View Poll Results: Whom would you have lead your army?

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  • Julius Gaius Caesar

    124 16.27%
  • Hannibal Barca

    189 24.80%
  • Alexander the Great

    297 38.98%
  • King Leonidas of Sparta

    22 2.89%
  • Scipio Africanus

    39 5.12%
  • Attila the Hun

    31 4.07%
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    60 7.87%
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Thread: Greatest General of the Ancient World

  1. #61
    Anibal Barca
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    If a guy states that you're ignorant for no reason, you get angry. "Please read a book at least on Hannibal Mehmed II" I won't tolerate these words from a guy who does not know that Islam was founded after Christ.
    - Mehmed

    You shouldn't have taken it so personally Mehmed. After all, it's true what Stronghold said, you show a LOT of misinformation regarding Hannibal, and so you should really get more info before taking those kind of conclusions (and I have brought to this forum LOTS of that info). I mean, a guy who says "Hannibal: Declared war to one of the greatest empires of all times; won one major battle"...puhleeze one major battle?!??! Way misinformed Mehmed! Just to give an example, I name Trebia where romans had an army of 40.000+ and the 2 consuls present leading it.



    Hannibal took his own life rather than surrender to Rome; Alexander died because of a stupid sickness at the height of his power. Yes, Anibal, the truth hurts doesn't it?
    - Mehmed

    In fact it only makes me feel proud! I would be much more "hurt" if he had died one year after Cannae of a "stupid sickness", and with a reputation of gay, paedophile, drunk, paranoic and comrade's murderer.

    OTOH, Hannibal lived a full life of great achievements, luxurious life and recognized respect everywhere he lived. One can only 'envy' his life, not regret it. His last act with 65 years old was a proof of his determination and strength of character. He feared not death, and prefered to die free, rather than living the last years as a roman slave (if he was not going to be executed).

    And here I focus a point I had forgot to refute before. Siblesz posted, a page or 2 ago, a weird quote from Machiavelli regarding Hannibal's "inhuman cruelty was wholly responsible" for never facing "any dissention, either among the troops themselves, or against their leader, whether things were going well or badly". This is totally :wub: and I'm glad you Siblesz took the right conclusions, and at least you wrote that he was an italian and that he was writing during a period where Carthage's past history and information was very biased. I have to agree with Siblesz and say that Machiavelli's quote is very far from the truth. Hannibal may have performed cruel acts as anyone HAS to do during a war, but it was not "wholly responsible" to this that his men followed him so strongly "whether things were going well or badly". The main reason for this was his great human qualities as a men and military leader: He didn't drink nor he used prostitutes; he dressed and slept like his men during campaign (reports from his Iberian campaign where he was sleeping in the ground next to his men and dressing a linen tunic like his fellow Iberian soldiers); he always distributed fairly the spoils of war and the MAJOR fortunes he and his father gathered from the wealthy carthaginian possesions (for which some accused him of avarice) were used to arm/equip their soldeirs with the best possible, and to pay them fully and in advance. Adding to the respect and consideration he had for his men and every men in general, he was a military genious....and what better pair of qualities would one want to justify such sense of loyalty among his men?

    I really think Machiavelli was being intentionally naive and nationalist coz another proof of Hannibal's lack of "inhumane cruelty" is the fact that the roman generals always got honored funerals and the roman captured soldiers were always given the chance for ransom (though the roman senate usually failed on their men), while the other captured (italian) men were freed.

    To finish, a bunch of quotes that I could quickly find and proove some of my points:

    "At length after eight months of hardship and anxiety he took the city [Saguntum] by storm. A great booty of money, slaves, and property fell into his hands. The money, as he had determined, he set aside for his own purposes, the slaves he distributed among his men according to rank, and the miscellaneous property he sent off at once to Carthage. The result did not deceive his expectations, nor did he fail to accomplish his original purpose; but he both made his troops more eager to face danger and the Carthaginians more ready to accede to his demands on them" - Polybius

    "On the death of Hasdrubal, to whom after that of Hamilcar they had entrusted the government of Iberia, they at first waited for a pronouncement on the part of the troops, and when news reached them from their armies that the soldiers had unanimously chosen Hannibal as their commander , they hastened to summon a general assembly of the commons, which unanimously ratified the choice of the soldiers" - Polybius

    At last, though not directly connected to the point but also not totally disconnected is Hannibal's also great suport after the 2nd punic war where he was freely and overwhelmingly elected as Suffete at Carthage(top job), and his immediate measures:

    "201-196 BC Hannibal serves as Shofet in Carthage:
    -restores order, moral and efficiency
    -saw corruption and weakness of Carthage’s divided and petty government as the cause of her defeat
    -stop the rich from over-taxing the poor to pay the war debt
    -uncovered and denounced the corruption of many of the rich families
    -introduced taxation based on wealth
    -revived commerce, industry and trade as never before
    -trade with the Levant via North Africa not effected by war
    -Carthage prospers

    195 BC-Hannibal’s enemies at Carthage tell Rome that he is planning another war with the aid of Antiochus III of Syria
    -many rich families and rivals of the Barcids plot against him
    -Rome is jealous of Carthage’s renewed prosperity
    -Cato the Elder (consul) jealous of Scipio’s fame and wishes to capture Hannibal
    -Rome demands he be turned over to keep the peace
    -Hannibal fled to Tyre in Phoenicia, and then to the court of King Antiochus III of Syria"

    He would then spend luxurious vacations at the courts of several kings till the end of his life (183BC, with 65years)

    Hannibal may be the father of all military strategy(and I'm sure he is) or heck; he was maybe far more clever than Alexander. But, Alexander was succesful and Hannibal wasn't. It's plain simple.
    I agree with your words but this topic is not about who was successful or not, it's about the "greatest general of the ancient world"


    Now tell me, Does any of Alexander's conquests have anything to do with the empire of China?
    I was talking of ancient Turkey [place and inhabitants], not China

  2. #62
    wilpuri's Avatar It Gets Worse.
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    I was talking of ancient Turkey [place and inhabitants], not China
    -Anibal Barca

    I think what Mehmed meant, was that the "turks" or turkic tribes were far from Asia minor in these times. He wouldn't be insulted if you called the persians sissies or whatever, at least not because they are his people..
    I might be wrong, but that's how I understood it
    The common culture of a tribe is a sign of its inner cohesion. But tribes are vanishing from the modern world, as are all forms of traditional society. Customs, practices, festivals, rituals and beliefs have acquired a flut and half-hearted quality which reflects our nomadic and rootless existence, predicated as we are on the global air-waves.

