The French in 1940 [Lance-Corporal Jones vs. The Pretender]

[Lance-Corporal Jones]

The French in 1940


Lance-Corporal Jones vs. The Pretender

The Battle of France has given birth to, in some people's minds, a certain perception of France as a craven country, quick to surrender. This is due to what is percieved as an excessively rapid collapse of the country in May-June 1940 under the onslaught of the German army with the known results.

Whereas there is no contest on the factual elements of the debate -- viz., that the German offensive began on May 10th, 1940 and that an armistice was signed on June 22nd, 1940 -- what we shall address in this debate is the reason for this collapse.

On the one hand, there is a school of contenders who would argue that the collapse of France was due to cowardice and military ineptitude; this position shall be further defended and explained by my opponent, The Pretender.

I, on the other hand, will defend the position according to which cowardice and military ineptitude were not the deciding elements in the defeat, but rather, a combination of flawed strategy and betrayal at the hands of the political class.

______________________________________________________________


Now that I have introduced the debate, I would like to begin by discussing the broad view of the conflict. What we have here is a campaign lasting from May 10th to June 25th 1940 which caused the fall of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, with a balance of 92,000 French dead, 250,000 French wounded, 2,500 French tanks destroyed, 900 French aircraft shot down, as well as 3,500 British dead, 13,600 British wounded, 7,500 Belgian dead, 15,900 Belgian wounded, 2,900 Dutch dead and 6,900 Dutch wounded.

On the axis side, we find a balance of 49,000 German dead, 111,000 German wounded, 1,800 German tanks destroyed, and 1,400 German planes shot down, as well as 6,000 Italian casualties (dead, wounded, frozen to death, prisoners and missing combined).

As for a detailed description of the forces present before the battle, you may consult figures on my thread here.

Already these broad figures warrant a closer look; let us compare this performance to that of the Soviet Union in 1941.

From June 22nd to August 9th 1941, the Red Army, 158 divisions strong, with 17,500 tanks and 12,000 aircraft, retreated 10,000 kilometres in seven weeks, losing a grand total of 3,500,000 men (dead, wounded, captured and missing), 11,000 tanks and 9,500 aircraft, whilst Germany had pitted against this Soviet army an equivalent force to that which had faced the French in 1940: 133 divisions, 20 reserve divisions, 3,500 tanks, 7,500 artillery pieces and only 2,000 planes.

The five first months of conflict on the russian front costed the III Reich 71,000 dead and 148,000 woundeed, 1,300 tanks and 660 planes shot down.

Therefore, how do you explain that the French army, with vastly inferior numbers and equipment than the Soviet army, inflicted similar losses in manpower and greater losses in vehicles to the Germans on a shorter time frame?

Once this point has been addressed, I think we should move on to the smaller picture and analyze particular engagements. Your turn, Sir!

[Edward lV]

Before I start this debate, I want to say I in no way wish to insult anyone, and if I you are insulted by anything I write I apologise.
Anyway, I think it would be best to answer your question in 3 parts. First I will adress the issue of manpower and equipment.
“Therefore, how do you explain that the French army, with vastly inferior numbers and equipment than the Soviet army”
First, I am going to show the weaponry used by the two sides (French and German).

O.K, the main French rifle, the MAS-36.

Had an effective range of 450-500 yards.
A five round clip, bolt action.
Velocity of 2800 ft/s
Fired a 7.5mm round
Bayonet attachment.
Weighed 3.7 kg empty.

Compare this with the main German rifle of the time, the Kar98.

Effective range of 550 yards.
A five round clip, bolt action.
Velocity of 2493 ft/s
Fired a 7.92mm round
Bayonet attachment.
Weighed 3.8 kg empty.

As you can see, there is little difference between the two rifles. The kar98 may just edge it.

Now lets see the two light machine guns used.

For the French, the FM 24/29
Weighed 9.8 kg
Fired 7.5 mm rounds
Gas operated
450 round/minute
Velocity of 2772 ft/s
Proved so good that it was adopted by Germany.

And for the Germans the MG 34…
Weighed 19.2 kg
Fired 7.92 mm round
800 rounds./minute
Velocity of 2477 ft/s

The FM 24/29 was adopted by the Nazis thanks to its portability.

