Robert E. Lee vs The Duke of Wellington

[Farnan]

http://www.nps.gov/archive/peri/inf2_tac.htm

Also, 67th if you get a chance come to the US and visit some of the civil war battlefields, which are greatly preserved. You'll notice that many of these fields lacked good bayonet or cavalry charging terrain, especially with the number of fences and rolling hills.

[67th Tigers]

http://www.nps.gov/archive/peri/inf2_tac.htm

Also, 67th if you get a chance come to the US and visit some of the civil war battlefields, which are greatly preserved. You'll notice that many of these fields lacked good bayonet or cavalry charging terrain, especially with the number of fences and rolling hills.

The hard part of a bayonet charge is the approach, once you're 30 yards away.

If I liken a firefight to an American Football pitch, fire would be considered long range if both sides were on their respective touchlines (or is that only a Rugby term?). At such ranges both sides would be taking less than a casualty a minute, and would exhaust their ammunition long before a decision could be reached.

If one side advances to the 50 yard line and crosses it they'll start to take noticibly more casualties, probably due to unaimed fire starting to become effective, but units could and did continue to close (oddly, in the smokeless powder age it was noticed that the killing rate was higher for units firing at 600 yards or greater, the explanation being the targets were not identifiable as humans and so allowed the "unhardened" firer to aim).

In fact, units could advance to 10 feet from each other, exchange fire, but not put in a bayonet charge, so there must be another explanation to why there was a reluctance to bayonet other human beings.

[Farnan]

The hard part of a bayonet charge is the approach, once you're 30 yards away.

If I liken a firefight to an American Football pitch, fire would be considered long range if both sides were on their respective touchlines (or is that only a Rugby term?). At such ranges both sides would be taking less than a casualty a minute, and would exhaust their ammunition long before a decision could be reached.

If one side advances to the 50 yard line and crosses it they'll start to take noticibly more casualties, probably due to unaimed fire starting to become effective, but units could and did continue to close (oddly, in the smokeless powder age it was noticed that the killing rate was higher for units firing at 600 yards or greater, the explanation being the targets were not identifiable as humans and so allowed the "unhardened" firer to aim).

In fact, units could advance to 10 feet from each other, exchange fire, but not put in a bayonet charge, so there must be another explanation to why there was a reluctance to bayonet other human beings.

Could be do to the familiarity between the combatnants, American soldiers from both sides exchanged food between each other, watched each other drink from the same river. Outside of battle there was little animosity, thus when it came to bayoneting the other guy there was a reluctance.

[Erebus Pasha]

Could be do to the familiarity between the combatnants, American soldiers from both sides exchanged food between each other, watched each other drink from the same river. Outside of battle there was little animosity, thus when it came to bayoneting the other guy there was a reluctance.

Well there must have been plenty of animosity too or no fighting would've have taken place. Anyway fraternising between rival troops was fairly common. In fact there is quite a few occasions in the peninsular when the Franch and British troops excahnged 'gifts' and friendly insults between the fighting.

[Legio XX Valeria Victrix]

One thing to remember is that the British of 1812 and the Americans of 1863 counted armies differently. The
British only counted bayonets and sabres, and excluded the service, logistic, and ordnance (inc artillery)
troops from these counts, the Americans of 1863 counted everything and the rule of thumb is that around
1/3rd of the troops were detached to the logistics. Below is a rough CS orbat in effectives only (i.e. a
direct comparison to the British)

Lees orbat:

I Corps (Longstreet)
McLaw's Division: ca 4,000 bayonets and 16 guns
Picket's Division: ca 3,500 bayonets and 18 guns
Hood's Division: ca 4,800 bayonets and 19 guns
Walton's Arty Bde: 37 guns

II Corps (Ewell)
Early's Division: ca 3,200 bayonets and 16 guns
Johnson's Division: ca 4,200 bayonets and 16 guns
Rode's Division: ca 4,800 bayonets and 16 guns
Brown's Arty Bde: 31 guns

III Corps (Hill)
Anderson's Division: ca 4,500 bayonets and 17 guns
Heth's Division: ca 4,700 bayonets and ? guns (about 16)
Pender's Division: ca 4,200 bayonets and 15 guns
Walker's Arty Bde: 36 guns