    ROGER SCRUTON, Modern Culture

  3. #63
    Mehmed II's Avatar Vicarius
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    Anibal, dude! No one can be compared to Alexander! That guy conquered the known world in 10 years! He died in his thirties dude!Thirties ! Imagine what he could have done if he didn't die so early!

  4. #64

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    lets have a discussion on what color is "better" next, fuschia or taupe !!!Stop the insanity, and just chill. Post again in a few days...or i will erase all of these topics...

    Savvy?-_-

    Boris
    He that will not reason is a bigot, He that cannot reason is a fool, He that dares not reason is a slave.

  5. #65
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    Let me just finish this post boris... Anyway I have a solution that most of us can agree upon.

    In a fair fight between Hannibal and Alexander, On unseen ground(new to both) with fair amounts of units and men. Hannibal has a 60% chance of winning. This is just a battle not a war.

    In a war between Alexander and Hannibal, if both countries were to be of = strength, Alexander has a 70% chance of winning. This is a war not a battle.

    We saw Alexander finish several wars and rebellions whilst Hannibal won more "solid" battles more gracefully. I feel that Hannibal could beat Alexander in a battle but not in a war and for arguments sake we should agree upon this. -_-

    PS; sorry trobalov if it got out of hand and *ot* but I was just defending myself from a few people. I thank anibal.

  6. #66

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    I dont think anyone is saying this argument is getting out of hand, and I am pretty sure we all want to continue it, but since we are all getting threatened, I wont say anything but this:

    I agree to disagree with all of Annibal and Lord Strongholds posts. Especially LS's last one. I disagree, and maintain my belief's (which should be well known.)

    NM
    Former Patron of: Sbsdude, Bgreman, Windblade, Scipii, Genghis Khan, Count of Montesano, Roman American, Praetorian Sejanus

    My time here has ended. The time of the syntigmata has ended. Such is how these things are, and I accept it. In the several years I was a member of this forum, I fought for what I considered to be the most beneficial actions to enrich the forum. I regret none of my actions, and retain my personal honor and integrity.
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  7. #67
    Mehmed II's Avatar Vicarius
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    I agree with your words but this topic is not about who was successful or not, it's about the "greatest general of the ancient world"
    Now you seem to be missing the most important thing you need to be the "greatest general in the ancient world" my friend: Success..

  8. #68
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    Yes but Alexander had to go up against poor soldiers and Alexander had FAR more resources than Hannibal ever did. in a strength to resource ratio, Hannibal did far more than Alexander. Most of Alexander's city takings did not require a battle at all.

    Word of Alexander slaughtering the cities of Tyre and others. Alexander's troops killed them all inside and sold even the women and children into slavery. This caused other cities to open peacefully to him. This allowed Alexander to take far more land then other generals.

    Hannibal employed similiar tactics. He sold into slavery and killed the Romans of any town he conquered that fought him. Yet the other towns did not surrender. It is because they were controlled by the legions and was a result of extra manpower on Rome's part. It also proves that the men of the west are more disciplined and obeying as opposed to the middle east.

    In the end Alexander made a mockery of Macedonia. He adopted Persian customs and appeared to his men to favor the persians more than the macedonians themselves. This lead to several soldiers plotting against him and led to Philota's and his families death. Later Alexander in drunken revelry slayed his friend Cletius. He was obviously not favored by his soldiers in the later years.


    Hannibal kept his men close and they loved him for it. Many of the Bruttiians from Italy even followed him back to Carthage to defend her against rome at zama where they were wiped out to the man because of a reliance of elephants to substitute cavalry.

  9. #69
    Anibal Barca
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    the most important thing you need to be the "greatest general in the ancient world" my friend: Success..
    and Hannibal had plenty of that, in what a "greatest general" title concerns: strategy and battles! While I have already exposed his master strategy that nearly brought down (hadn't his home suport behaved so treacherously) an overwhelmingly superior foe in what manpower concerns (not to mention better armoured and disciplined soldiers, and sea supremacy), I'll post now his 2 major battles (imo).

    TRASIMENE the greatest ambush of all times imo, where a complete army syncronizedly ambushes another complete army, and totally surprises the latter to the last seconds before engagement:

    "After out-manoeuvring the Romans [by strategically moving through the Etruria marshes and positioning himself between the suposedly blocking armies and Rome] and learning of the approach of the headstrong Roman general, Flaminius, Hannibal set up an ambush near Lake Trasimeno to head off the pursuing army. By design, this move forced Flaminius' army into open combat, and, as it passed between the northern shore of Lake Trasimene and the opposite hills.

    On the morning of June 24, 217 b.C. (according to the non-reformed calendar, and corresponding to April in the Julian calendar) Consul Flaminius ordered his troops to start again in pursuit of the Carthaginians. The night before Hannibal had instructed his men to light fires on the hills of Tuoro, so that the Romans would believe that his forces were farther away than they actually were. The truth of the matter was that his men were laid out in such way as to surround their enemies from all sides.

    The Romans moved off in a thick fog, winding along the narrow valley. All at once Hannibal gave orders for a general attack. From the surrounding hills the Carthaginian cavalry and infantry came down with an enormous impact, engaging the enemy army from all sides. The Romans did not even have time to draw up in their usual battle array, and were forced to fight in open order. The Carthaginians drove them on to the lake, where there was no escape.

    It was a terrible massacre: Hannibal's troops destroyed almost the entire Roman army of 25,000, killing possibly 15.000 Roman soldiers, including Consul Flaminius himself. Many others were driven to drown in the lake. An ancient tradition says that because of the blood, which for over three days filled the area, the name of the stream which crosses it was changed to Sanguineto - Blood River.

