How would Roman Legions have performed against pre-gunpowder "medieval" armies

[Entropy Judge]

I do disagree with you when you posted that the Roman Legions were no better than most in close combat. That's like me posting the mongols were no better than most on horseback.

I'm not sure what post exactly you're referring to, but the Romans were soldiers, not warriors. Soldiers are trained in group tactics - that is, they are trained to rely on others to help them - while warriors are not. The Romans, often as not, fought warriors, not soldiers, and so, individually, were not any better individually. As long as the Romans have the room to cooperate, they will generally prevail, but stretch them a bit too much, and longer, slashing swords aren't going to be blocked by someone else's shield, and crowd them a bit too much and their shields begin to hamper their own movement.

[Titus001]

I'm not sure what post exactly you're referring to, but the Romans were soldiers, not warriors. Soldiers are trained in group tactics - that is, they are trained to rely on others to help them - while warriors are not. The Romans, often as not, fought warriors, not soldiers, and so, individually, were not any better individually. As long as the Romans have the room to cooperate, they will generally prevail, but stretch them a bit too much, and longer, slashing swords aren't going to be blocked by someone else's shield, and crowd them a bit too much and their shields begin to hamper their own movement.

That is why the Roman soldier was Superior to the warrior. The Roman soldier was trained as a group to work as a machine while the warrior was not. I never said the roman soldier was better than a warrior in a 1 on 1 fight. I meant that the Roman legions were much more the better than 5000 warriors in a pitch battle. Talking about individual fighters is useless in a pitch battle unless the battle is a small one. That makes the Romans infantry superior in a pitch battle b/c they had the traning to work as a group in pitch battle unlike the warrior. The guy that said they were no better than most I thought he meant the legion in pitch battle against a foe. He might of meant in a 1 on 1 fight which I do agree 100% that the roman soldier was no better than most. But, in a pitch battle the romans were superior to any army up until the powerful Sassanid Empire came onto the seen.

Battlefield Britain bbc. Romans vs Boudica. Shows the wedge formation/close nit fighting>individual warriors.
http://www.metacafe.com/watch/337573...field_britain/

Batman DEAD END
batman vs. alien vs. predator batman has no chance. The predator would win with ease. The guy that made this is a batman fanboy......
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hjp0I_okX0w

[ThiudareiksGunthigg]

Great post +1 rep

Ummm, his post was full of errors of fact about Medieval armies and outdated Nineteenth Century myths about Medieval warfare that are now totally rejected by military historians. So explain to me how it's a "great post" again? :hmmm:

Or the Romans in the late stage could not afford to pay for highly armored/trained infantry anymore.

The late Roman Army still consisted of highly trained and well armoured soldiers who remained an extremely effective military force. They were just armoured differently. We've discussed why segmentata was abandoned many times and it's possible that it was partly because it was expensive, though that is far from certain. What is certain is that in the Third Century the Roman Army standardised its equipment across the whole Empire and the western variant armour that we call segmentata disappeared. This happened at the same time that the gladius was replaced with the spatha, the curved rectangular scutumj was replaced with oval or round shields and the pilum was replaced with a variety of ranged weapons. Taken together, these changes seem to reflect changes in tactics rather than ones neccessitated by economics.

Maybe thats why the legions dropped in number be it obsolete/strategy or economy.

The size of the administrative unit dropped from 6000 to 1000. The army overall increased in size to more than double its former number. What these changes mean is open to considerable debate.

Mark Herman wrote “The increasing power of cavalry stemmed not from any significant increase in their own capability, but to the gradual disappearance of trained infantry.”

If "Mark Herman" thinks the later Roman Army didn't have trained infantry then "Mark Herman" needs to educate himself better. I've never heard of "Mark Herman" and I'm pretty familiar with the current leading scholars on the late Roman Army so I strongly suspect "Mark Herman" doesn't know what the hell he's talking about.