As you can see, the weaponry available to both sides were somewhat even. The MP38/40 was not widely issued until Barbarossa, where soviet units armed with machine guns could overpower Germans with rifles. Neither side had any real man on man advantatage on paper, yet the Germans managed a crushing victory. The only way that is possible is bad planning or cowardice on the French part. Now I believe it was a bit of both. However if you look at the number of Frenchmen who surrendered, over 1.8 million, you can see where the cowardice comes into play. The majority of free French forces after the occupation were African conscripts from the colonies. The Vichy regime was a Nazi puppet, they could quite easily have sent volunteers to the free French, but for whatever reason did not. The French navy refused to cooperate with the allies after the surrender, preferring to return to occupied ports which lead to the allied raid which sunk much of the French fleet who refused to join the allies.

“inflicted similar losses in manpower and greater losses in vehicles to the Germans on a shorter time frame?”

We are not hear to discuss the successes and failures of the Soviet union, that is a whole different scenario from fall gelb.

[Lance-Corporal Jones]

First, I am going to show the weaponry used by the two sides (French and German).

O.K, the main French rifle, the MAS-36.

Had an effective range of 450-500 yards.
A five round clip, bolt action.
Velocity of 2800 ft/s
Fired a 7.5mm round
Bayonet attachment.
Weighed 3.7 kg empty.

Compare this with the main German rifle of the time, the Kar98.

Effective range of 550 yards.
A five round clip, bolt action.
Velocity of 2493 ft/s
Fired a 7.92mm round
Bayonet attachment.
Weighed 3.8 kg empty.

As you can see, there is little difference between the two rifles. The kar98 may just edge it.

Now lets see the two light machine guns used.

For the French, the FM 24/29
Weighed 9.8 kg
Fired 7.5 mm rounds
Gas operated
450 round/minute
Velocity of 2772 ft/s
Proved so good that it was adopted by Germany.

And for the Germans the MG 34…
Weighed 19.2 kg
Fired 7.92 mm round
800 rounds./minute
Velocity of 2477 ft/s

The FM 24/29 was adopted by the Nazis thanks to its portability.

As you can see, the weaponry available to both sides were somewhat even. The MP38/40 was not widely issued until Barbarossa, where soviet units armed with machine guns could overpower Germans with rifles.

I hardly think a difference in the qualities of small arms may influence the outcome of a large-scale battle and I consider this comparison to be irrelevant, apart from the fact that, for instance, the French main machine gun was the Hotchkiss 1914 rather than the Châtellerault assault rifle which you point out. Far more relevant is the fact that German calibres were quite uniform (7.92 and 9mm) whereas French calibres were quite varied (8mm 7.5mm 7.65 6.35mm) which posed severe problems in supply.

As you can see, the weaponry available to both sides were somewhat even. The MP38/40 was not widely issued until Barbarossa, where soviet units armed with machine guns could overpower Germans with rifles. Neither side had any real man on man advantatage on paper, yet the Germans managed a crushing victory.

Despite the fact that there was a certain advantage in numbers on the German side, even against the combined allied forces, as you probably know a battle is all about obtaining local superiority. Whereas, for instance, only 960 French tanks (on paper) were grouped into armoured divisions, all German armour was grouped into the 10 panzer divisions, allowing a far greater concentration of Panzers: for instance, in the breakthrough at Sedan, no less than 7 panzer divisions, supported by 3 motorized and 30 infantry divisions, broke through 7 B reserve infantry divisions. Hardly balanced at all!

Furthermore, allow me to point out that whereas the French had 20 regular infantry divisions, the Germans had 50; and, in general, the German reserve divisions performed better than the French A and B reserve divisions.

However if you look at the number of Frenchmen who surrendered, over 1.8 million, you can see where the cowardice comes into play.

I'm sorry, but I'm afraid you're flinging figures without having a closer look at them. When you say that "1.8 million Frenchmen surrendered" you're assuming that they surrendered in the heat of battle, spontaneously; in such a case there would be a case for cowardice, however, this is far from the truth.

In fact, there were 1,450,000 prisoners -- rather than the 1.8 million wikipedia figure -- out of wich 1.100.000 were ordered to turn themselves in by the Pétain government! This process began upon the 17th of June with Péain's broadcast in which he said, I quote, "it is with a broken heart that I tell you that the fighting must cease."

Starting from this broadcast on June the 17th, German officers, acting upon truce, approached French positions announcing that the war was over. The civillian population, as well, was convinced that the war had ended, and sometimes even refused to collaborate with the army, as was the case of the mayors of Vierzon, Montargis, Angers, Nantes, Thouars or Loudun.