    Hannibal then now allowed his own troops to rest and paid the last honours to those of the highest rank among the fallen, about thirty in number, his whole loss having been about fifteen hundred, most of them Celts.

    [Some 6000, who managed to breakthrough in the front retired] in a body to a certain Etruscan village. After the battle, on Maharbal being sent by the general with the Spaniards and pikemen to surround the village, finding themselves beset by a complication of dangers they laid down their arms and surrendered on condition of their lives being spared.

    Reinforcements [to Flaminius] of about 4,000 cavalry under Gaius Centenius [the 2nd blocking army] were intercepted before they arrived and were also destroyed."

    Final note: Hannibal knew well the area, having passed several times through the place. So he was aware of the morning myst that almost blinded the human eye at that time of the day. No need to say that he gambled very well with this too (imagine that wasn't any fog in that crucial morning ...however the fog was even thicker than usual according to Polybius "It was an unusual misty morning" ).


    CANNAE, a battle still studied in military academies:

    http//www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/polybius-cannae.html
    -less than 50000 on Hannibal's side against +-85000 to 90000 betterarmoured and disciplined roman soldiers in a fair battle, in a plain, in their own homeland...
    -on the roman side..."out of six thousand horse, only seventy escaped with Caius Terentius to Venusia, and about three hundred of the allied cavalry to various towns in the neighborhood. Of the infantry ten thousand were taken prisoners in fair fight, but were not actually engaged in the battle: of those who were actually engaged only about three thousand perhaps escaped to the towns of the surrounding district; all the rest died nobly, to the number of seventy thousand. [20.000 of these 70.000 were actually captured and freed by Hannibal, except the romans who were sold as slaves to the greeks after their ransom being denied by the roman senate]"
    -"On the side of Hannibal there fell four thousand Celts, fifteen hundred Iberians and Libyans, and about two hundred horse"
    -(about those 10.000 not engaged in the main battle) "Lucius had left a force of ten thousand foot in his own camp, in order that, if Hannibal, neglecting his camp, employed his whole army in the field, they might during the battle gain entrance there and capture all the enemy's baggage. On the other hand, if Hannibal, guessing this danger, left a strong garrison in the camp, the force opposed to the Romans would be reduced in numbers. The circumstances of their capture were more or less as follows. Hannibal had left an adequate force to guard his camp, and when the battle opened, the Romans, as they had been ordered, delivered an assault on this force. At first they held out, but as they were beginning to be hard pressed, Hannibal, who was now victorious in every part of the field, came to their assistance, and routing the Romans shut them up in their camp. He killed two thousand of them and afterwards made all the rest prisoners"

    Note: Everybody usually said/says, when romans lost any battle, that their commander was a really bad commander! At Cannae, people say Varro was stupid to put his infantry so massed up without extending it to the sides, but they tend to forget a big detail: when Hannibal deployed his troops before the battle, he made it in a slight curve of the river, with his back facing the river Aufidus, and approximately covering the extension between the two ends of water, and also some rocky sloping mountains. He was inviting the enemy to attack and push him to the water (and drown Hannibal just like he did at the Lake Trasimene's ambush. Doing this they would avenge their dead roman ‘brothers’ with the exact same punishment they suffered). To do that, Varro had to mass up the infantry, so they all could charge and push with full strength between those two ends of the river's curve. But after the romans got close, deployed for that push, Hannibal commanded the all army to advance fast and.....and the rest we all know about



    The accounts I take are rough and could easily be wrong but hypothesis account that approximately 5000 soldiers per legion x 8 = 40,000 + half as much from allies =60,000 at Cannae alone and that is rough.
    - LS

    You're wrong here Stronghold. The allies always contributed with an equal number of soldiers (in desperate times even more):

    "They decided to bring eight legions into the field, a thing which had never been done before by the Romans, each legion consisting of about five thousand men apart from the allies. For, as I previously explained, they invariably employ four legions, each numbering about four thousand foot and two hundred horse, but on occasions of exceptional gravity they raise the number of foot in each legion to five thousand and that of the cavalry to three hundred. They make the number of the allied infantry equal to that of the Roman legions, but, as a rule, the allied cavalry are three times as numerous as the Roman" - Polybius


  10. #70

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    After the two battles you demonstrate here, Hannibal never wins another great victory of this decisive magnitude. You are repeating the same battles, his three glorious ones. But after that he remains in Italy for years and accomplishes nothing. If Hannibal had died of sickness or something right after Cannae, you might be able to argue that he "would" have gone on to crush the romans, and win the war, and that would probably make him equal to Alexander. But he didnt. His campaign lost its momentum.

    You keep dismissing Hannibals failure to take the city of Rome as not part of his "great" strategy. But I say that it was Roma that only mattered EVER. It's like chess. Take all but one of the pieces of the other side, and you have still not yet won. Rome is the King in this analogy, and Hannibal seemed to have failed to recognize that. His battles were again--TACTICAL. They were advantages that he could then exploit for a strategic victory, and yet he failed to do so. He was lacking in equipment and supplies, yes, but that was of his own doing. If he was relying on allies and luck to allow him to win, then do you know what he was doing? He was assuming. And that is a mistake. Made at the strategic level.

    Strategy is defined here as: A framework guiding those choices that determine the nature and direction to attain the objective.

    Hannibals strategy is either a failure, or flawed. If his strategy was to take rome, he never had a good strategy to do this, seeing as he totally miscalculated the resolve of the Carthaginian senate, and its support for the war. (Which again he never consulted about starting this war) If his strategy was to defeat Roman armies, then he performed this brilliantly, but it was not a proper strategy. How else can you defend him? I don't see how you can defend his relying on the Carthaginian senate when he lived in Iberia and was not intimately a part of it. Did he assume they would support him by default? How can you defend his assumptions here? He seldom sought out there help when he was in Iberia, why should he expect it then?