[Titus001]

Ummm, his post was full of errors of fact about Medieval armies and outdated Nineteenth Century myths about Medieval warfare that are now totally rejected by military historians. So explain to me how it's a "great post" again? :hmmm:



The late Roman Army still consisted of highly trained and well armoured soldiers who remained an extremely effective military force. They were just armoured differently. We've discussed why segmentata was abandoned many times and it's possible that it was partly because it was expensive, though that is far from certain. What is certain is that in the Third Century the Roman Army standardised its equipment across the whole Empire and the western variant armour that we call segmentata disappeared. This happened at the same time that the gladius was replaced with the spatha, the curved rectangular scutumj was replaced with oval or round shields and the pilum was replaced with a variety of ranged weapons. Taken together, these changes seem to reflect changes in tactics rather than ones neccessitated by economics.



The size of the administrative unit dropped from 6000 to 1000. The army overall increased in size to more than double its former number. What these changes mean is open to considerable debate.




If "Mark Herman" thinks the later Roman Army didn't have trained infantry then "Mark Herman" needs to educate himself better. I've never heard of "Mark Herman" and I'm pretty familiar with the current leading scholars on the late Roman Army so I strongly suspect "Mark Herman" doesn't know what the hell he's talking about.

"At the Battle of Charlons(circa 451 AD) Attila the Hun rallied his troops by mocking the once vaunted Roman infantry, alleging that they merely huddled under a screen of protective shields in close formation. He ordered his troops to ignore them and to attack the powerful Alans and Visogoths instead. It was a sad commentary on the force that had once dominated Europe, the Mediterrean and much of the Middle East."

"Ancient writers like Zosimusin the 5th century AD condemned the "reserve" policy as a major weakening of the military force. Other modern scholars (Ferrill et al) also see the pullback as a strategic mistake, arguing that it left lower quality "second string" limitanei forces to stop an enemy, until the distant mobile reserve arrived. While the drop in quality did not happen immediately, it is argued that over time, the limitanei declined into lightly armed, static watchman type troops that were of dubious value against increasing barbarian marauders on the frontiers. The pullback of the best infantry was based more on political reasons (shoring up the power bases of the emperors and various elites) rather than on military reality. In addition it is claimed, the "forward" policy was not at all a static "Maginot" approach, but that traditional heavy legions and supporting cavalry could still move to a trouble spot by redeploying them from fortifications elsewhere along a particular frontier."

Vegetius also said the late roman legion declined compared to the trajan era legions.

Did I ever say the late roman legion was not effective? The late Roman army/legion won a crap load of victories in the later empire. It is open to debate that the legion had lost it's power that it had in the Trajan days. It is fact that the Trajan imperial legions were a more heavy armed/slower troops compared to the later legions. For example the Scutum is a heavier shield compared to the new shield that was used in the later empire. They had to be lighter armed to keep up with the cavalry to rush to the borders when the invaders crossed. I still believe the economy played a major roll in the change of strategy in the empire. I believe the froward policy was the way to go like what they did in the past. Having the crack legion troops on the border seems more effective over the mobile reserve policy. The econmoy forced the change in policy not military threats in my opinion. I think one of the reason besides the economy that the mobile reserve was adopted was not so much the new military threats from the outside but more of a political move by the emperors."The pullback of the best infantry was based more on political reasons shoring up the power bases of the emperors and various elites rather than on military reality." I just think having the lower quality troops on the border was a mistake on the romans part. Again I'm not saying the later legion was crap. I just believe that they lost it's awesome power it had during Trajan era. Be it economy or new threats the legions evolved for better or worse.

[ThiudareiksGunthigg]

"At the Battle of Charlons(circa 451 AD) Attila the Hun rallied his troops by mocking the once vaunted Roman infantry, alleging that they merely huddled under a screen of protective shields in close formation. He ordered his troops to ignore them and to attack the powerful Alans and Visogoths instead. It was a sad commentary on the force that had once dominated Europe, the Mediterrean and much of the Middle East."

And this a quote from who, exactly? Whoever they are, their analysis is largely based on fantasy. We have one detailed account of the battle of Chalons – that of Jordanes in his Getica XXXVIII (197) – and there’s absolutely nothing in that account that has Attila “mocking” the Romans or ordering his troops to “ignore” them. So where is this nonsense coming from?