Stuart's Cavalry Division: ca 4,000 sabres and 20 guns

ca 37,900 bayonets, 4,000 sabres and 273 guns

The British Orbat break down as roughly:

Cavalry Division: 4,000 sabres and 6 guns
1st Division: 6,200 bayonets and 6 guns (2 of the 5 brigades are detached as an erasatz division as part of

Beresford's Corps)
3rd Division: 5,800 bayonets and 6 guns
4th Division: 5,200 bayonets and 6 guns
5th Division: 6,700 bayonets and 6 guns
6th Division: 5,500 bayonets and 6 guns
7th Division: 5,100 bayonets and 6 guns
Light Division: 3,500 bayonets and 6 guns
Spanish Division: 3,400 bayonets, 500 sabres and 6 guns
Pack and Bradford's Brigades: 4,500 bayonets
Artillery Reserve: 6 guns (plus the siege train)

44,900 bayonets, 4,000 sabres and 60 guns (the guns are all detached forward)

Your Confederate numbers are WAY off. Are you going off anything credible here, or just the modern rule of 'for every man in the field with a rifle there are two behind the lines supporting him.' ?

Records from the war are pretty detailed, especialy for the Gettysburg campaign. As an example, take the 26th North Carolina Regiment, which went into battle with 842 men in their ranks, including officers. They lost over 650 men in the battle, an impossibility if 1/3 of those men did not serve as infantry. Of course every unit has its cooks, teamsters, so forth, but in many cases those men served as infantry in addition to their other duties, especially when battle was imminent.

[67th Tigers]

Your Confederate numbers are WAY off. Are you going off anything credible here, or just the modern rule of 'for every man in the field with a rifle there are two behind the lines supporting him.' ?

Records from the war are pretty detailed, especialy for the Gettysburg campaign. As an example, take the 26th North Carolina Regiment, which went into battle with 842 men in their ranks, including officers. They lost over 650 men in the battle, an impossibility if 1/3 of those men did not serve as infantry. Of course every unit has its cooks, teamsters, so forth, but in many cases those men served as infantry in addition to their other duties, especially when battle was imminent.

Picking the largest regiment at the battle (which is part of the largest brigade) is hardly typical. An average CS Regiment at that battle had about 350 odd present, of whom roughly a third (the nominal "third line") would be detached as service troops.

The average brigade had 1,396 officers and men present, and deducting detachments and sick maybe 800 bayonets in the firing line. However there are some wild exceptions.

In the 26th NC's case, using figures from the net:

842 officers and men present
588 killed and wounded
96 men remaining (does this include lightly wounded)
deficit = 158 men (19%) detached (more if the lightly wounded are effective, as per Lee's standing orders)

A lower quantity than average, but the strongest regiment of the strongest brigade of the strongest (?) division would have to provide less of its strength as a % to the division logistics

[Legio XX Valeria Victrix]

Picking the largest regiment at the battle (which is part of the largest brigade) is hardly typical. An average CS Regiment at that battle had about 350 odd present, of whom roughly a third (the nominal "third line") would be detached as service troops.

The average brigade had 1,396 officers and men present, and deducting detachments and sick maybe 800 bayonets in the firing line. However there are some wild exceptions.

I used the 26th NC as an example because its casualties are the freshest in my mind. Still, I don't see how they negate the point I was trying to make simply due to their size. With time, I can provide a list of many regiments in the ANV that lost more men that would be present at roll if a third of their men did not serve at the front line.

In any case, numbers regarding military orders of battle are always going to be flimsy. You and I could go back and forth with examples of how a regiment commiteed to battle with all the men listed on its roster present, and some that went into battle with less than half present. The fact is battle situations are so chaotic that numbers fluctuate right up to (and obviously during) the firefight. My issue with your earlier post was that you doctored up the CSA numbers based off an unpredictable mathmatical theory. Conversely, it seemed you did not do that with the British numbers.

[67th Tigers]

I used the 26th NC as an example because its casualties are the freshest in my mind. Still, I don't see how they negate the point I was trying to make simply due to their size. With time, I can provide a list of many regiments in the ANV that lost more men that would be present at roll if a third of their men did not serve at the front line.