    I think Hannibal was living out a personal vendetta against Rome. He never really prepared himself for the full consequenses of war against them because it wasnt a coldly prepared war, it was one that he hotbloodedly got involved in, and it was always HIS war, not Carthage, not Rome, it was a war HE wanted, for revenge.

    NM
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  11. #71
    Anibal Barca
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    After the two battles you demonstrate here, Hannibal never wins another great victory of this decisive magnitude
    Ignorance. In the Iberian conquest he "decisively" had beaten forces that exceeded 100.000 forces:

    "Hannibal on assuming the command, at once set forth with the view of subduing a tribe called the Olcades, and arriving before their most powerful city Althaea, encamped there and soon made himself master of it by a series of vigorous and formidable assaults, upon which the rest of the tribe were overawed and submitted to the Carthaginians. After exacting tribute from the towns and possessing himself of a considerable sum, he retired to winter quarters at New Carthage. By the generosity he now displayed to the troops under his command, paying them in part and promising further payment, he inspired in them great good-will to himself and high hopes of the future. Next summer he made a fresh attack on the Vaccaei, assaulted and took Hermandica at the first onset, but Arbacala being a very large city with a numerous and brave population, he had to lay siege to it and only took it by assault after much pains. Subsequently on his return he unexpectedly found himself in great peril, the Carpetani, the strongest tribe in the district gathering to attack him and being joined by the neighbouring tribes, all incited to this by the fugitive Olcades, and also by those who had escaped from Hermandica. Had the Carthaginians been obliged to meet all this host in a pitched battle, they would assuredly have suffered defeat; but, as it was, Hannibal very wisely and skilfully faced about and retreated so as to place the river Tagus in his front, and remained there to dispute the crossing, availing himself of the aid both of the river and of his elephants, of which he had about forty, so that everything went as he had calculated and as no one else would have dared to expect. For when the barbarians tried to force a crossing at various points, the greater mass of them perished in coming out of the river, the elephants following its bank and being upon them as soon as they landed. Many also were cut down in the stream itself by the cavalry, as the horses could bear up better against the current, and the mounted men in fighting had the advantage of being higher than the unmounted enemy. Finally, Hannibal in his turn crossed the river and attacked the barbarians, putting to flight a force of more than one hundred thousand. After their defeat none of the peoples on that side of the Ebro ventured lightly to face the Carthaginians, with the exception of the Saguntines. Hannibal tried as far as he could to keep his hands off this city, wishing to give the Romans no avowed pretext for war" - Polybius

    Or in Gaul:

    "In the meantime a large force of barbarians had gathered on the opposite bank to prevent the Carthaginians from crossing [the river Rhone]. Hannibal observing this and concluding that as things stood it was neither possible to force a crossing in face of such a strong hostile force nor to put it off, lest he should find himself attacked on all sides, sent off on the third night after his arrival a portion of his army, giving them native guides and placing them under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar the Suffete. Advancing up the bank of the river for two hundred stades they reached a place at which the stream divides, forming an island, and here they stopped. Using the timber they found ready to hand and either nailing or lashing logs together they soon constructed a number of rafts sufficient for their present need, and on these they crossed in safety, meeting with no opposition. Occupying a post of some natural strength they remained there for that day to rest after their exertions and at the same time to prepare for the movement which they had been ordered to execute. Hannibal, moreover, with the part of the army that remained behind with him, was similarly occupied. The question that caused him the greatest embarrassment was how to get the elephants, thirty-seven in number, across.

    On the fifth night, however, the force which had already crossed began a little before dawn to advance along the opposite bank against the barbarians there, while Hannibal had got his soldiers ready and was waiting till the time for crossing came. He had filled the boats with his light horse and the canoes with his lightest infantry. The large boats were placed highest up stream and the lighter ferry-boats farther down, so that the heavier vessels receiving the chief force of the current the canoes should be less exposed to risk in crossing. They hit on the plan of towing the horses astern of the boats swimming, one man at each side of the stern guiding three or four horses by their leading reins, so that a considerable number were got across at once in the first batch. The barbarians seeing the enemy's project poured out of their camp, scattered and in no order, feeling sure that they would easily prevent the Carthaginians from landing. Hannibal, as soon as he saw that the force he had previously sent across was near at hand on the opposite bank, they having announced their approach by a smoke-signal as arranged, ordered all in charge of the ferry-boats to embark and push up against the current. He was at once obeyed, and now with the men in the boats shouting as they vied with one another in their efforts and struggled to stem the current, with the two armies standing on either bank at the very brink of the river, the Carthaginians following the progress of the boats with loud cheers and sharing in the fearful suspense, and the barbarians yelling their war-cry and challenging to combat, the scene was in the highest degree striking and thrilling. At this moment, the barbarians having deserted their tents, the Carthaginians on the far bank attacked suddenly and unexpectedly, and while some of them set fire to the enemy's encampment, the larger portion fell upon the defenders of the passage. The barbarians, taken quite by surprise, rushed some of them to save their tents, while others defended themselves against their assailants. Hannibal, all falling out favourably as he had purposed, at once marshalled those of his men who were the first to land, and after addressing some words of exhortation to them, led them to meet the barbarians, upon which the Celts, owing to their disordered condition and to their being taken by surprise, soon turned and turned to flight.

    The Carthaginian general, having thus made himself master of the passage and defeated the enemy, at once occupied himself in fetching over the men who had been left on the other bank, and having in a very short time brought his whole army across encamped for that night beside the river." - Polybius

    Entering and crossing the Alps he also defeated strong forces who were defending strong defensive positions, being thus very difficult battles (ala Thermopylae).