"Ancient writers like Zosimusin the 5th century AD condemned the "reserve" policy as a major weakening of the military force. Other modern scholars (Ferrill et al) also see the pullback as a strategic mistake, arguing that it left lower quality "second string" limitanei forces to stop an enemy, until the distant mobile reserve arrived. While the drop in quality did not happen immediately, it is argued that over time, the limitanei declined into lightly armed, static watchman type troops that were of dubious value against increasing barbarian marauders on the frontiers. The pullback of the best infantry was based more on political reasons (shoring up the power bases of the emperors and various elites) rather than on military reality. In addition it is claimed, the "forward" policy was not at all a static "Maginot" approach, but that traditional heavy legions and supporting cavalry could still move to a trouble spot by redeploying them from fortifications elsewhere along a particular frontier."

The idea that the limitanei were "second string" or lightly armed, static watchman type troops … of dubious value” is not accepted by current military historians. As Elton and Heather both point out, units were moved from the limitanei into the comitatenses when required without any need for retraining or reequipment. That doesn’t make sense if they were somehow inferior to the rest of the field army troops. The idea that the military reforms of the Third Century somehow “weakened” the Roman Army also doesn’t make sense – if the later Roman Army was so terribly “weakened”, why didn’t the Eastern Empire also fall? Why did this “weakening” only affect the West? And Arther Ferrill’s thesis is not well regarded by other historians of the period. He ignores the fact that when the Western Roman Empire put its army up against the invaders it beat them almost every time. The fall of the Roman Empire was not a military collapse, it was a political and economic one. The army remained highly effective right to the end. The economically stronger and politically more stable Eastern Empire – which had exactly the same type of army – survived while its weaker, poorer and more divided Western counterpart collapsed.

Vegetius also said the late roman legion declined compared to the trajan era legions.

Vegetius was an armchair expert who glorified and idealized the early Empire’s army and whose own experience of warfare and the army of his own time was precisely zero. Ammianus, on the other hand, was a former soldier and he didn’t seem to notice that the army was somehow less effective.

Did I ever say the late roman legion was not effective? The late Roman army/legion won a crap load of victories in the later empire. It is open to debate that the legion had lost it's power that it had in the Trajan days. It is fact that the Trajan imperial legions were a more heavy armed/slower troops compared to the later legions.

“Slower”? What are you basing this on?

For example the Scutum is a heavier shield compared to the new shield that was used in the later empire.

I’ve used reconstructions of both kinds of shield in re-enactment combat. The difference in weight is negligible.

They had to be lighter armed to keep up with the cavalry to rush to the borders when the invaders crossed.

Sorry but cavalry armies move slower than infantry ones. You can threaten, cajole or tempt a man to march faster, but if a horse is tired all the gold or shouting in the world won’t keep him from going slowly or stopping.

I still believe the economy played a major roll in the change of strategy in the empire. I believe the froward policy was the way to go like what they did in the past. Having the crack legion troops on the border seems more effective over the mobile reserve policy. The econmoy forced the change in policy not military threats in my opinion.

This change was necessitated by the economy, how exactly?

[Titus001]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Ferrill
http://www.ancientworlds.net/aw/Article/398211
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_infantry_tactics

I just ordered Arthur Ferill's book called The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation

What is your opinion on this book if you read it.....

[ThiudareiksGunthigg]

I just ordered Arthur Ferill's book called The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation

What is your opinion on this book if you read it.....

Of course I've read it - I don't comment on and dismiss books I haven't read. Here's my Amazon.com review of Ferrill's book which summarises why other military historians think it's junk:

On the whole Ferrill's book is a useful resource as a summary of the major events in the collapse of the Western Empire, but the central thesis of Ferrill's work and his final conclusion are both very weak. Ferrill dismisses the longer term economic and administrative failings of the Western Empire, but does so without actually discussing them. He says that to see the later Empire "as a troubled giant .... a decaying Empire .... is to miss the point." (p.164) but he doesn't explain why. In fact, the long term problems of inflation, a declining population and a shrinking tax base, along with a widening gap between rich and poor in the West and a spiraling trend towards ruralisation of the population all combined and accelerated slowly over a long period between the reign of Diocletian and 476 AD.

What we conspicuously don't see in this period is any major military defeats of the Roman army by barbarian invaders. When the weakening, fragmenting and economically aenemic Western Empire is confronted by a military threat in this period it usually defeats it - at least for as long as the failing economy and collapsing administration is still able to organise armed resistance.

The fall of the West was an economic and administrative failing - battles and tactics had virtually nothing to do with it.

