Propose a duel you would like to see!

[Jom]

I'd like to hear somebody debate on modern technology in classrooms. In a Belgian magazine (Humo) there's been going on a fierce debate on the use of Smartboards and facebook in the classrooms... Only yesterday my 9 year old brother came home with an assignment where he has to make a Powerpoint presentation in front of the class. It would be interesting to see what teachers and others with teaching experience think about this evolution.

Making a PowerPoint presentation is nothing particularly radical; I was making them back when I was 13 or 14. The problem with a debate on this subject, is that there may not be ready access to statistics and studies for both sides.

Sounds interesting, but could you elaborate?

Also, would you like to debate upon cassus belli in the modern world?

As in, do you think that there's such a thing as a legitimate casus belli? Or a debate on whether they've changed or not since the medieval period?

[m_1512]

Cassus belli then it is. Which side would you debate on?

[Jom]

Cassus belli then it is. Which side would you debate on?

Well, I asked you an either/or question, and you replied simply with the affirmative. Which casus belli proposition do you prefer?

[m_1512]

By which I meant I am OK with both. Which one would you like?

[The Norseman]

I would like to see a duel on whether the human kind is good or not.

And a duel on war, is it inevitiable and do we need it?

[The Vitiated Mind]

I would Propose Cahoma vs Ferdiad .
Rabbits vs Cats ( or anything else )

[Spike]

I would like to see a duel of : Which rogue country is more dangerous to the world? Iran or North Korea?

[liamb109]

I want a debate on overpopulation and whether that will be a problem or not.

[Aquila SPQR]

I would like to see a duel of : Which rogue country is more dangerous to the world? Iran or North Korea?

I'll gladly debate about it. I think that when we think about those two - Iran is more dangerous. Anyone willing to argue against it?

I have to admit that tomorrow I'm leaving home for a week, so keep it in mind.

[Jagmodo]

I would like to see debate on:

Minorities:

- assimilation or
- cultural preservation.

Before someone accuses me for having something against minorities I want to say that it is pure opposite. Yesterday I was on a concert of a Rusyn minority of Croatia and was delighted by their songs and their traditional garments. I just think that it would be shame if they completely assimilate and is nice to preserve their customs. If anything, it is diversity that makes things interesting. And I know that the matter is much more complex than some wishes. At the end all depends on the people alone (of course if they live in a relatively normal, non-oppressive state).

[Madej]

I wish to volunteer myself for a debate, with any willing opponent, on whether or not there exists objective moral facts. I would be taking the side that there are independent, irreducible moral properties inherent in the fundamental structure of reality.

Alternatively, I volunteer myself for a debate, with any willing opponent, on the topic of whether non-trivial a priori knowledge exists or not. I would be taking the positive side.

[elfdude]

I wish to volunteer myself for a debate, with any willing opponent, on whether or not there exists objective moral facts. I would be taking the side that there are independent, irreducible moral properties inherent in the fundamental structure of reality.

I'd be willing to challenge that, depending on what you mean, since I've had debates before without the definitions in place and agreed upon, send me a PM with your definitions on the subject and I'll see if we really do disagree or if it's just another definition difference.

[Denny Crane!]

I'd be interested to follow this as I believe this would be a somewhat atheist v atheist on objective morality yes?

[Madej]

I'd be interested to follow this as I believe this would be a somewhat atheist v atheist on objective morality yes?

Yes. In fact, I will probably be making the point that morality is necessarily secular and that all meta-ethical theories grounded in God's will, commandments, or the emergent properties of his will/commandments, are inherently forms of moral subjectivism. I haven't heard back from elfdude yet, but I suspect that he will be taking a reductionist, naturalistic stance on moral realism. I, on the other hand, will be defending a non-reductive, platonist conception.

[Denny Crane!]

I'd agree when approaching religion that you do so with a moral framework in place and from that perspective you analyse it through a filter which brings out morals and ethics that are supposedly objective but conform to your bias and cultural influences. That I'd have no problem with but the arguments I suppose will be in proving that humans create that framework instinctively because there is some objectivity to it which is where the commonality in moral systems come from. Evolutionary theories from the likes of Kropotkin and in general the fact that we seem to be hardwired for empathy are quite a strong statement of support on that one. Stefan Molyneux, bit of a crazy anarchist has a theory on this called Universally Preferable Behaviour.

really interested for this debate, can't wait to see it.

[elfdude]

I'm having difficulties understanding what his position really is and until then I'm going to hold back on a debate. It seems to me that he's simply defining subjective as objective in which case we don't really disagree on anything but his word choice. If that's true then meh to debate. Here's our PM back and forth trying to hammer out the specifics.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Just got home.