It is obvious that the surrender of the armies, surrounded and divided in three pockets, was not due to cowardice, but due to the fact that the new government -- apparently legitimate, though in fact the National Assembly vote had been illegal -- had ordered the hostilities to cease. To continue the fight -- as De Gaulle did -- was in theory to commit high treason.

In fact, the French army refused to surrender to the point that French general Huntzinger, on the 29th of June -- one week after the armistice -- had to send a written order demanding the surrender of the Maginot Line, out of which 45 our of 53 "grands ouvrages" and 130 bunkers were still resisting!

I therefore conclude that the prisoner figure is by no means due to cowardice, but rather, as a consequence of military defeat.

Furthermore, I might add that rather than decrease, French fighting spirit increased over time: indeed, whereas between May 10th and June 3rd the Germans suffered an average 2,499 losses per day, between 5th and 24th June they suffered 4,762 per day -- a figure higher than Barbarossa.

These figures should make you rethink the supposed "cowardice" of the French soldier.

The majority of free French forces after the occupation were African conscripts from the colonies. The Vichy regime was a Nazi puppet, they could quite easily have sent volunteers to the free French, but for whatever reason did not.

I fail to see the logic behind this argument. The Vichy regime was a Nazi puppet, and therefore it did not send volunteers to the Free French. If it did, it would hardly be a nazi puppet. Furthermore, does being committed to nazism -- as Pétain was -- imply cowardice? Quite a few Frenchmen, in fact, either joined the S.S., the Vichy militias, or the Vichy army and fought alongside the Germans. You may disapprove of this choice on moral grounds, but it is certainly not born out of cowardice.

The French navy refused to cooperate with the allies after the surrender, preferring to return to occupied ports which lead to the allied raid which sunk much of the French fleet who refused to join the allies.

The fact that the French fleet chose its side wrongly does not imply cowardice either. In fact, facing bombardment in the port of Mers-el-Kebir whilst unable to shoot back may hardly be considered cowardly. The French fleet chose to align themselves with Vichy, which is a decision and nothing more.

“inflicted similar losses in manpower and greater losses in vehicles to the Germans on a shorter time frame?”

We are not hear to discuss the successes and failures of the Soviet union, that is a whole different scenario from fall gelb.

I do believe it is significant, however; had the French been the cowards you claim they were, how come they inflicted such losses to the Germans with inferior means than the Soviets, and without having to retreat 10.000 km, which, I remind you, would have left the French in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean?

As for another comparison, the example of Poland, which is often quoted: let's have a look at the casualty figures in armour in Poland compared to France:

Total losses
Pz.Kpfw. I: 89
Pz.Kpfw. II: 83
Pz.Kpfw. III: 26
Pz.Kpfw. 35(t): 7
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t): 7
Pz.Kpfw. IV: 19
Pz.Bef.: 5
Total: 236

Losses in % of available
Pz.Kpfw. I: 9.1
Pz.Kpfw. II: 7.4
Pz.Kpfw. III: 29.9
Pz.Kpfw. 35(t): 6
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t): 12.7
Pz.Kpfw. IV: 9.6
Pz.Bef.: 2.3
Total: 8.5 %

Compare to the casualty figures for France:

Total losses (for both May and June)
Pz.Kpfw. I: 182
Pz.Kpfw. II: 240
Pz.Kpfw. III: 135
Pz.Kpfw. 35(t): 62
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t): 54
Pz.Kpfw. IV: 97
Pz.Bef.: 69
Total: 839 (the majority in France)

Losses in % of available
Pz.Kpfw. I: 32.9
Pz.Kpfw. II: 26.1
Pz.Kpfw. III: 43.7
Pz.Kpfw. 35(t): 52.5
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t): 26.1
Pz.Kpfw. IV: 34.6
Pz.Bef.: 44.8
Total: 33 %

As you may see, the French inflicted severe damage to German armour despite a series of severe shortcomings -- for instance, limited air support, few landmines, diluted and scattered armoured forces -- and these figures pay testimony to the fierce nature of the battle.

Infantry forces comparisons yield similar results: the Polish army suffered 200,000 casualties in 35 days (5,714 per day) and the French army suffered 330.000+ casualties in 45 days (7,333+ per day) and considering that the ratio was roughly the same (Germany engaged 68 divisions against 52 Polish, 135 divisions against 104 French) there is a roughly equal ratio of 1.3.