But Ferrill simply dismisses all this as "missing the point" without a word of explanation as to why all these highly significant factors are completely irrelevant. He simply tells us they are - end of story.

He writes:

"Many historians have argued .... that the fall of Rome was not primarily a military phenomenon. In fact, it was exactly that. After 410 the emperor in the West could no longer project military power to the frontiers."
(p. 164)

This is quite true, but what Ferrill skips lightly over is the reason for this - the depopulated and cash-strapped Western Empire, having fought five civil wars in the last century and wracked by political instability, was simply in no position to field the armies it needed to protect the border provinces. It's not as though outdated Roman armies were being tackled and beaten by superior barbarian forces. The armies weren't withdrawing after being routed on battlefields by overwhelming or tactically superior Germanic troops. The Empire simply couldn't maintain its centralised military infrastructure any more because it didn't have the manpower or the cash to do so.

Ferrill acknowledges that this so-called "military" collapse, strangely enough, didn't actually involved many battles or any major defeats, but he's not deterred:

"One need not produce a string of decisive battles in order to demonstrate a military collapse. The shrinkage of the imperial frontiers from 410 to 440 was directly as a result of military conquests by barbarian forces."
(p. 164)

Though these "military conquests by barbarian forces" occurred, strangely enough, without any decisive battles. The truth is the barbarians moved, usually without major opposition, into areas that the dwindling and economically starved Roman army had already abandoned or which it could no longer defend in strength. Their "invasions" - actually very small in number - were a symptom of the decline of the Roman army and the economic and administrative decline of the West, not its cause.

Ferrill asserts otherwise, with great boldness. But, again, he doesn't tell us why - he just tell us.

"To be sure, the loss of strategic resources, money, material and manpower compounded the mere loss of territory and made military defence of the rest of the Empire even more difficult. It is simply perverse, however, to argue that Rome's strategic problems in the 440s, 50s and 60s were primarily the result of financial and political difficulties or of long term trends such as depopulation."
(pp. 164-65)

Why is this quite reasonable and sensible conclusion "simply perverse"? Ferrill doesn't tell us, he just says it is.

He goes on to argue that any explanation of the fall of the West has to take into account the survival of the East - which is very true - and seems to believe that this is an argument against the "simply perverse" idea that systemic and economic problems were the real causes. In fact, the East always had a far greater population and a massive concentration of the whole Empire's wealth. The division of 395 made this disparity worse, giving the West more to defend and far less resources with which to do it. Further weakened by civil wars, local warlords and a string of weak or shortsighted rulers, it's actually amazing the West struggled on for as long as it did. So it's very clear why the East survived while the West fell.

Ferrill continually acknowledges key points in the real reasons for the fall of the West without acknowledging (or grasping) their significance. In discussing what the West did wrong while the East got right, he says the East "was better able to afford the heavy subsidies barbarian leaders demanded in the years after Adrianople" (p 166). But he fails to see why this is the case - because the East was far wealthier than the West. This was not a military factor, and it certainly had nothing to do with equipment, training or tactics - it purely economic. The East was able to pay Attila off for years and then, when he became too much of a nuisance, refuse to pay him anymore. The Hunnic king then decided to make up for his lost revenue by attacking the West, since the more impoverished half of the Empire made an easier target than the still relatively rich and strong East.

Similarly, the East were able to pay off and deflect a succession of potential barbarian problems, usually getting them to afflict the increasingly weak and fragmented West. Ferrill briefly acknowledges the East's significant economic strength, but then ignores it to pursue his ghostly theory of military explanations.

Without giving any good reasons for setting aside significant and relevant factors in the decline of the West such as economics and depopulation, Ferrill blithely declares that they can, indeed, be set aside. But not before lumping them in with "race mixture .... lead poisoning and other fashionable theories" (p. 166), which is a pretty shoddy piece of rhetorical trickery.

He goes on to argue that the real reasons for the fall of the West was a deterioration of the Western Roman Army - not the decline in the infratructure and recruitment which sustained the army, as I've argued above, but a decline in the tactics, training and quality of the troops.

For the decline in training he relies almost entirely on Vegetius' problematic manual and on a highly dubious report from Jordanes of a pre-battle speech by Attila about the quality of Roman troops. And for the decline in the quality of the troops he simply points to the "barbarisation" of the army and takes it as given that this meant the troops were therefore of low quality. Again, Hugh Elton shows the flaws in this idea. As he argues, the use of barbarian troops had been going on in the Roman army for centuries and continued in both the East and the West in this period. So why did this practice suddenly cause a decline in quality in the West in the Fifth Century?

