Were the Massive Numbers Involved in Chinese Battles Realistic?

[Ace_General]

These areas of operations were some of the more developed in the region. Massed mobilization played a major role and while the Russians were sturdy they were not as effective when it came to combat and neither was their equipment (especially the massive bardiche which was a step down from pikes). Peasants would often be expected to mobilize in order to provide the soldiers with food in the area of operations (serfdom is effective). The advance against the steppes cities were relatively slow and only made possible by cavalry at first. If anything the Russians must be really hardy in order to be combat effective under those conditions. The organizations by the Russians were excellent however, the defeat of Kazan for instance was extremely well supplied but a relatively slow advance.

Agreed, reminds me of a book I read written about the soviet army, which applies to older russian armies where the Red Army was compared to a massive but dull axe. I.E. the edge, the tatical side, wasnt all that great, but the sheer size of the axe head, representing the operational level(and the Russian skill in that level of strategy) the huge numbers of russian forces in the field, and the sheer force generated in the handle, representing the strategic level of war and the extraordinary level of will and mobilization of Russian society allowed the Russians to outlast, then slowly overwhelm and grind to dust smaller, more tactically proficient opponents.

And country to the Popular view of the elite roman legions, the Roman army and operational and strategic strategy of Republican Era Rome resmbled the Red Army to a large degree: I.E. mass mobilization of society, tactical reliance on superior Morale, concentration of mass and large scale shock attacks to compensate for a lack of individual fighting skill, and the greater experience and professionalism of Enemy armies. Not to mention the Roman method of opening multiple fronts against powerful foes, willingness to accept losses and keep on fighting(take losses to cause losses, instead of maneuver and trying to rout the enemy like Alexander and Hannibal, grinding down enemy forces and their will to fight in bloody infantry struggles and seiges), and fixation on capturing key terran and population centers as opposed to destroying enemy armies in the field and suing for a favorable peace like other ancient powers.

For example, the performance of the Roman state and their overall grand strategy in the second Punic war seem more like that of modern 19th or early 20th century state as opposed to a pre-modern state and military. (I.E. the level of mobilization and losses taken and sustaining the war, the focus on conquering spain then Africa instead of just defeating the field army of the Carthaginians and Hannibal in Italy)

Put it up here, I think everyone would want to see it.

I'll post it in a separate thread.

[Lord Oda Nobunaga]

A very interesting comparison. One thing that I do recall is that after the Napoleonic Wars and before the Crimean war the Russians were captured by some sort of new warrior culture. Basically this culture influenced everyone from Qing, America, Prussia and Austria. The Russians even built an army roughly 1.5 million strong even though they were only able to mobilize a little over half in the Crimean War (about 800,000 or so?). Hence the basic plan of the coalition was pretty smart; blockade the Black Sea and Baltic Sea until these expenses made them collapse (thankfully the Queen's husband realized this and was able to exercise some power in suggestion). Aside from that though the strategy was pretty competent in itself.

I think it was really this type of expense (and ineffectiveness for that price!) which saw the Han, Tang and Ming collapse. In the case of Han that was one of the reason for the dynasty being replaced by Wang Mang and then restored by Liu Xiu. It was the organization afterwards in which the Emperor tried to promote loyalty to the autocrat which backfired and ended up giving power to eunuchs and generals. As the autocrats became useless the inner circle of eunuchs became stronger and practically made their own bureaucracy apart from the emperor's power and the generals became more independent minded and created a state of feudalism. So even trying to rectify the issues with ineffective tax control and executive powers can totally back fire and ruin the state anyway (like what happened with Qin and their centralized absolutism).

[Condottiere 40K]

The other aspect being loss of productivity and it's effect on the GDP, assuming the manpower wasn't considered surplus to the economy's requirements.

[hellheaven1987]

The other aspect being loss of productivity and it's effect on the GDP, assuming the manpower wasn't considered surplus to the economy's requirements.

Just like British could sustain for four years campaign with two years in full mobilization, Chinese could do it too; most campaigns of this type were not very long anyway, and long campaign such as Changping generally had some sore of man rotation.

[Condottiere 40K]

That would be where grain storage, not only for the armies, but also for the civilians, would be required to keep the non agriculture economy still functioning. Since that's where I'd assume the volunteers would be mostly drafted.