    And finally in Italy. Besides MY FAVOURITE unmatchable 2 battles I already refered, Trasimene and Cannae, he also won decisively major battles: Trebia, Herdonea, Numistro and ENDLESS minor major engagements...or do you think that multiple outnumbering armies surrounding Hannibal's little army during the following 14 years afetr Cannae would let him forage, ravage and pill at his will. The problem was that Hannibal was simply too much of a genious to let himself be caught in unfavourable conditions, and get defeated. Before stating such ignorances you should get informed NM. And now it's my time to ask you which were Alexander's "major and decisive" battles, coz judging from your post, I'm expecting around 10 when I thought they had been also around 3 or 4 (even if more like of a set of chasing 'battles' than properly battles )


    To finish here's another brilliant battle of Hannibal in Italy, at Geronium:

    "There was a small eminence between his[Hannibal's] own camp and that of Minucius capable of being used against either of them, and this he decided to occupy. The ground round the hill was treeless but had many irregularities and hollows of every description in it, and he sent out at night to the most suitable positions for ambuscade, in bodies of two or three hundred, five hundred horse and about five thousand light-armed and other infantry. In order that they should not be observed in the early morning by the Romans who were going out to forage, he occupied the hill with his light-armed troops as soon as it was daybreak. Minucius, seeing this and thinking a favourable chance, sent out at once his light infantry with orders to engage the enemy and dispute the position. Afterwards he sent his cavalry too and next followed in person leading his legions in close order, as on the former occasion, operating exactly in the same manner as then. The day was just dawning, and the minds and eyes of all were engrossed in the battle on the hill, so that no one suspected that the ambuscade had been posted. Hannibal kept constantly sending reinforcements to his men on the hill, and when he very shortly followed himself with his cavalry and the rest of his force, the cavalry on both sides soon came into action. Upon this, the Roman light infantry were forced off the field by the numbers of the Carthaginian horse, and, falling back on the legions, threw them into confusion, while at the same time, on the signal being given to those lying in ambush, they appeared from all directions and attacked, upon which not only the Roman light infantry but their whole army found itself in a most perilous position. It was now that Fabius, seeing the state of matters and seriously fearing a total disaster, came up in haste with his own army to assist. On his approach the Romans again plucked up courage, although they had now entirely broken their ranks, and collecting round the standards retreated and took refuge under cover of Fabius' force after losing many of their light-armed troops, but still more of the legionaries and the very best men among them. Hannibal, being afraid of the new legions, which, quite fresh and in admirable order, had come to the help of their comrades, abandoned the pursuit and brought the battle to a close." - Polybius Book 3



    About strategy again (I'm very surprised on your lack of strategic insight NM)...
    You keep dismissing Hannibals failure to take the city of Rome as not part of his "great" strategy....Hannibals strategy is either a failure, or flawed. If his strategy was to take rome, he never had a good strategy to do this
    LOL, he had the ONLY and most brilliant strategy possible!

    (i have to go out for a couple of hours now but I'll edit and finish this post later)

  12. #72
    Mehmed II's Avatar Vicarius
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    Anibal, what is this?

    I agree with your words but this topic is not about who was successful or not, it's about the "greatest general of the ancient world"
    You seem to be finally accepting the fact that Hannibal was not "successful" in the long term in his campaign against Rome.

    But, you suddenly change your ideas and post this:
    and Hannibal had plenty of that, in what a "greatest general" title concerns: strategy and battles!
    Guys, you seem to be missing the point here. I'm repeating it over and over again. We are NOT talking about the great generals of the ancient world; we are talking about the GREATEST general in the ancient world. Now, it seems that we have two competitors, both of them are great generals.

    a) One of them is a general who fought against a very technologically advanced, disciplined enemy, won (I apologize for my ignorance) 4 large pitched battles but eventually LOST
    B) The other one is a general who fought against a very powerful army in QUANTITY and WON.

    Also do not forget that both of these enemies were "empires".
    a) Alexander fought against the Persian Empire: One of the richest, largest empires in the world known for its large armies.
    B) Hannibal fought against the roman empire, the ideal empire known for its famous, disciplined, well trained armies.

  13. #73

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    Before stating such ignorances you should get informed NM.
    Now you are getting out of hand. Chill dude. I said, if you read my post:
    "Hannibal never wins another great victory of this decisive magnitude" Note the ANOTHER. And he does not. I could care less about "victories" against iberian tribesmen or Gauls. Caesar shows what "accurate historic numbers" are to a single account. Those numbers may very well be trumped up greatly, and even if they arent, it was BEFORE the italian campaign, and hardley worthy of mention in this thread. Show me a good example of a DECISIVE battle after Cannae--another battle that "shook rome to its core" and you will come up empty handed. He fought many little skirmishes, and simple meeting engagements, nothing of serious damage to the roman war machine. The romans even adopted a great strategy of avoiding conflict with hannibal which showed him to be impotent to attack Rome proper.

    You still havent answered my assertion that Hannibal never understood that the city of Rome was the proverbial King of the chess game.

    Scipio was a superior strategist to Hannibal, as he was the one who cut off Hannibal and forced him back to North Africa, after he had been unable to be removed from Italy. Thats great strategy. Because it worked just as he expected. He also had a troubled senate that wanted him to return to the homeland, but he was able to control his opponents and get what he wanted.

    LOL, he had the ONLY and most brilliant strategy possible!
    Methinks if you start a war (or at least get involved in one without trying diplomacy) and your best strategy leads to defeat, it is not a brilliant strategy.

    NM
    Former Patron of: Sbsdude, Bgreman, Windblade, Scipii, Genghis Khan, Count of Montesano, Roman American, Praetorian Sejanus

    My time here has ended. The time of the syntigmata has ended. Such is how these things are, and I accept it. In the several years I was a member of this forum, I fought for what I considered to be the most beneficial actions to enrich the forum. I regret none of my actions, and retain my personal honor and integrity.
    Fallen Triumvir

  14. #74

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    I personally think that it is a tie:

    Hannibal always impressed me. This guy opposed perhaps the strongest nation of that era and with his exceptional strategic mind and ruthlessness, he proved to the word that he was the the nemesis indeed. The battle of Canna and the ambush of the lake Trasimeno still astonish me. The results of excellent generalship indeed...

    Second of all, I agree that the persian army was not as trained and "machined" as the Roman army was. But I must add: You simply can't expect an army with that size to be completely trained and disciplined. Despite this fact, Alexander conquered the known world in less than 10 years and you can't blame him for his short life and bad successors. What could have been done if he hadn't died so early? I shudder to think.....