Secondly, most of the barbarian troops used in the West weren't part of the regular units anyway - they were federate bands hired for specific campaigns or to defend particular territories. Their use and significance certainly did increase as the Fifth Century progressed, but largely for the very economic and administrative problems that Ferrill is so keen to dismiss. So, once again, we aren't seeing a "military explanation" - we're seeing the result of longer term, systemic economic and social weakness.

Ferrill's final sentence reads: "As the western army became barbarised, it lost its tactical superiority, and Rome fell to the onrush of barbarism". This is nonsense. There was no loss of "tactical superiority" - whenever the ailing Western Empire could field a decent sized army it won hands down. In fact the military history of the fall of the Western Empire is a string of Roman victories and barbarian defeats. It's the economic and administrative history of the West in this period which is the tale of woe and its the weaknesses here which robbed the Empire of its ability to field and maintain those armies and led, eventually, to its economic and administrative fragmentation and its eventual political collapse.

[Titus001]

HA I just went to amazon and it had your critical view as the most helpful. That's pretty cool. I already ordered the book so far so I don't have an opinion on it just yet. Only found out about the book from wiki with the page called roman infantry tactics.

This is kind of funny. I will have my second book on the romans and you gave it a "bad" review. My other book which is funny from reading some of your old posts you will not like it either. Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire edited by Moses Hadas..... Oh well I wanted to get something up to date but it seems these two authors are two peas in a pod.

[ThiudareiksGunthigg]

This is kind of funny. I will have my second book on the romans and you gave it a "bad" review. My other book which is funny from reading some of your old posts you will not like it either. Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire edited by Moses Hadas..... Oh well I wanted to get something up to date but it seems these two authors are two peas in a pod.

Gibbon's work is, of course, a classic. But it's also 232 years old and seriously out of date in most respects. If you are interested in up-to-date books on the late Roman army and the fall of the Western Empire, I'd recommend:

Peter Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians

Bryan Ward-Perkins, The Fall of Rome: And the End of Civilization

Hugh Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, AD 350-425

and

Pat Southern and Karen Dixon, The Late Roman Army

[Flavius Nevitta]

"Ancient writers like Zosimusin the 5th century AD condemned the "reserve" policy as a major weakening of the military force. Other modern scholars (Ferrill et al) also see the pullback as a strategic mistake, arguing that it left lower quality "second string" limitanei forces to stop an enemy, until the distant mobile reserve arrived. While the drop in quality did not happen immediately, it is argued that over time, the limitanei declined into lightly armed, static watchman type troops that were of dubious value against increasing barbarian marauders on the frontiers. The pullback of the best infantry was based more on political reasons (shoring up the power bases of the emperors and various elites) rather than on military reality. In addition it is claimed, the "forward" policy was not at all a static "Maginot" approach, but that traditional heavy legions and supporting cavalry could still move to a trouble spot by redeploying them from fortifications elsewhere along a particular frontier."
I believe the froward policy was the way to go like what they did in the past. Having the crack legion troops on the border seems more effective over the mobile reserve policy. The econmoy forced the change in policy not military threats in my opinion. I think one of the reason besides the economy that the mobile reserve was adopted was not so much the new military threats from the outside but more of a political move by the emperors."The pullback of the best infantry was based more on political reasons shoring up the power bases of the emperors and various elites rather than on military reality." I just think having the lower quality troops on the border was a mistake on the romans part. Again I'm not saying the later legion was crap. I just believe that they lost it's awesome power it had during Trajan era. Be it economy or new threats the legions evolved for better or worse.

The problem with this idea is that you seem to have a wrong picture of the earlier Roman boarder defense in mind. The limes was not a Maginot line like defense system. It was never ment to stop any bigger invasions.

It was more like a boarder control system, more like the US-Mexican boarder than the Maginot line. It did work nicely as there were no barbarian atempts to invade in bigger numbers, only small raids. The first time something like that really happens, during the reign of Marcus Aurelius, the boarder defense is not capable of stopping or even delaying the invasion.