In any case, numbers regarding military orders of battle are always going to be flimsy. You and I could go back and forth with examples of how a regiment commiteed to battle with all the men listed on its roster present, and some that went into battle with less than half present. The fact is battle situations are so chaotic that numbers fluctuate right up to (and obviously during) the firefight. My issue with your earlier post was that you doctored up the CSA numbers based off an unpredictable mathmatical theory. Conversely, it seemed you did not do that with the British numbers.

Simple rule of thumb, regiments detached 1/3rd of their strength to the rear. It is slightly variable, Sherman got the number down to 1/4 by massively restricting regimental baggage, similarly at times it approached 1/2.

The fact of the matter from my POV is that Americans tend to doctor stats by omission. Men known to have deserted still carried on rolls as "Present". Men detached for logistics listed as in the firing line. This makes the few definate examples of regimental dispositions valuable, but in the meantime we must guestimate based off the known facts.

For example, we have Vaughn's cavalry brigade in Nov 64, 1,358 present, 993 effectives, Wood's cavalry brigade in Jul 64 had 661 effectives out of 966 present.

The largest Confederate Force in the war was that which fought the Seven Days, and it had a much smaller tail (which almost damned it).

[Legio XII]

For one thing, this scenario is rather biased. Giving Wellington, admittedly one of the greatest defensive minds in history, a long, unbroken ridge with flanks guarded by a river on the left and a presumably fortified or soon to be fortified building on the right is quite frankly unfair. In this scenario, if one were to stick to the conditions provided, I would give the victory to Wellington. This would be his type of battle.

However, if Wellington were to leave the safety of his ridge, which he seems to cling to like a life preserver, he would be at a serious disadvantage. (I am not accusing him of cowardice in saying this. The times he used ridges and the reverse slope positioning of infantry were brilliant military accomplishments. However, it leaves something to be questioned as to whether he would be as successful without them(the dominating ridges he seemed to have around quite often).)

Contrary to many posts posted previously, the British cavalry would not have as great an advantage as has been said. In the American Civil War, cavalry on both sides was a screening force, and rarely used in pitched battle, with exceptions such as Brandy Station. Thus the Confederate cavalry was not composed of hussars or dragoons, and would not stick around to fight it out with the heavier cavalry of the British. Rather it is more likely that they would skirmish with the British cavalry, and wear them down, then counterattack. And with a commander such as J.E.B. Stuart at the command of the Confederate cavalry, the exhausted British cavalry would be in extreme danger.

There is another factor to be considered, that of the quality of the Spanish and Portuguese allies of the British. I have no sources to back this up, but it would be fairly reasonable to assume that they were not of the same quality of the British redcoats. If Lee were able to concentrate an attack on these troops and break them, he could possibly create and exploit a gap in the British line. Admittedly, that is a big if.

On a side note, Lee would not have the brilliant Stonewall Jackson around. He was fatally wounded at Chancellorsville, and would die before Gettysburg. Nonetheless, Lee would possess some of the fastest marching infantry of the 19th century, other brilliant commanders who were capable of taking initiative, and his own brilliant mind.

So, all that being said, I would give this scenario to Wellington. But this scenario only. In any other scenario, in which Wellington did not have the benefit of time to prepare a strong defensive position, the battle would very likely go to Lee.

[Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus]

How about this ? Napoleon is better then both of them.


[/Thread]

[Legio XII]

Simple rule of thumb, regiments detached 1/3rd of their strength to the rear. It is slightly variable, Sherman got the number down to 1/4 by massively restricting regimental baggage, similarly at times it approached 1/2.

The fact of the matter from my POV is that Americans tend to doctor stats by omission. Men known to have deserted still carried on rolls as "Present". Men detached for logistics listed as in the firing line. This makes the few definate examples of regimental dispositions valuable, but in the meantime we must guestimate based off the known facts.

For example, we have Vaughn's cavalry brigade in Nov 64, 1,358 present, 993 effectives, Wood's cavalry brigade in Jul 64 had 661 effectives out of 966 present.

The largest Confederate Force in the war was that which fought the Seven Days, and it had a much smaller tail (which almost damned it).