  15. #75
    Anibal Barca
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    Ok NM, I'll continue my post, on what strategy (and other new posts' points) concerns, here.
    You keep dismissing Hannibals failure to take the city of Rome as not part of his "great" strategy. But I say that it was Roma that only mattered EVER. It's like chess. Take all but one of the pieces of the other side, and you have still not yet won. Rome is the King in this analogy, and Hannibal seemed to have failed to recognize that.
    - NM

    You are suggesting he should have marched directly on Rome? Your strategy would be indeed doomed from the start. Repeating once again:

    "of course that breaking Rome from its numerous and overpopulated italian allied cities was CRUCIAL. If he went, as you suggest, right on to Rome with some slowing heavy equipment the following would happen:

    1)it's a bit difficult and dangerous task to take that heavy gear through the Pirenees, Southern Gaul and the Alps...all hostile territory as the multiple enemies Hannibal had to fight or ingeniously avoid show us.

    2)it would have slowed him immensily, and he and his army would have more than probably been pinned by multiple armies, and obliged to offer battle when the conditions did not favour him. Besides, being slow, would doom his war from the begining as he would have not prevented some of his main goals, including fighting in the enemy land and play the allies-atrition war in Italy and not in his homeground:

    "one of the two roman consular armies was geting ready in Sicily to embark to Africa when Hannibal emerged in Italy, while the other consular army missed Hannibal for a couple of days (even hours as cavalry clashes actually hapened) in Massilia/Marseille, where Scipio's father and his consular army landed, thinking he was going to be with a good days advantage over Hannibal, giving him time to coordinate his defense with his Southern Gaulish allies against Hannibal....Hannibal already had crushed those gauls brilliantly at the river Rhone, where those same Gauls were blocking Hannibal's cross on the other side of this large river. Hannibal decided to continue the march to Italy though, preventing the romans to concentrate their forces in Hannibal's home ground, and so preventing them to play an atrition war with Carthage's Iberian/ African allies. The exact atrition war that Hannibal was about to start in Italy with Rome's italian allies."

    3) if, as you suggest, he would have headed on Rome, he would have been pinned down against the walls of the well fortified Rome by multiple LARGE armies coming from all the overpopulated Italy and rome's allied cities. That's why he had to neutralize and secure the overpopulated southern region from the romans, before heading on Rome and its also overpopulated central allied states. As you must agree, his 'little' army was incapable of doing both, and that's why he asked for reinforcements (another army) after Cannae, to secure with standing garrisons and a nearby army, these numerous vital new allied cities! The southern Italy region was the first place to be neutralized and secured also coz it was the easiest point to get those reinforcements from Carthage. And as I said, those reinforcements never came, but Hannibal still managed to hold alone with his little army, STRATEGICALLY and TACTICALLY, for 14 years and still winning battles, even if surrounded by greatly outnumbering roman armies. As I said, less than 3 years after Cannae, Rome had already 220.000 men on the field.

    Quite frankly NM, he would have never nearly got where he did with your doomed strategy. Hannibal's strategy was brilliant, worthy of an unmatchable genious... but screwed by the factor one could less expect, his suposedly strongest ally, Carthage itself."

    As you see from my 3 points, Rome was always the target (or the 'King' if you wish), but he would never risk it to the point of sieging Rome, leting himself be pinned against the walls and become obliged to offer battle against multiple surrounding armies coming from the vast manpower resources from all around him. Besides the fact that bringing that heavy equipment he left in Iberia before crossing the Pirenees to properly siege cities, would have slowed him to the point where he had to offer battle in unfavourable conditions most of the times (due to less agility) and probably he would have never even entered Italy considering what that agility helped him in the previous battle! Securing that recently conquered (or becomed allied) southern vast manpower resources with a second army from Carthage (at least one of the 3 they sent elsewhere) he would finally have the precious time and freedom of movement to march on Rome and build siege machinery, without risking being slow and become surrounded from multiple armies, and obliged to offer battle in unfavorable conditions. Is it so hard for you to see that this was the "most brilliant" (and probably the only) strategy against such a powerful foe, who had overwhelmingly outnumbering manpower resources, wich armies consisted of betterarmoured and disciplined soldiers, and also had the sea supremacy?



    he never had a good strategy to do this, seeing as he totally miscalculated the resolve of the Carthaginian senate, and its support for the war. He seldom sought out there help when he was in Iberia, why should he expect it then?

    I don't see how you can defend his relying on the Carthaginian senate when he lived in Iberia and was not intimately a part of it. Did he assume they would support him by default? How can you defend his assumptions here?

    I think Hannibal was living out a personal vendetta against Rome. He never really prepared himself for the full consequenses of war against them because it wasnt a coldly prepared war, it was one that he hotbloodedly got involved in, and it was always HIS war, not Carthage, not Rome, it was a war HE wanted, for revenge.
    - NM

    honestly NM, your arguments are geting weaker and weaker. You ask why would the Carthaginian Senate suport him....hmmm...maybe coz Hannibal was working for Carthage? Maybe coz the Carthaginian Senate, when offered war by Rome, reacted like this:

    "On the Roman envoys arriving and appearing before the [Carthaginian] Senate and delivering their message, the Carthaginians listened with indignation to this choice of alternatives, but putting up their most able member to speak, they entered upon their justification. They said not a word of the treaty with Hasdrubal, considering it as not existent, or if existent, as not concerning them, since it was made without their approval. Here they quoted the precedent of the Romans themselves, alleging that the treaty made in the war for Sicily under Lutatius, though agreed to by Lutatius, had been repudiated by the Romans as having been made without their approval. They pointed out that at that time the Saguntines were not the allies of Rome, and to prove their point they read aloud several extracts from the treaty. The Romans refused definitely to discuss the matter of justification, saying that while Saguntum still stood unharmed matters admitted of a plea of justification and it was possible to reach a decision on the disputed points by argument, but now that the treaty had been broken by the seizure of the city either they must give up the culprits, which would make it clear to all that they had no share in the wrong, but that it had been done without their approval, or if they refused to do so and thus confessed that they were participators in the misdeed they must accept war.

