities after each victory. While winning is one thing, and a great thing, by taking huge amounts of causalities you make the actual victory itself look very pointless.

    "Hannibal knew how to gain a victory, but not how to use it." Unlike Pyrrhus, Hannibal had devastating victories against the Roman's. He beat the Roman's so thoroughly in a single battle, that even to date, the modern world still has a model of this victory in question. The problem with Hannibal is, he didn't know how to use it. I'd say that's his only flaw as a commander.

    Alexander is a bit different than these two. He died at a relatively young age, but never suffered a military defeat, and had an empire that stretched to western India. Had he not died at thirty-three, I think he'd have been more important than Pyrrhus and Hannibal.
    The part about Phyrus i dissagree with. He did NOT take horrendous casualties. The Romans took heavier casualties in every battle he fought them despit the fact that they had more men.

    What he took is more cassualties then he could afford. He just didn't have the manpower so even if he lost 1/2 to 1/3 less men then the Romans they could afford the losses and he could not. So its not like he was just taking huge losses but winning. He needed to take very few casualties and deliver devastating caualties to the Romans in order to compete with their manpower. If he had the Manpower of Carthage or Rome who knows what he could have accompished.

  11. #571

    Default Re: The better general : Pyrrhus vs Hannibal and Alexander

    Also as far as Hannibal goes i dont think he had problems using victories like people stereotype him. What he had was too few men to surround and lay a proper siege to a city the size and population of Rome. Even if he could have gathered enough men Rome could have recalled several legions from Spain Scicily Cisalpine Gaul and possible Macedonia.

    His strategy was to foment dissent among Roman Allies and cause chaos for Rome and have her lose controll of the penninsula. If he could do that he thought he could bring Rome to terms. But a protracted Siege would have forced him to be stationary for too long alowing Rome to bring all their forces to strike him and get rid of him once and for all.

    He probably did all he could considering what he had to work with. And siege warfare back then was not usualy successfull unless you had treachery from within. Storming fortified cities usualy didn't go well and starving cities out was usualy the better policy. You would eventualy receive a settlement when the defenders got desperate.

    Now had Carthage went all in on Italy and didn't waste all their resouces trying to hold spain it could have been much different. But Carthage just wasn't united the way the Romans were in times of crisis.
    Last edited by CatoTheYounger; April 17, 2013 at 05:44 AM.

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