What Made Crassus Such a Bad General?

[Jesus The Inane]

Ok, so everybody thinks that he was an awful general.

But why? I don't know that much about his life but against Spartacus he seemed to be quite effective, as far as I know. And I mean, the decimation he order must have put order among his troops as this would make them fear him and hence do what exactly he told them to do.

Also, he seemed quite good in instilling fear, I mean, he knew how to use fear in order to put order. Like when he order all the slaves to be crucified, this made a slave think twice before revolting...

[Ulf]

Crassus was very good at making money. This was his major skill. His generaling abilities were not all that bad, but reasons people think he wasn't all that great as a general is because 1.) He lived in the shadow of Caesar and Pompey who are arguably the best generals in roman history probably 2nd and 3rd only to Scipio Africanus. and 2.) his legions were completely destroyed by the Parthians which was a major setback to the eastern campaign.

[bbcrackmonkey]

Scipio Africanus was definitely not Rome's greatest general. Pompey and Ceasar fought many more battles and they fought many more opponents. Scipio Africanus only fought one enemy, Carthage, and although he was an excellent general and never lost a battle, Ceasar and Pompey could dance circles around him.

That being said, Crassus made his immense fortune by riding Sulla's coattails. Sulla became dictator of Rome many years before Ceasar did, and he offered vast rewards for turning in political opponents and anyone disloyal to him. Crassus turned in thousands of men and collected vast rewards for doing so, and then bought up most of the real-estate in Rome using various scams and schemes. Crassus was a Class-A conman, and a horribly inefficient and worthless general. His victory over Spartacus was not very remarkable, and then his unprovoked attack on Parthia and his utter defeat lost Rome 60,000 soldiers. His march deep into Parthian territory was absolutely incompetent, and he continued to march deeper and deeper despite advice to halt and fortify his position.

[Ulf]

Scipio Africanus was definitely not Rome's greatest general. Pompey and Ceasar fought many more battles and they fought many more opponents. Scipio Africanus only fought one enemy, Carthage, and although he was an excellent general and never lost a battle, Ceasar and Pompey could dance circles around him.

Scipio defeated not just Carthage, but the man that some people consider to be the best general of all time. Rome could not have existed if it had not been for Scipio. What i'm saying is that the situation that Scipio was in brought on more pressure and so forced him to become one of Rome's best genearls. Where as Caesar and Pompey's situation was not nearly as vital to the survival of the empire. The reason Caesar and Pompey fought so many more battle is because everytime Caesar won a battle, he let his enemy leave with only the promise not to fight against him anymore. And of course they just ran back to Pompey and fought against Caesar even harder. Although I do recognize the importance of Caesar and Pompey and their amazing abilities are generals, I still think that due to the amazing amount of pressure put on Scipio, he is the better general.

[MaximiIian]

Crassus kicked ******. Rich & Ruthless...an excellent combonation.
He wasn't that bad of a general, really, it's just that he kept getting caught in guerrilla attack from the enemy, and the parthians were just that much better than roman troops.

[RollingWave]

Putting down a rebellion and making foreign expeditions are different things......Crassus 's disastorous campaign against the Pathian leaves little room to argue..........

As for Ceaser vs Scipo etc.... If Scipo had failed, there was certainly a good possibiltiy that Rome as we know it would never come to pass, while if Ceaser failed, not much would have changed except who became the first emperor.

[Jesus The Inane]

But in the battle against the Parthians, didn't he form his troops in a square? wasn't that wise? could he had done something better?

[Petronius]

Originally posted by Hapsburg
Crassus kicked ******. Rich & Ruthless...an excellent combonation.
He wasn't that bad of a general, really, it's just that he kept getting caught in guerrilla attack from the enemy, and the parthians were just that much better than roman troops.

This is not what happened during his Parthian campaign, actually. Crassus's army was seriously imbalanced - fighting a horse-based army such as the Parthians with a heavily melee infantry army was one of his major blunders. Further, (if we're talking about Carrhae here), he let his important cavalry units pursue an apparently fleeing enemy and get surrounded and destroyed. If he would have raised more foot archers as became regular practice among Roman armies in the East, then he certainly would have been able to beat the Parthians. Foot archers outrange horse archers, carried more powerful bows and would reduce the threat of these cavalry mounted missile troops from a danger to more of a nuissance. In any case, it took the Parthians almost the whole day to 'wear down' the Roman infantry. Even then, the Roman army held strong - that is, until the whole army broke down upon the breakdown in leadership and the collapse of Roman morale (due to the envellopment of isolated units sent out by Crassus). Most of the casualties were dealt out after this key event. So the success of the Parthians, who are in general highly overrated by modern historians (using anachronistic methods of analysation, of course), was due to Crassus's many blunders in several key areas, as well as Surena's timely exploitation of this and effective coordination of his army. Funny enough, Surena was subsequently killed by the Parthian king (who suspected him of 'disloyalty' directly related to his victory at Carrhae). Two invasions by the Parthians were heavily defeated by the Romans in Syria afterwards.