I highly doubt that the British are innocent of doctoring numbers themselves, my friend. And in the case of the Confederate army, it was often not a case of intentional miscalculating but rather one of simple ignorance. The armies of the American Civil War, on both sides, were notoriously susceptible to desertion, due to the fact that, in the later years, conscripts made up increasingly large numbers of each army in a war that seemed to have no end. The Confederate armies were plagued with higher desertion rates than their northern brethren.

As for men known to have deserted but still listed as present, that is due to supply issues, especially on the Confederate side. The more men reported present, the more supplies the various quartermasters could attempt to wrangle from their respective states. (In the Confederacy, each state equipped its own troops, i.e. South Caroline was responsible for it's troops and no one else's. This made for an enormously inefficient and ineffective logistics system.)

How about this ? Napoleon is better then both of them.


[/Thread]

That is debatable. Napoleon, while aggressive, was not a god. He often attacked headlong (Eylau, for example, or Borodino) when prudence would have advised otherwise. In doing so, he achieved victory, but albeit at very high cost. I feel that Napoleon and Lee were of kindred spirits, and were equal.

[JP226]

Uh oh, now you've done it. Comparing an AMerican general to a european one, we're going to hear it now.

[Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus]

That is debatable. Napoleon, while aggressive, was not a god.

O rly ?

He often attacked headlong (Eylau, for example, or Borodino) when prudence would have advised otherwise.

Yeah Un-like Lee at the Third day of Gettysburg when he brilliantly sent Pickett....... Oh wait.

In doing so, he achieved victory, but albeit at very high cost.

Every Good general has a Bloodbath or two in his draw.

I feel that Napoleon and Lee were of kindred spirits, and were equal.

Lee never had an Austerlitz.

[67th Tigers]

That is debatable. Napoleon, while aggressive, was not a god. He often attacked headlong (Eylau, for example, or Borodino) when prudence would have advised otherwise. In doing so, he achieved victory, but albeit at very high cost. I feel that Napoleon and Lee were of kindred spirits, and were equal.

Napoleon is more comparable to Lee than Wellington, both are gifted amateurs with a poor grasp of logistics rather than a professional. Whereas Wellington was the comensurate professional soldier

Lee's combat record is statistically average though, he can be taken as a representative Confederate general rather than an exceptional one. Napoleon, when in command of small, high quality armies (i.e. before 1807, and the move towards "monstrous gigantism") proved a very good improviser. However, in his later campaigns his shoddy staff work and planning came home to roost, he simply couldn't effectively command the large armies of 1808-13, and when his army shrank away again in 1814 since the armies were within his span of command he did quite well. The 127,000 men he assembled for the Low Countries Campaign in 1815 were again beyond his span of command (not helped by the loss of Berthier, who would ignore the Emperor's orders and issue more sensible ones, whereas Soult would not go against his Emperor, but could not read his handwriting).

Meanwhile Wellington and Gneisenau (yes, Gneisenau, Blucher had very little to do with the armies operations) had their armies fairly well in hand, managing to hold together their armies and stay in mutual cooperation.

A good summary of the decay of the French army is in this book: http://www.amazon.com/dp/1846032784/

Ah, yes, another attempt to rewrite history. Just what we need.

Rewrite? The book is a series of analysis of the cavalry actions the British undertook. It's a very good read, and kind of ends up following the orthodoxy. It manages to single out the 4-5 occasions the British cavalry didn't perform, and has good analysis. Well worth reading to understand how the British cavalry actually performed (very well) and their reasons for failure (generally not keeping back a reserve, or, as at Campo Mayor, not launching the reserve)

I highly doubt that the British are innocent of doctoring numbers themselves, my friend. And in the case of the Confederate army, it was often not a case of intentional miscalculating but rather one of simple ignorance. The armies of the American Civil War, on both sides, were notoriously susceptible to desertion, due to the fact that, in the later years, conscripts made up increasingly large numbers of each army in a war that seemed to have no end. The Confederate armies were plagued with higher desertion rates than their northern brethren.

Not really, desertion in the Confederate Army, if you take the last few months out of the equation (when the writing was on the wall and many of the men decided to return home and try and secure their property against the occupier) then the Union Army has a much worse desertion problem.