These divisions had been strengthened by several reforms: transforming Leichten Divisionen into panzer Divisionen, far more tanks with guns superior to the 20mm, improved motorization, and a greater presence of Ausf. C and Ausf. D tanks in the French campaign.

I rest my case, dear Sir. Your turn.

[Edward lV]

I hardly think a difference in the qualities of small arms may influence the outcome of a large-scale battle and I consider this comparison to be irrelevant.

I beg to differ. You equipt an army now with kar98's and they will be trampled by a much smaller force. Small arms are vital to the army.

Despite the fact that there was a certain advantage in numbers on the German side, even against the combined allied forces, as you probably know a battle is all about obtaining local superiority. Whereas, for instance, only 960 French tanks (on paper) were grouped into armoured divisions, all German armour was grouped into the 10 panzer divisions, allowing a far greater concentration of Panzers: for instance, in the breakthrough at Sedan, no less than 7 panzer divisions, supported by 3 motorized and 30 infantry divisions, broke through 7 B reserve infantry divisions. Hardly balanced at all!

So military ineptetude on the part of the french? I am arguing that the French failed to prepare and when the time came did not fight as well as they could have dont forget. The fact French forces were not deployed correctly strengthens my argument.

Furthermore, allow me to point out that whereas the French had 20 regular infantry divisions, the Germans had 50; and, in general, the German reserve divisions performed better than the French A and B reserve divisions.

Surely the fact the German reserves outpreformed the french reserves proves that the French forces were not up to scratch?

I'm sorry, but I'm afraid you're flinging figures without having a closer look at them. When you say that "1.8 million Frenchmen surrendered" you're assuming that they surrendered in the heat of battle, spontaneously; in such a case there would be a case for cowardice, however, this is far from the truth.

When did I say they surrendered in the heat of battle? The surrender of 1.45 million is still a very large number. When the battle for france ended, not half of the French land was occupied, huge swathes of land in the south were still under French control. Yet the government surrendered along with the French soldiers. With no resistence. Even in Africa, far from German influence, the vast majority of French land declared itself vichy. How is that not cowardly?

In fact, there were 1,450,000 prisoners -- rather than the 1.8 million wikipedia figure -- out of wich 1.100.000 were ordered to turn themselves in by the Pétain government! This process began upon the 17th of June with Péain's broadcast in which he said, I quote, "it is with a broken heart that I tell you that the fighting must cease."

Again, how is mass surrender not cowardly? If Gordon Brown told you to shoot yourself, would you do it? Charles de Gaulle didnt follow, what was stopping others?

It is obvious that the surrender of the armies, surrounded and divided in three pockets, was not due to cowardice, but due to the fact that the new government -- apparently legitimate, though in fact the National Assembly vote had been illegal -- had ordered the hostilities to cease. To continue the fight -- as De Gaulle did -- was in theory to commit high treason.

So an illigitement government, not voted in, ordered the French to surrender and they did? Without questioning the authority of said government? Are you sure the soldiers had not just given up hope?

In fact, the French army refused to surrender to the point that French general Huntzinger, on the 29th of June -- one week after the armistice -- had to send a written order demanding the surrender of the Maginot Line, out of which 45 our of 53 "grands ouvrages" and 130 bunkers were still resisting!

As far as im awear, the German plan was to flank the line, not capture it. It is logical then that this would be one of the last positions to be held by the French. If they had realy wanted to they could have kept fighting. There was no real effort to resist.

I fail to see the logic behind this argument. The Vichy regime was a Nazi puppet, and therefore it did not send volunteers to the Free French. If it did, it would hardly be a nazi puppet. Furthermore, does being committed to nazism -- as Pétain was -- imply cowardice? Quite a few Frenchmen, in fact, either joined the S.S., the Vichy militias, or the Vichy army and fought alongside the Germans. You may disapprove of this choice on moral grounds, but it is certainly not born out of cowardice.

Africa was left untouched by the Nazis, atleast the Vichy parts, yet no voulenteers joined the allies from there even when invited to do so. The French were happy to lay down and be the germans puppet. There were ample oppertunities to rise up en masse, i.e the launch of Barbarrossa, yet few rebellions actualy took place.

The fact that the French fleet chose its side wrongly does not imply cowardice either. In fact, facing bombardment in the port of Mers-el-Kebir whilst unable to shoot back may hardly be considered cowardly. The French fleet chose to align themselves with Vichy, which is a decision and nothing more.