The myth of the Roman weakness to so called 'guerilla warfare' is founded in other anachronistic methods of analyzing history. Most probably, it traces back to E. Luttwak's "Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire". I'll directly quote a book I have on the matter.

"Luttwak is one of the few scholars to have examined the attributes of the Roman army on campaign. He believed that the military structure of the army of the Late Republic and Early Empire was fundamentally imbalanced towards close order, shock troops. This gave it great advantages in what Luttwak termed as 'High Intensity Warfare' - the winning of large-scale battles and the taking and holding of fortified positions. The Roman army certainly does seem to have been more efficient at this type of fighting than any of its opponents in this period. However Luttwak went further and claimed that the Roman army was at a disadvantage in more sporadic fighting or, 'Low Intensity Warfare', where there was not an enemy field army to be defeated in the open, or a stronghold to take by siege. In this way he explained Rome's failure to conquer the Germans and Parthians, since neither possessed fixed [military] assets that the Roman army could attack and destroy. Most scholars seem to have assumed that the army was ill-prepared to fight a guerilla war and have expressed suprise when its opponents did not oppose it in this way.

The supposed vulnerability of the Roman army to guerilla warfare is a myth derived from a misunderstanding of the evidence and of the nature of warfare in this period. The last chapter examined the military practices of several of Rome's enemies [Gauls, Germans and Parthians] and concluded that these were unsuited to fighting a guerilla ware - a type of warfare much less common in this period than is normally supposed [due to the difficulty in supplying troops in the field for a long period without a centralized state]. More importantly, the fundamental flexibility of the Roman army has not been filly appreciated. Not only was it capable of fighting a guerilla war, but it was actually better at this than most of its opponents, such as the Numidians or the tribes of Mount Amanus, who traditionally fought in this manner."

Source: The Roman Army, 100 BC - AD 200, by Dr. Adrian Goldsworthy.

[Ummon]

Crassus made strategic, logistic and tactical mistakes. He desperately wanted to be like Pompey and Caesar, but he wasn't up to the test.

1) strategic mistakes: pushing deep into enemy territory (and desert) instead of attracting the enemy outside it and consolidating conquests, maybe raising some more cavalry and missile auxiliaries. Trusting a double agent to lead his army.

2) logistic mistakes: marching far away from water sources, looking for a direct confrontation with an enemy army in which he was bound to be the exhausted, thirsty party. Not taking artillery with him. Bringing Gallic cavalry in the desert.

3) tactical mistakes: square formation, the best way to maximize cross-fire from parthian bows!

[Petronius]

Actually, Crassus's Gallic cavalry put an extremely good show for themselves on at Carrhae. He just didn't have enough of them. Or bowmen.

The Publius Crassus (Marcus's son), upon being surrounded by Parthian cataphracts, charged headlong into them. His unit took down a very good amount of the armoured Parthians before succumbing themselves.

[Pompeius Minus]

3) Tactical mistakes: square formation, the best way to maximize cross-fire from parthian bows!

I dunno about that one. The square is usually considered the best formation for defence against cavalry.

Crassus' biggest problem was that the Parthians had cleverly organized a camel train bringing in new arrows. Without that it's quite possible that his infantry could have waited behind their shields until the Parthians ran out of ammunition.

[MaximiIian]

Eh...they never should've fought the Parthians in the first place. They should've made an alliance of sorts with them, and later (during the Imperial days) married into the royal family. When the last of the Parthian kings dies without a male heir (thanks to a few successful assassinations), the Roman imperial family could claim it. and grab it legally.
But, no one thought ahead...

[Pompeius Minus]

But, no one thought ahead...

...into an unknown future 50 years ahead, no.

Another problem with the marriage plan is that it could backfire and give the Parthians a claim to the imperial throne!