As to the British, it was a common enough practice before the Duke of York's reforms to draw the pay of lost men, but this, and a lot of other abuses, had been stamped out by the time of the Napoleonic War.

[Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus]

Napoleon is more comparable to Lee than Wellington, both are gifted amateurs with a poor grasp of logistics rather than a professional. Whereas Wellington was the comensurate professional soldier

Did you just......like.......honesty........how do you.........Are you just.....are you........



Image Macro Char is not pleased. Nor should anyone with a firm grasp of history be pleased. Good Improvisers ? Amateur's ? Ridiculous, These are not the teenage boy Mecha pilot's of Generalship Tigers, from your speech you would think that Lee and Napoleon were countryboy's which no military learning that just happen to waltz into command.

Well, let's start from the top........

Lee's combat record is statistically average though, he can be taken as a representative Confederate general rather than an exceptional one.

1) What do you base that on
2) Who, in your opinion is a 'exceptional' Confederate general

. Napoleon, when in command of small, high quality armies (i.e. before 1807, and the move towards "monstrous gigantism") proved a very good improviser.

Just a good Improviser ? Hardly, Napoleon calculated his campaigns meticulously, taking in every single factor into account and then coming up with a comprehensive plan.

However, in his later campaigns his shoddy staff work and planning came home to roost,

Describe this. If you are talking about the decline in the quality of his Marshal's, then yes, that was a mistake. Napoleon's ego became grander and he neglected to reform it. This is why he had Men like Massena and Lanne's in 1805, and men like Grouchy in 1815.

he simply couldn't effectively command the large armies of 1808-13,

The Grande Armee of 1809 had less men in it then it did in 1805. The Latter having 219,000 men and the former having 170,000. Your assertion that Napoleon couldn't command large commanders of men is Ridiculous. As we shall continue to see later on.

and when his army shrank away again in 1814 since the armies were within his span of command he did quite well.

The only instant where Numbers hurt Napoleons Ability to command was in 1812. The 600,000 man Army that set forth from the Berezina was simply too cumbersome for one man to take it all under himself. Again, a case of trying to make his command too central, but who ever took command of 600,000 men before ?

The 127,000 men he assembled for the Low Countries Campaign in 1815 were again beyond his span of command

Again, Napoleon commander far Larger armies then he did in le cent jours and commanded them to Un-paralleled success. In 1805 he commander 219,000 as previously noted. When Napoleon himself entered Spain in november of 1808 he had with him 240,000 effectives. Twice the number as he did in the campaign of Waterloo.

(not helped by the loss of Berthier, who would ignore the Emperor's orders and issue more sensible ones, whereas Soult would not go against his Emperor, but could not read his handwriting).

All Berthier did was Take down Napoleons word's, write them down, and send them out. Berthier, by his own admission, was as Chandler points out, a 'glorified clerk.' He was good at his Job, and it's no doubt that he would of done a better job then Soult but that is no where near a determining factor in the Hundred days.

[hellheaven1987]

I demand Stonewall Jackson be resurrected into Rober Lee's command.

[67th Tigers]

1) What do you base that on
2) Who, in your opinion is a 'exceptional' Confederate general

1. Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won, Appendix B "Mobilisation and Combat Effectiveness" contains a statistical analysis of many actions from the first three years of the war. It shows Lee was "representative" of CS generals in general.

2. Longstreet..

Just a good Improviser ? Hardly, Napoleon calculated his campaigns meticulously, taking in every single factor into account and then coming up with a comprehensive plan.

Bad news if he did, he made a major blunder in every single campaign. Ulm for example, Napoleons shifting of lines from the Rhine to the Danube was well done, but he found he'd overshot Mack (who he thought was on the Ammer) and his LoCs were threatened by his own movement. Mack helped him out by turning to start taking each one of Napoleon's Corps in detail rather than marching for the Rhine, allowing Napoleon to concentrate against him. It's notable that Napoleon only had 67,000 troops at his command, with other forces detached elsewhere under other commands. This "masterpiece" was improvised out of a serious strategic error, and written up as intentional afterwards, saved only by Mack's poor situational awareness.

Describe this. If you are talking about the decline in the quality of his Marshal's, then yes, that was a mistake. Napoleon's ego became grander and he neglected to reform it. This is why he had Men like Massena and Lanne's in 1805, and men like Grouchy in 1815.