Moral realism can be understand as a multi-part thesis:

1. Moral statements attribute properties to their respective subjects, such as wrongness and goodness.

This is easily understandable because without it a moral debate is impossible. Defining wrongness and goodness is central to the ideal that objectivity exists in morality.

2. These moral properties exist. That is, at least some things in the world have these properties.

You will have to be far more specific. Technically speaking thought arises in the brain which in turn is a real thing. Obviously this does not predicate that morals are absolute or objective although it does mean thought exists physically.

3. We can sometimes know that the things which we attribute these properties actually have them.

This doesn't seem to be leading to objective morality or something that I can argue at all. It seems to me what you're doing is stating that morals are real, but whether they're real or not it does not mean that they're objective which would predicate their existence in a similar fashion to H20.

The first of which is moral platonism, which holds that moral properties are irreducible, nonphysical properties that we know on the basis of intuition.

But intuition is not objective.

We should not confuse this with the statement that we can know all normative facts on the basis of intuition. So I entirely reject an all-encompassing, ethically normative approach to intuitionism.

You really should avoid using concepts like platonism and intuitionism because these implies formal doctrines, if you're going to debate use your own descriptions of what you mean not someone else's dogma. Furthermore there's so many forms of platonism as to be ambiguous when you state it as though it has meaning.

The second of which is ethical naturalism, which holds that moral properties are reducible to non-subjective natural properties. Ethical naturalism brings with it certain nuances such as the division between analytic and synthetic formulations. Anayltic naturalism holds that it is true that "Good = [some natural property]" as matter of tautology or definition. Synthetic reductionism holds that the underlying nature of the Good can be revealed to be some natural property, e.g. in the way that Water = H20 is true.

You have failed to define the two concepts apart from one another.

I would be defending the moral platonist view.

This is meaningless until you define it more.

Unfortunately when I'm asking you to define what you mean I mean that you need to define what your claims are. Using a formal doctrine to describe your claims is insufficient for a real debate, I do not intend to debate a Wiki page on platonism. Describe what you actually mean, what your conclusion is and the reasoning that leads to it otherwise the debate is ambiguous at it's outset in which case it's impossible to be had. Given that our two philosophies are close as it is with really wordchoice being the only obvious difference to me at this point it does not seem that you're doing anything but defining subjective as objective. In which case, you can call it as you will but no debate can be had.

I take an objective fact to mean that the fact is true independent of what a mind thinks. I take morality to be objective if moral propositions describes some genuine feature of the reality rather than the psychological relations of Gods or of subjects of experience. That is not, however, to say that objective moral principles cannot hold subjective mental states.

This entire paragraph is ambiguous. Objective fact is independent of what the mind thinks, thus objective morality is independent of a mind's existence which is to essentially say, in a universe of rocks there still exists moral truths. Is that what you're saying?

[Madej]

I do not believe that I am defining the subjective as being objective (in the context of meta-ethics). What I think is happening here is that you are confusing how we come to know moral facts--which is, in an ontological sense, a 'subjective' process by some standards--with moral facts as they exist by themselves. The moral properties that I am stipulating do not supervene on these intuitions. Here is more of our PM exchange:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

I will chronologically order my comments.

1. Realize that I described moral realism as a multi-part thesis. You are correct in saying that the first three stipulations do not get you all the way to moral objectivity unanalyzed. The "moral platonism" and "ethical naturalism" that I defined here are moral realist theories that work within the above preliminary definitions.

2. In your statement that, "but intuition is not objective," you are confusing moral facts themselves with how subjects come to know moral facts. Noticed that I said that, under the moral platonist view, moral properties are irreducible, nonphysical properties. That is a description of their ontology. To say that we know them on the basis of intuition has no bearing on the ontology of these properties.

3. In the context of a meta-ethical debate, the meaning of 'platonism' is quite clear. Will it suffice it for me to say "ethical non-naturalism"?

4. As for failing to separate analytic and synthetic reductionism, allow me to elaborate further. To say that, for example, the Good = happiness by definition is not, in fact, to make the claim that the underlying nature of the Good is happiness. For in the latter case, it is not a tautology that is revealed by analyzing the definition of the Good. This is similar to the way that you cannot establish that Water = H20 tautologically, analogous á la the synthetic reductionist view. By contrast, that the Good = happiness (or some other natural property) is tautologically true for the analytic reductionist.