It didnt chose sides, it fled. The ships in British ports were going to leave for german ones to surrender. Does this not prove my point? They were leaving allied ports wher they were safe to go and surrender to the Germans. Explain that.

I do believe it is significant, however; had the French been the cowards you claim they were, how come they inflicted such losses to the Germans with inferior means than the Soviets, and without having to retreat 10.000 km, which, I remind you, would have left the French in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean?

Ill take Barbarrosa. Lets see...

The great purge left the Soviet Union with inept leadership. You are compairing a modern army with a large, unorganised force which was taken by suprise with few compitent leaders. The Soviet army was a sham! Infact wikipedia tells me the soviet forces stationed on the eastern front (western for them) numbered near 2.9 million wheras axis forces were peaking at 5.5 million. A significent gap wouldnt you say? The reason so many soviets died was because the axis caught them unawears. It is proven later with the Soviet counter attacks that when they are prepared and well equiped they can give the germans a run for there money.

[Lance-Corporal Jones]

I beg to differ. You equipt an army now with kar98's and they will be trampled by a much smaller force. Small arms are vital to the army.

My dear sir, we are comparing similar rifles, we are not comparing a bullpup assualt rifle to a bolt-action, or a sword to a club for that matter. The comparison is irrelevant and I'm afraid you are building a strawman.

So military ineptetude on the part of the french? I am arguing that the French failed to prepare and when the time came did not fight as well as they could have dont forget. The fact French forces were not deployed correctly strengthens my argument.

Military ineptitude, or subtle planning by the Germans? The fact that the Germans exploited this weakness in the French line is due to Gamelin's manoeuver in Belgium, certainly, but Gamelin's move was a gambit: he thought Army group B was the strongest, and engaged it successfully in Belgium, but in fact, army group A, the strongest, avoided the French 1st army and smashed into the Ardennes gap.

It's military chess, and the Germans made the better move, but it's by no means "military ineptitude".

Surely the fact the German reserves outpreformed the french reserves proves that the French forces were not up to scratch?

No, it is due to the fact that the Germans had more manpower, and therefore a larger pool of young recruits.. The French B reserve divisions were composed by elder men, hence the inferior performance.

When did I say they surrendered in the heat of battle? The surrender of 1.45 million is still a very large number. When the battle for france ended, not half of the French land was occupied, huge swathes of land in the south were still under French control. Yet the government surrendered along with the French soldiers. With no resistence. Even in Africa, far from German influence, the vast majority of French land declared itself vichy. How is that not cowardly?

I fail to see the logic behind your reasoning. What do you mean by "no resistance"? If you mean that marshall Pétain negotiated an armistice with Hitler (it was an armistice, let's not forget this particular point) and that subsequently, hostilities were ended and all surrounded forces were ordered to give themselves up, this is pretty much standard procedure.

What is admirable, in fact heroic, is the fact that they kept on resisting in pockets up to a week after the official cease of hostilities.

Again, how is mass surrender not cowardly? If Gordon Brown told you to shoot yourself, would you do it? Charles de Gaulle didnt follow, what was stopping others?

You are building a strawman. Charles de Gaulle, despite being in Britain at the time, was sentenced to death by the Vichy government. High treason is a serious offense, and continuing to fight when your country is no longer at war is a serious crime. This is not "shooting yourself" because Gordon Brown says so. However, if the PM were to sign a peace with another country, by continuing to fight against it, you would be committing a heinous crime, you do know that, don't you?

So an illigitement government, not voted in, ordered the French to surrender and they did? Without questioning the authority of said government? Are you sure the soldiers had not just given up hope?

No one knew the government was illegitimate at the time. Laval, Pétain's right-hand man, had forced the vote for Pétain's powers by discounting all null National Assembly votes (which is anticonstitutional). However, this was not known, and therefore, in everyone's mind, Pétain's government was legitimate.

The fact that general Huntzinger had so send an ultimatum to the resisting French troops urging them to cease all resistance shows that they still had the will to fight despite the armistice.

For instance, when general Lescanne, undefeated and after having repelled all assaults from the 1st and 16th armies, was informed of the armistice, refused all demands of surrender from the enemy. On the 27th of June, general Weygand sent the Germans an emissary, announcing that they were willing to cease hostilities but they refused captivity, as they were still undefeated.

Unfortunately, the armistice didn't have any clauses for the safeguard of the troops, and the german envoy replied, quote, that "refusing unconditional surrender shall be considered a violation of the prescriptions of the armistice conventions."