Grouchy was fine, he was following orders and handled his army well. The problem was his orders from the Emperor were very shoddy indeed. It's a testament to the myth of Napoleon that when he makes such serious errors someone else gets the blame.

The Grande Armee of 1809 had less men in it then it did in 1805. The Latter having 219,000 men and the former having 170,000. Your assertion that Napoleon couldn't command large commanders of men is Ridiculous. As we shall continue to see later on.

No, he wouldn't, but he shouldn't have had too. Reforms such as the battalion carre coming out of the Seven Years War allowed for command to be passed down. The problem is Napoleon started to centralise. At Ulm, Napoleon gave a vague notion of his idea to Berthier, who wrote a coherent movement order and they managed to execute their movements with the Emperor only in contact with a small portion of the army.

In later campaigns, Napoleon wants more personal control of the Corps movements, which means moving them closer together. This lead to a decrease in flexibility and a massive spike in troop density on the battlefield. The troop density at Waterloo was 12 times that of Austerlitz. This was simply too dense a concentration of troops for them to fight effectively.

Napoleon was at his best when fighting with a flexible, dispersed, high quality army. The trend is obvious looking at the last major battle Napoleon actually won, Wagram. His army has become a battering ram rather than razors they were in 1806.

The only instant where Numbers hurt Napoleons Ability to command was in 1812. The 600,000 man Army that set forth from the Berezina was simply too cumbersome for one man to take it all under himself. Again, a case of trying to make his command too central, but who ever took command of 600,000 men before ?

He never commanded 600,000. Probably closer to 250,000 (the rest being on parallel axes and often simply demonstrating), but it was too much. It is a well known fact that only 30,000 men can march on one axis without causing interference, this was why army corps were necessary. The road system to move such an army just didn't exist.

All Berthier did was Take down Napoleons word's, write them down, and send them out. Berthier, by his own admission, was as Chandler points out, a 'glorified clerk.' He was good at his Job, and it's no doubt that he would of done a better job then Soult but that is no where near a determining factor in the Hundred days.

A COS that can't read his commanders handwriting, and hasn't the moral courage to rewrite the well meaning garbage coming from his commander into something more coherent and understandable? Berthier took Napoleon's orders and made them workable. Soult simply passed down Napoleon's unworkable orders.

[Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus]

Bad news if he did, he made a major blunder in every single campaign. Ulm for example, Napoleons shifting of lines from the Rhine to the Danube was well done, but he found he'd overshot Mack (who he thought was on the Ammer) and his LoCs were threatened by his own movement. Mack helped him out by turning to start taking each one of Napoleon's Corps in detail rather than marching for the Rhine, allowing Napoleon to concentrate against him. It's notable that Napoleon only had 67,000 troops at his command, with other forces detached elsewhere under other commands. This "masterpiece" was improvised out of a serious strategic error, and written up as intentional afterwards, saved only by Mack's poor situational awareness.

Surprisingly enough, for those like Clausewitz and Jomini, Chandler, Elting and others, 1805 was a master piece. If you would like to try to prove them wrong then go ahead. Regardless, there has never been a 'perfect' campaign in the history of warfare. Nothing goe's exactly as planned, no commander has a perfect rap-sheet. But for Napoleon's 'Major Blunder' Let's look at the result, an Entire Austrian army Capitulates and later he Destroy's the Allied army which ended the third coalition. Odd that such a 'major blunder' should have so little effect.

Grouchy was fine, he was following orders and handled his army well. The problem was his orders from the Emperor were very shoddy indeed. It's a testament to the myth of Napoleon that when he makes such serious errors someone else gets the blame.

Grouchy Concerned himself with a Prussian Rearguard and completely ignored what was happening at Waterloo. He then spent the rest of his life defending himself for it. This is hardly some 'myth.'

No, he wouldn't, but he shouldn't have had too. Reforms such as the battalion carre coming out of the Seven Years War allowed for command to be passed down. The problem is Napoleon started to centralise.

Napoleons style of Command enabled him to Dominate all of Europe. I fail at seeing how that is a problem.