I hold that moral facts are states of affairs that obtain necessarily. They are not grounded in anything, not in subjects, not in my opinion, and not in Gods. They are independent, nonphysical properties that exist objectively; properties that we can sometimes know on the basis of intuition. The moral properties themselves are not subjective in either an epistemological or an ontological sense. Our knowledge of them is objective in an epistemological sense too, but this could be construed as being ontologically subjective if only in the virtue of the fact that we have internally accessible reasons to believe in these objective properties.

Does this help at all?

[elfdude]

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

I will chronologically order my comments.

1. Realize that I described moral realism as a multi-part thesis. You are correct in saying that the first three stipulations do not get you all the way to moral objectivity unanalyzed. The "moral platonism" and "ethical naturalism" that I defined here are moral realist theories that work within the above preliminary definitions.

2. In your statement that, "but intuition is not objective," you are confusing moral facts themselves with how subjects come to know moral facts. Noticed that I said that, under the moral platonist view, moral properties are irreducible, nonphysical properties. That is a description of their ontology. To say that we know them on the basis of intuition has no bearing on the ontology of these properties.

3. In the context of a meta-ethical debate, the meaning of 'platonism' is quite clear. Will it suffice it for me to say "ethical non-naturalism"?

4. As for failing to separate analytic and synthetic reductionism, allow me to elaborate further. To say that, for example, the Good = happiness by definition is not, in fact, to make the claim that the underlying nature of the Good is happiness. For in the latter case, it is not a tautology that is revealed by analyzing the definition of the Good. This is similar to the way that you cannot establish that Water = H20 tautologically, analogous á la the synthetic reductionist view. By contrast, that the Good = happiness (or some other natural property) is tautologically true for the analytic reductionist.

I hold that moral facts are states of affairs that obtain necessarily. They are not grounded in anything, not in subjects, not in my opinion, and not in Gods. They are independent, nonphysical properties that exist objectively; properties that we can sometimes know on the basis of intuition. The moral properties themselves are not subjective in either an epistemological or an ontological sense. Our knowledge of them is objective in an epistemological sense too, but this could be construed as being ontologically subjective if only in the virtue of the fact that we have internally accessible reasons to believe in these objective properties.

Does this help at all?

No you left the entire portion of what I asked you to define undefined and instead used more ambiguous terminology. However this last portion: Our knowledge of them is objective in an epistemological sense too, but this could be construed as being ontologically subjective if only in the virtue of the fact that we have internally accessible reasons to believe in these objective properties.

Seems to state that you hold the same view as I do. It seems to me that you're saying that: Morals are known subjectively beyond that I haven't any idea what you mean. The idea that they arise objectively and are then known subjectively is begging the question of what is moral. The rest of your information seems entirely irrelevant to actually defining your position or is too ambiguous from my perspective to have any useful meaning.

[irelandeb]

I'm having difficulties understanding what his position really is

Gender:Female

[Madej]

Seems to state that you hold the same view as I do. It seems to me that you're saying that: Morals are known subjectively beyond that I haven't any idea what you mean. The idea that they arise objectively and are then known subjectively is begging the question of what is moral. The rest of your information seems entirely irrelevant to actually defining your position or is too ambiguous from my perspective to have any useful meaning.

Relevant to what you just put forward, my position is that moral facts are objective facts that we ultimately know on the basis of a subjective mental state, intuition, but that this epistemological method has objective validity and is conferred by objective reason. I hold that objective moral facts do not and cannot 'arise'; they are, in fact, necessary truths. The validity of the epistemological means we must resort to in order to know moral facts are indeed objective. It's only that, in a strictly ontological sense, the acquisition of knowledge is a subjective process. That is not to say that the content of that knowledge is subjective however.

Let us suppose a scenario where we agree on all of what has been said so far. Is it not still truitful for us to debate your naturalistic approach to morality alongside my antinaturalist approach? For I think that moral facts are brute facts alongside with which our actions contain objective, nonphysical wrongmaking and rightmaking properties. Is there not a clear and meaningful disagreement there?

The idea that they arise objectively and are then known subjectively is begging the question of what is moral.

Not if what is moral is what is moral regardless if we apprehend their truths or not. I think that you might have misunderstood the exact way in which I meant that human reasoning might be considered 'subjective'.

No you left the entire portion of what I asked you to define undefined and instead used more ambiguous terminology

They should fail to be ambiguous when one considers the context of the debate: meta-ethics. Just as an example, it is not ambiguous to be labeled a 'consequentialist' in opposition to 'retributivism' in law punishment/deterrence even though 'consequentialist' can also mean that you hold to a certain criterion of the Good in normative ethics.