[MaximiIian]

Yes...
Either way, Parthia-Rome or Rome-Parthia would've flourished, depending.
They could've expanded farther east, perhaps all the way to India, if this theoretical plan succeeded. They could expand even farther east if it backfires, giving them a new capitol centred in Persia...
That's a very :wub: interesting theory...

[Xiaodun]

Congradulations. I have withstood much and never have I reposted here again, but Hapsburg, your post was just begging me for a reply so I will. Please forgive me this once.

First, in this age Rome was still a Republic, no imperial family
Second, the emperour in Imperial Rome was less of a monarch and more of a hereditary postion that give you huge amounts of senate guaranteed power
Third, Crassus didnt want to conquer Parthia for Rome, he need to do so to build up his reputiation as a military general thus enablying him to match against Pompey and Caesar.
Fourth, the Parthians throne is often shifting users, I doubt that a single line would have lasted so long.

Forgive me this once. Ugh, Im going back into exile. If you want more info PM me or something.

[MaximiIian]

1. I knew that. I meant AFTER the republic. Key word: thinking ahead.
2. I know. That's what I was going on.
3. Huh. I thought that Roman ordered him to.
4. Yeah, that is a bit of a problem there...

[Ummon]

Actually, Crassus's Gallic cavalry put an extremely good show for themselves on at Carrhae. He just didn't have enough of them. Or bowmen.

The Publius Crassus (Marcus's son), upon being surrounded by Parthian cataphracts, charged headlong into them. His unit took down a very good amount of the armoured Parthians before succumbing themselves.

It was more merit of the young Crassus who had served with Caesar for years and was rather heroic himself. The troops though suffered in the hot, dry climate.

About square formation, more slingers and archers in a long thin screen, would have resolved the problem, Square was useless, and ultimately damaging because it relinquished initiative and maximized enemy bowfire. Parthian arrows passed the roman shields infact, due to composite bows being used.

To lose against the Parthians, it took a severely incompetent general, and Crassus was.

[Tacticalwithdrawal]

As Deathdoom says, he went East to try and build himself a military reputation (and no doubt to run the richest Roman province), its pretty certain that Rome wasn't hugely enthusiastic about the adventure. I actually feel quite sorry for the bloke, surrounded by people such as Pompey, Cicero, Caesar,

Quote from roman-empire.net which pretty neatly sums him up: 'Crassus was a decent both as a speaker and as a commander, but he struggled and failed to live up to comparison with these exceptional individuals. His talent lay in making money, which might have bought him political influence but couldn't buy him true popularity with the voters.'

[Petronius]

About square formation, more slingers and archers in a long thin screen, would have resolved the problem, Square was useless, and ultimately damaging because it relinquished initiative and maximized enemy bowfire. Parthian arrows passed the roman shields infact, due to composite bows being used.

While I understand that the square formation would take the initiative away from the Romans, they didn't have the proper troops or hugely intuitive commander needed to defeat a horse-based army such as the Parthians with what resources they had. Parthian arrows, however, served more to annoy and slow the Romans down, wounding only occationally (and very very rarely killing). This is because the Romans were armoured except in the legs and arms - most wounds were likely to have been minor ones in these places. The effectiveness of the Parthian bow, while certainly an advanced weapon, is overexaggerated. Because the horse is such an unstable 'gun platform' (to use an anachronistic term, essentially), the proper leverage and power in the shot is not obtained; therefore, the arrows, not accurate or powerful enough to pierce armour must be used to wear down the enemy before the decisive charge of cataphracts.

This was Parthian tactics, which most of the time did not seem to work against a better balanced Roman Army - Crassus's quaestor, Cassius, defeated the Parthians using their own tactics (leading a small amount of troops away from the main body and then envelopping them). Both times when the Parthians fought Publius Ventidius Bassus in Syria, they lost to superior tactics and application of troop strengths. Corbulo was able to sweep away the Parthian armies without too much trouble. While all three of these men were excellent generals, they were not as prominent as Caesar; and yet, they were able to defeat the Parthians. Does this not say something about the adaptability and superiority of the Roman system?

[Jesus The Inane]

"3) tactical mistakes: square formation, the best way to maximize cross-fire from parthian bows!"

Can you explain that to me? I don't understand. If he formed a centralize formation, wouldn't the casualties be larger because the archers just shoot at the center and they'll surely hit something because the enemy is closely pact?

In the square formation, only certain "units" will be the target for the archers, mostly the ones infront? Or, perhaps, the angles of the square?