At Ulm, Napoleon gave a vague notion of his idea to Berthier, who wrote a coherent movement order and they managed to execute their movements with the Emperor only in contact with a small portion of the army.

Prove it.

In later campaigns, Napoleon wants more personal control of the Corps movements, which means moving them closer together. This lead to a decrease in flexibility and a massive spike in troop density on the battlefield. The troop density at Waterloo was 12 times that of Austerlitz. This was simply too dense a concentration of troops for them to fight effectively.

The Field was 4 miles wide at Waterloo.............

Napoleon was at his best when fighting with a flexible, dispersed, high quality army. The trend is obvious looking at the last major battle Napoleon actually won, Wagram. His army has become a battering ram rather than razors they were in 1806.

And again, he commanded more men in 1805 then he did in 1809. So remind how that he was better at commanding smaller forces is proved by when he had a Greater success with a Larger force.

A COS that can't read his commanders handwriting, and hasn't the moral courage to rewrite the well meaning garbage coming from his commander into something more coherent and understandable? Berthier took Napoleon's orders and made them workable. Soult simply passed down Napoleon's unworkable orders.

Berthier Took down Napoleons word, put it on paper and sent it out. The only issue with Napoleons 'coherence' is that he never mastered the French language. You would seem to think that Napoleon spat out Drivel and Berthier carved it into a smooth and brilliant line of thought.

[67th Tigers]

Surprisingly enough, for those like Clausewitz and Jomini, Chandler, Elting and others, 1805 was a master piece. If you would like to try to prove them wrong then go ahead. Regardless, there has never been a 'perfect' campaign in the history of warfare. Nothing goe's exactly as planned, no commander has a perfect rap-sheet. But for Napoleon's 'Major Blunder' Let's look at the result, an Entire Austrian army Capitulates and later he Destroy's the Allied army which ended the third coalition. Odd that such a 'major blunder' should have so little effect.

It was, but it wasn't planned. Napoleon made what should have been a fatal error with his first movement. He was a good enough General to fight his way out of the trouble.

You've said nothing that contradicts my basic point, Napoleon planned poorly, and fought his way out of trouble.

Grouchy Concerned himself with a Prussian Rearguard and completely ignored what was happening at Waterloo. He then spent the rest of his life defending himself for it. This is hardly some 'myth.'

Grouchy's orders were clear and he followed them. He knew what was happening at Waterloo, it was part of the Emperors concept of operations..

Napoleons style of Command enabled him to Dominate all of Europe. I fail at seeing how that is a problem.

No, the Royal Armies reforms of the 1780's allowed the French to dominate. Napoleon simply inherited them.

Prove it.

How very juvenile.

"Napoleon and Berthier had made an excellent team during many campaigns, Berthier having the knack of of overcoming detail shortcomings in Napoleon's "broad brush" concepts and interpreting his general ideas and poor Corsican French (and appalling handwriting) into practical operations." - Wootten, Waterloo 1815

Any reading of Napoleon's staff system should have familiarised you with the basic concept of the poor staff work of Napoleon.

The Field was 4 miles wide at Waterloo.............

and 8 miles wide at Austerlitz, with a much smaller army contesting it.

And again, he commanded more men in 1805 then he did in 1809. So remind how that he was better at commanding smaller forces is proved by when he had a Greater success with a Larger force.

No, he didn't. In 1805 command was pushed down and his Marshals enabled. In 1809 the army was centralised, and Napoleon tried to get away initially with commanding it be telegraph from Paris. Until Berthier rather bluntly told Napoleon to come to the field that is

Berthier Took down Napoleons word, put it on paper and sent it out. The only issue with Napoleons 'coherence' is that he never mastered the French language. You would seem to think that Napoleon spat out Drivel and Berthier carved it into a smooth and brilliant line of thought.

That is prettymuch what happened. Napoleon had "fat fingers". A simple handwave over the map with no thoughts as to how to do it, or if was even possible. Berthier made it happen.

[Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus]

It was, but it wasn't planned.

What wasn't planned ? Mack's destruction ? Wrong. Central to Napoleons plan of success was to seize the Initiative by Neutralizing Mack. Napoleon knew that He could not let the Allies gather on the Danube lets he would allow a threat to gather which could reach as Deep as Alsace if it was properly handled by the Allies.