If a stronger invasion happens, like we see from the 3rd century onwards, with the newly established tribal federations, the limes control system reaches its limits.

In such a case legionary and cavalry vexillations have to be drawn from all over the empire, collected at a certain spot and led against the enemy. This takes a very long time.

One of the major changes appears during the reign of Gallienus (260-268). Vexillations of infantry and cavalry (which were scattered all over the empire before), were grouped together to form some kind of field army. This saved lots of time because the troops did not have to be recalled from the boarders first. These units marched to the area of crisis and there united with the local forces.

This was done to save time, and, during the 3rd century crisis, where the emperor had to haste from one spot of trouble to another, was the only way to effectively counter the invasions (he didn't have the time to send back his forces anyway). so the development of a "field army" is only logical.

If you ask why this army had a large proportion of cavalry:

the Romans during the 3rd and 4th century did not use a higher number of cavalry than before in their battles (and unlike the old myth they always used quite a lot compared to all other powers at their time[except Sassanid Persia]). During the first 2 centuries when he boarders were quiet the Romans spread their forces, infantry and cavalry all along these boarders. In the whole army the number of cavalry was comparatively low, which probably had to do with money. However when there was a conflict vast proportions of the cavalry forces were withdrawn from the boarders and sent to the conflict area. An average of 20% of an army in the field consisted of cavalry, to achieve that around 1/3 to half of all the Alae had to be withdrawn from the boarders. This meant that while fro a conflict mostly the local and nearby infantry (plus some from areas without problems) could be called to form a field army, the cavalry had to be called from half of the empire which took considerable time (and as Thiudareiks already said cavalry marches slower than infantry).

That's the reason why a high proportion of the cavalry forces (and often other special troops too) were grouped at one place (usually there were more than one field army but you know what I mean) from the mid 3rd century onwards. Now they were at hand and could (together with a nucleus of infantry) march towards the area of crisis and there meet up with the local troops to form a strong field army.

[Ambiorix_thijs]

@ ThiudareiksGunthigg

You are mistaken about your horse knowledge. A rider can forse his horse to run to his death? The horse will simply run till its death.
you are referring to Donkeys

No offense i just mention it cause its a mistake.

[ThiudareiksGunthigg]

@ ThiudareiksGunthigg

You are mistaken about your horse knowledge. A rider can forse his horse to run to his death? The horse will simply run till its death.

And what use are dead horses to the cavalrymen?

you are referring to Donkeys

No, I'm referring to horses. You can force-march infantry, but if you try to force-march cavalry you end up with horses that are exhausted and useless or dead.

No offense i just mention it cause its a mistake.

It is not a mistake. It's common knowledge amongst anyone who has studied military history.

[AqD]

Sorry but cavalry armies move slower than infantry ones. You can threaten, cajole or tempt a man to march faster, but if a horse is tired all the gold or shouting in the world won?t keep him from going slowly or stopping.

ROFL That's the most stupid thing I ever heard of

You can threaten, cajole or tempt a man to march faster, but even if he runs until death he cannot complete the distance that a horse can do comfortably.

Besides, who said a cavalryman must have one horse only? The mongolian army, for instance, have 3-6 horses for each horse archer, and the whole army could march more a hundred of miles a day.
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LIVE SEX WEBSHOWS

[gaius valerius]

The Mongolians would form the exception my friend. They had perhaps the steppes = endless pasture... ?????? In the case of for example the armies of the Mongolians yes they'd march faster. But that is only as long as pasture and open space is available.

[Ambiorix_thijs]

Well i study history too in Ghent in my master year. However i can assure you that horses have this strange abillty. They really can run until they drop death Off course their riders wont do this, that would be stupid. I just wanted to point out this fact. I really dont want to critise you. Its just a fact.

[AqD]

The Mongolians would form the exception my friend. They had perhaps the steppes = endless pasture... ?????? In the case of for example the armies of the Mongolians yes they'd march faster. But that is only as long as pasture and open space is available.