    After listening to the Carthaginians' statement of their case, they made no other reply but the following. The oldest member of the embassy, pointing to the bosom of his toga, told the Senate that it held both war and peace for them: therefore he would let fall from it and leave with them whichever of the two they bade him. The Carthaginian Suffete bade him let fall whichever the Romans chose, and when the envoy said he would let fall war, many of the senators cried out at once, "We accept it." The ambassadors and the Senate parted on this terms." - Polybius Book 3

    Hope this was clear...very clear.

    ....and maybe coz Hannibal was always a loyal "subject of the crown" always sending them part of the Iberian riches he got?:

    "At length after eight months of hardship and anxiety he took the city [Saguntum] by storm. A great booty of money, slaves, and property fell into his hands. The money, as he had determined, he set aside for his own purposes, the slaves he distributed among his men according to rank, and the miscellaneous property he sent off at once to Carthage. The result did not deceive his expectations, nor did he fail to accomplish his original purpose; but he both made his troops more eager to face danger and the Carthaginians more ready to accede to his demands on them" - Polybius

    the same he did after Cannae, sending most of the booty (tons of jewelry of all those dead officers) "thrown at the floor" of the Carthaginian Senate.

    I could care less about "victories" against iberian tribesmen or Gauls
    - NM
    Maybe you should. It was those same 'tribesmen' in Iberia, for example, that kicked roman armies' asses over and over, even with much smaller forces. To make my point, Hamilcar and Hannibal took 20 years to conquer (nearly) all Iberia, while romans took nearly 200 years to conquer also (nearly) all Iberia, and with much MUCH more resources 'spent' (or killed if you wish ).

    Caesar shows what "accurate historic numbers" are to a single account. Those numbers may very well be trumped up greatly
    - NM

    Indeed. In the case of Caesar in Gaul, or in the case of Alexander in Persia, this may very well have happened, since the accounts are done by the winner private writers...not the case in this iberian battle, where Polybius puts these numbers and do not express any doubt, except that , after killing a bunch of them and crossing the river... "putting to flight a force of more than one hundred thousand".


    Show me a good example of a DECISIVE battle after Cannae--another battle that "shook rome to its core" and you will come up empty handed
    - NM
    LOL it will be kind of hard to find a second impressive battle as Cannae indeed....even if you search through all history! However, if it hasn't hapened, is mainly due to Rome's fear of Hannibal and his 'little' army: "As the 213 BC campaigning season opened, the Romans now had over 220,000 men in the field. Gracchus and Fabius the younger were the new counsels. The policy remained the same: contain Hannibal!"

    HOWEVER I could point out many examples of great battles after Cannae NM. Like when he defeated and killed Marcelus at Venusia, the most reknowned general (by far) at the time:

    "Herdonea, after the defeat of the Romans at Cannae, had become one of Hannibal's allies. In the first battle, Roman discipline was so lax that, according to Livy, the Romans began to flee almost as soon as Hannibal's army raised its battle cry.

    Roman efforts to destroy Hannibal's logistic bases in southern Italy, rather than face him in open battle, also failed as he destroyed several more armies. In the second battle of Herdonea (if Livy is correct) in 210 BC, another Gnaeus Fulvius, this time a Proconsul, fought and lost a much more credible battle against Hannibal (including the death of G. F. Centumalus himself). Hannibal then defeated M. C. Marcellus again at Numistro.

    According to Livy, messengers had been sent to Hannibal, warning him that some in the town wanted to switch sides and open the gates to the besieging forces of Fulvius. In response to this, and the news of Marcellus' capture of Salapia (a coastal town on the Adriatic) Hannibal, leaving his baggage behind, force marched an army to attack Fulvius.

    Hannibal achieved complete surprise. The Carthaginians were already in battle formation, relatively near the Roman camp, as the Romans were trying to form up. The Romans lost another 16,000 men to Hannibal's veterans at Herdonea. The Roman survivors were sent to Sicily as punishment, and joined the Cannae legions there.

    Hannibal managed to hold off vastly superior Roman armies, defeating Marcus Claudius Marcellus yet again, at Asculum.

    In 208 however, Hannibal succeeded in ambushing and killing the two Roman Consuls, one of them the famed Marcus Claudius Marcellus (referred to as "the Sword of Rome", where Fabius was "the shield")."

    hmmm...the two consuls defeated and killed...a couple of proconsuls too...many roman armies utterly crushed...good enough?

    won (I apologize for my ignorance) 4 large pitched battles but eventually LOST
    - MehmedII
    yes MehmedII, I apologize you too

    Scipio was a superior strategist to Hannibal, as he was the one who cut off Hannibal
    I would say Hannibal was cut off not by Scipio, but by the Carthaginian Senate in 216BC. For the reasons I stated, if Hannibal got this second army (at least one of the 3 the Carthaginian Senate sent elsewhere), he would have secured from Rome those recently won VAST southern recruit pools, calmly march on Rome, calmly build siege machinery and calmly take the city, and calmly win the war. No time for Scipio and his army 6 years later...no time for Zama 14 years later neither.

    And I would say that both Scipio (being a very good strategist, though still not as good as Hannibal imo) and Hannibal, were GREAT strategists....better than Alexander who strategy was nearly ...march forward

    He also had a troubled senate that wanted him to return to the homeland
    better having this kind of "troubled senate" than one who would send him no reinforcements nor supplies nor assistance.



    Now MehmedII,
    You seem to be finally accepting the fact that Hannibal was not "successful" in the long term in his campaign against Rome.
    That's where I draw the line. Hannibal was successful, VERY successful... Carthage was not


    Finally MehmedI,
    Alexander conquered the known world in less than 10 years
    Known world? What about Carthage and its empire, what about Rome? They were powerful nations around 323BC, especially Carthage, who had already traveled and found the british isles, the west atlantic african coast, and more than probably India (by Sea) and America. Carthage also had a very powerful agricultural and manufacturing 'industry', boosting greatly their trade routes. Rome and Carthage were thrieving. The "known" world you're talking about was more like the the known rotting world: the coastal middle east fell with the fall of one city (Tyre), Egypt fell without a single fight, and Persia (since Cyrus the Great) was decadent (as Wulf explained before), a bunch of disgoverned pop with an army that had no drill anylonger (for a long time). Resuming, a quickly assembled group of poorly trained, poorly armoured and poorly commanded soldiers. Darius himself was a coward and clumsy commander, who fled the field after the first couple of men fell in the ground (or maybe he wasn't so coward and knew his army were MTW peasants fighting against a professional army, that Philip had assembled and trained).