Napoleon made what should have been a fatal error with his first movement. He was a good enough General to fight his way out of the trouble.

Macks only real option was to yell.......



over and over again.

I still am confused as to what you actually think Napoleons 'great blunder' was. You say that Napoleon could of had his forces thrashed had Mack took more Initiative, but you avoid the fact that Napoleons security measures were so tight that Mack had little idea what his foe was doing and thus any active measure taken against Napoleons larger force was a leap in the dark that could of assured his complete annihilation. Napoleon placed Mack between a rock and a hard place, the net crafted by the Emperor virtually assured Mack's destruction. The Austrian commander could move forward, backwards or not move at all, at that point in mattered little, the avenues of Retreat were shut and Mack's destruction was virtually certain.

You've said nothing that contradicts my basic point, Napoleon planned poorly, and fought his way out of trouble.

Napoleon never planned poorly, even in his Greatest failure, the Russian invasion of 1812 he took into account every scenario and planned meticulously. In another one of his more, lukewarm campaigns, The Italian campaign of 1800 he also created a superb strategem. However, Moreau's reluctance on the Rhine opted him to change his plan.

If anything is true, it's the opposite of what you say. Napoleon planned for every situation, and created grand and elaborate strategies to defeat his foe. These plan's usually succeeded in one way or another, however, they did sometimes fail.

Grouchy's orders were clear and he followed them. He knew what was happening at Waterloo, it was part of the Emperors concept of operations..

Grouchy's orders were: 'A Letter which has just been intercepted states that general Bulow is about to attack our right flank we believe that we can see the Corps on the height of St.Lambert. So do not lose a moment in drawing near to us, and affecting a junction with us, in order to crush Bulow whom you will catch in the very act of Concentrating'

However, the letter did not reach him in time. But still, Grouchy should of took the Initiative, and marched towards his emperor, or at least try to communicate with him to see what was going on.

No, the Royal Armies reforms of the 1780's allowed the French to dominate. Napoleon simply inherited them.

Odd considering how A) the Reform's of the 1780's still left the army in no Great state and were little more then a shaping up of Artillery, B) They were torn up by the Revolution which almost re-created a new army from Scratch and C) The corps d'armee system as it was, was Napoleons Creation.

Napoleon doctrine was greatly Shaped by many officers of that time (Like the Baron du Tiel) But he did not 'Inherit' it as you say he did.

How very juvenile.

When you claim something you have to prove it.

"Napoleon and Berthier had made an excellent team during many campaigns, Berthier having the knack of of overcoming detail shortcomings in Napoleon's "broad brush" concepts and interpreting his general ideas and poor Corsican French (and appalling handwriting) into practical operations." - Wootten, Waterloo 1815

Perhaps Mr.Wooten could Indulge us with a few Examples ?

Any reading of Napoleon's staff system should have familiarised you with the basic concept of the poor staff work of Napoleon.

It was by no means perfect, But the Loss of Berthier while certainly being felt was not crucial by any means.

and 8 miles wide at Austerlitz, with a much smaller army contesting it.

At Waterloo Napoleon had 72,000 men. At Austerlitz, Napoleon had 67,000. Napoleon had more men at Waterloo and Half the space. Theres your density.

No, he didn't. In 1805 command was pushed down and his Marshals enabled.

And who commanded the Marshals ? Your trying to say that the role of a director is lesser just because He is letting his actors act. It's ridiculous.

In 1809 the army was centralised, and Napoleon tried to get away initially with commanding it be telegraph from Paris. Until Berthier rather bluntly told Napoleon to come to the field that is

So your saying that Napoleon centralized his army by trying to command it via....telegraph ?


What ?

That is prettymuch what happened. Napoleon had "fat fingers". A simple handwave over the map with no thoughts as to how to do it, or if was even possible. Berthier made it happen.

Thats completely Insane but i'll indulge you.

A) It's inconsistent to what Berthier would say of himself. He declared himself a 'nothing' in the army, he merely took down the emperors word's then put them on paper and sent them out
B) It's inconsistent with the Fact that Napoleon planned Meticulously before every Campaign.
C) You provide no examples for this, you are being incredibly vague, however Ironic that may be.