No. It would just need hell amount of money to feed those horses if you're not nomadic people and not march on pasture-rich places. It's doable, as demostrated by several military campaigns in Han and Tang (only in their best days, though never have like 6 horses per soldier)

Even if you cannot afford so many horses, an army of entirely cavalry can still move far faster than an army of infantry - because horses simply run faster than the strongest human does, and they can carry more weights and their stamina is better. And the argument about force-match is just ridiculous - you may force a human to keep running at full speed for 24 hours and he would still not be able to outrun any horses

The only reason cavalry units march slower is that you mix them with infantry and thus marching in faster speed wouldn't make any sense. If cavalry themselves are really slower on march, as ThiudareiksGunthigg said, then Romans wouldn't have used them for scouting at all!
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Bondage Webcam

[Entropy Judge]

Even if you cannot afford so many horses, an army of entirely cavalry can still move far faster than an army of infantry - because horses simply run faster than the strongest human does, and they can carry more weights and their stamina is better. And the argument about force-match is just ridiculous - you may force a human to keep running at full speed for 24 hours and he would still not be able to outrun any horses

Actually, I remember reading (in several places, but I don't know any of them off-hand, so I can't give you sources ) that one of the biggest advantages humans have as predators is that they *can* keep going for hours on end. Wolves, I believe, are the only other creature that can effectively "jog" and keep moving long distances at a steady, relatively fast pace. So it would rather depend on the distance involved - relatively close, and the cavalry would definitely move faster, but once you start inreasing the distance, they tend to take longer.

[AqD]

Actually, I remember reading (in several places, but I don't know any of them off-hand, so I can't give you sources ) that one of the biggest advantages humans have as predators is that they *can* keep going for hours on end. Wolves, I believe, are the only other creature that can effectively "jog" and keep moving long distances at a steady, relatively fast pace. So it would rather depend on the distance involved - relatively close, and the cavalry would definitely move faster, but once you start inreasing the distance, they tend to take longer.

But it's probably due to other animals' unwillingness, rather than their incapability to do so. After all, it's already well proved that nomadic ponies/horses can move far faster than human on very long distance.
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NATURE'S NATURAL COLLECTIVE CARE. INC.

[antaeus]

But it's probably due to other animals' unwillingness, rather than their incapability to do so. After all, it's already well proved that nomadic ponies/horses can move far faster than human on very long distance.

its not the fact that a pony can go for longer or further thats important, but the fact that a person can harness that.

[ThiudareiksGunthigg]

Well i study history too in Ghent in my master year. However i can assure you that horses have this strange abillty. They really can run until they drop death Off course their riders wont do this, that would be stupid. I just wanted to point out this fact. I really dont want to critise you. Its just a fact.

And I’m not disagreeing with you. But, as you say, the riders won’t do this because dead horses aren’t much use to cavalrymen. So the fact remains that there are severe limits on how hard you can push your cavalry if you don’t want your horses to die.

Speaking of which …

ROFL That's the most stupid thing I ever heard of

*Polite cough*

You can threaten, cajole or tempt a man to march faster, but even if he runs until death he cannot complete the distance that a horse can do comfortably.

According to the US Army field manual of 1917, you can get the following average marching speeds for infantry and cavalry:

Infantry - normal march: 2.5 mph
- quick time: 3.4 mph
- double quick time: 6.1 mph

Cavalry - walk: 4 mph
- trot: 8 mph
- gallop: 12 mph

So obviously cavalry can comfortably maintain a walking speed of 4 mph while infantry can only move along at a bit more than half that, at 2.5 mph. But you can cajole, threaten, encourage, inspire and/or bribe an army of fit infantry to force-march at a combination of quick time or double quick time for many hours, whereas if you try to do the same with cavalry you end up with horses dropping from exhaustion.

Thus an entirely infantry army could move at 6.1 mph if pushed, but a combined infantry/cavalry army like the later Roman comitatenses would be limited to the 4 mph walking speed of its cavalry if it wanted its horses to be in any condition to fight at the end of the march.

That’s what I meant when I said infantry armies were faster, though to be more clear I should have said “faster than combined cavalry/infantry armies”.

Besides, who said a cavalryman must have one horse only?

Ummm, well unless you can show me any evidence that the late Roman cavalryman led a string of re-mounts, the context of the discussion says so.

The mongolian army, for instance, have 3-6 horses for each horse archer, and the whole army could march more a hundred of miles a day.

Great, but we aren’t discussing a steppe nomad army, we’re discussing the later Roman Army. The idea that cavalry increased in importance in the later Roman Army to make the army more “mobile” is another armchair general’s error.