  16. #76
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    LOL This argument could go on and on. Anyway when you NM state that hannibal's overall strategy is poor think about it. The romans can easily get a new fleet so the sea is out of the question for Carthage in terms of getting men into Italy.

    So what does Hannibal do? He decideds to cross over the pyrenhees and alps into Rome. All the time fighting off thousand of iberians, gauls, dissention. He did this when most times of the year were considered impossible to do what he did. He completely surprised the Romans and made fools of them. As Hannibal stated the battles against the gauls were of at least the same quality as the ones against Alexander's battles against the Indians

    The fact that Hannibal stayed in Rome for 16 years alone is mindboggling. No general has done that under the same circumstances that Hannibal faced. He had mainly Bruttian tribesman at the time and was vastly outnumbered.

    In respect, Hasdrubal and the other commanders of Carthage's armies were rubbish. They had really no chance in terms of fighting Romans lead by Scipio and other Roman Generals. This means that Hannibal is the only army of Carthage able to win a fight against the Romans. Which means that Rome only needs 1 army to hold of Hannibal whilst thousands of others can run rampant in Carthage. Scipio was just 1 of those army generals.

    Scipio had seen Hannibal in action at LEAST 3 times. He knew that Hannibal relied heavily upon his Numidian horse. Scipio helped de-throne Syphax and proclaim Massinissa as king of Numidia. Hannibal had only 4 thousand numidians at Zama and was thus forced to rely upon elephants to win the battle. Hannibal had no clue as to Scipio's tactics and his elephants wrecked horrendous casualties against his own numidians in response to javelins from the velites.

    Darius had no access to Macedonian pikemen and thus couldn't beat the pikemen without losing horrendous casualties. Why didn't Darius perform a "mass flanknig maneuver" in which his men would come from behind the pikemen? Becuase the persian "levies" were not trained and disciplined enough and probably still wouldn't win. Either that or he was just stupid. He had access to greek mercenaries but not to the elite pikemen of Macedonia.

    120,000 men still have to have some form of strategy. Even a million men could not beat 1000 if they had strategy.
    Proof of this lies at Thermopylae(spelling?). The persians advanced into 300 spartan hoplites and were slaughtered until they found the trail leading behind the enemy. The persians could have used horse archers to crush the hoplites by losing almost no men.

    Another thing. You say that Carthage exaggerated the numbers of her foes. The romans would be DESPERATE to get Hannibal out of Italy and the German tribes are easily able to recruit 100,000 men into an army. The greek historians and writers stated that over 1 million persian troops were at Thermopylae. This has been proven wrong and no great unification or law staes in Greece at the time that figures must be correct. This means that just as likely the troops at Alexander's battles could easily be exaggerated in turn. I do not believe this to be so but still could be the case.

    Alexander had access to siege weapons whilst Hannibal did not. He could not land any by boat due to the roman navy and his troops would strave or be annahilated by gauls if they brought them over the mountains with the army. Even then Hannibal managed to take several towns by treachery which proves that even in sieges he is superior. he however could not go up against Rome's walls because they overnumbered Hannibal's forces even in flat plains. To attack rome itself would be suicide and he made the correct decision even though it was the only way to win the war.

    The whole strategy behind Hannibal taking towns was to convince the allies of Rome to abandon her. This would mean that at least half of Romes fighting men would leave the army and Hannibal could beat the Romans. The romans took advantage of Hannibal not being in 2 places at the same time( ) to take other towns with siege weapons and effectively destroyed his hope of unifying against rome.

    The fact remains that no Roman general would dare face Hannibal in plain open battle for at least 8 or 10 years whilst he is still in Rome.

  17. #77
    Mehmed II's Avatar Vicarius
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    The persians could have used horse archers to crush the hoplites by losing almost no men.
    Don't be so sure. Armoured knights of Charles Martel successfully defended themselves against the Ummayid horse archers, by dismounting and hiding behind their shields. Hoplites could've executed the same tactic, who knows?

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    Hoplites could've executed the same tactic, who knows?
    Hoplites do that already. It is how each of them helps the other by creating a shield wall which is nearly impenetreble. I bet that if the persians had scouted farther ahead they could have found the secret passage and eliminated the spartans easily.

    Anyway why did XerXes continue to let his men go into such a deathtrap? He never received information of what is going on or he is arrogant.(probably arrogant)

  19. #79
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    Greatest general of the ancient world, what about Mete Khan guys? Often told as Mao-Dun in Chinese records.

    The founder of the great hunnic empire, fought against his father, his mother and his brother for the throne, won and ordered the execution of all three at the end. With his armies, he advanced straight into China and passed the great wall. After taxing the chinese, he took over and united all of the steppe tribes in central asia and beyond. (Tunghuz-Mongol, Yue-chi, Oguz-Kırgız,Sabar) From the great lake of Hazar to the sea that separates China from Zipangu; what a nation eh?

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    Mao Dun? The Xiong Nu man who founded a steppe empire? Nowhere close to what Chingisz Khan made out of a similar steppe empire.

    But anyways, my vote goes to Cyrus the Great. Great strategist, organiser, tactician, and builder. Also the very first humanist to walk this earth. There is no greater.

    Lord Stronghold:

    Xerxes overextended himself after the victory at Thermopylae. The result was two armies trapped in enemy territory between angry Greek city-states. Even Mardonios lead his army badly, failing to set it up correctly and ending up getting slaughtered by the stinky Spartans.

    I still fail to comprehend why Greeks, expelled from their city, would come to the Persian court to beg assistance to invade their homeland and re-instate them as tyrant. Greeks... no right to call anyone 'barbaroi'.

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