Finally, between the 30th of June and the 7th of July, the remaining forts surrendered.

In fact, in case of violation of the armistice, general von Stülpnagel threatened to send the Panzer divisions to Marseille and Toulon, breaking the armistice and occupying the rest of France -- and, as you know, the French armies being surrounded, they could do nothing at all to stop them.

As far as im awear, the German plan was to flank the line, not capture it. It is logical then that this would be one of the last positions to be held by the French. If they had realy wanted to they could have kept fighting. There was no real effort to resist.

The line was completely surrounded at that stage and it certainly was not a matter of "no real effort" to resist. Furthermore, what strategic advantage was there to be gained by resisting in the Line? To let the Germans run rampant around France whilst unable to stop them? The French armies were surrounded and incapable of breaking out.

What good would a small free Alpine fringe have done, with the rest of the national territory occupied?

Africa was left untouched by the Nazis, atleast the Vichy parts, yet no voulenteers joined the allies from there even when invited to do so. The French were happy to lay down and be the germans puppet. There were ample oppertunities to rise up en masse, i.e the launch of Barbarrossa, yet few rebellions actualy took place.

Lay down their arms to the German's puppet, or take up arms for the German's puppet? Perhaps these troops felt more loyalty to what they saw as a more legitimate government than de Gaulle's makeshift Free French forces?

And furthermore, could Africa resist? The remaining colonial regiments were lightly armed, had no support or heavy armament, no experience at all, no anti-aircraft artillery in the fleet, a general shortage of small arms replacement parts, the absence of sufficient ammunition stocks, the inability to obtain more (produced in France) and the fact that they couldn't count on any reinforcements whatsoever?

Furthermore, against whom could they resist? Against Italy perhaps, as the Italian army in Africa, under-motorized and without effective artillery wasn't much better than the French colonial troops. But against the Italians and Germans, and even possibly the Spanish? Remember that Rommel chased us out of Cyrenaica with two German and two Italian divisions in 1941.

It didnt chose sides, it fled. The ships in British ports were going to leave for german ones to surrender. Does this not prove my point? They were leaving allied ports wher they were safe to go and surrender to the Germans. Explain that.

This decision which seems so irrational to you is simply because, precisely, they did choose sides. Had they chosen to remain in the allied side they would have remained in allied ports. But they thought that the Vichy side was the most legitimate, and felt it was their duty to obey their head of state. Therefore, they left the allied ports to go to Vichy ports.

Ill take Barbarrosa. Lets see...

The great purge left the Soviet Union with inept leadership. You are compairing a modern army with a large, unorganised force which was taken by suprise with few compitent leaders. The Soviet army was a sham! Infact wikipedia tells me the soviet forces stationed on the eastern front (western for them) numbered near 2.9 million wheras axis forces were peaking at 5.5 million. A significent gap wouldnt you say? The reason so many soviets died was because the axis caught them unawears. It is proven later with the Soviet counter attacks that when they are prepared and well equiped they can give the germans a run for there money.

You are still omitting my comparison with Poland, but I hope you will remember to address it in your next response.

Your apologetic speech for Russia may be turned against you just as well. You claim the Russians were taken by surprise: weren't the French taken by surprise at the Ardennes? The fact that the Russians had elbow room to retreat 6,000 miles is the only element that saved them. Had the French had space to retreat 6,000 miles, things might have gone differently, and in fact, all points towards the fact that it would have gone differently, as once the French overcame the initial blow, their kill rate soared from 2,499 per day in May to 4,762 per day in June.


As you may see, the battle was lost at a strategic level, not at a tactical level, and cowardice doesn't intervene in the strategic level. From a tactical point of view, if you wish, we may discuss particular engagements, but those engagements which tipped the balance in favour of Germany were, for the most part, grossly unbalanced (for instance, the breakthrough at the Meuse which opposed 7 reserve divisions to 40 German divisions) and the result of Germans successfully exploiting certain weaknesses. As I said before, this is like a game of chess: the Germans made the better move and split the French armies. The minds behind Fall Gelb were indeed excellent -- Manstein and Guderian had shown particular clairvoyance -- but we cannot infer "incompetence" from the fact that Mansterin and Guderian were brilliant.

[Lance-Corporal Jones]

My dear adversary, seeing that it's already been over three weeks since you last answered, I should like to extend a petition of answer or yield, either of which will be equally well accepted, but I must ask you not to leave things in this ambiguous state.