Robert E. Lee vs The Duke of Wellington

[Clouse123456]

NO WAY NO NO NO NO... DONT MAKE SUCH A THREAD!!! INSANITY!! you honestly want ppl to compare the armies and leaders separated by almost 60 years? Heh??? If anything Lee would have better weapons in all aspects and just blow Wellington away.

But honestly... with all due respect dude... this is like the most useless thread I've ever read. How can you possibly make this comparison? This isn't something you can try out by installing empire earth you know :hmmm:

Yea plus u will get those dumb arrogant americans commenting on this............I kid I kid

[67th Tigers]

Great, so the french can send in 60,000 men in to secure the peninsula then ! Oh wait, they can't. Because of populist resistance, thats why. Again, no matter what logistic or geographical problem can beset an army, it is a non-factor if there is no resistance to be had.

You seem to be putting the cart before the horse.

The reason for dispersion (and the Spanish Army dispersed the the same manner, and they had no insurgent troubles, obviously) was that the army had to go where supply was. The Guerrillas, while a nuisence (sp?), were only a factor in the size of foraging parties etc.

It's worth comparing the French and British loss rate, excluding battles. The French, on average, lost about 1/8th of their force per annum, the British 1/10th, as a point of comparison, Lee's army lost about 1/2 pa (but more to desertion than anything else).

The Guerrillas were a factor, but not a dominant one. The Spanish country and Wellington's Army were the dominant factors, with the Spanish Army also being a major factor.

[Mr Longbowman]

Lee would kick Wellingtons behind easy. I think that Wellington is a overrated commander, of course he still is a above-average commander but not in Lee class.

Napolean was already beaten and no chance he would survive a year after Waterlo even if Napolean got a crushing victory. Lee was probably the greatest commander of the 19th century.

And no Lee is not my Great-Grandfather.

[67th Tigers]

Lee would kick Wellingtons behind easy. I think that Wellington is a overrated commander, of course he still is a above-average commander but not in Lee class.

Napolean was already beaten and no chance he would survive a year after Waterlo even if Napolean got a crushing victory. Lee was probably the greatest commander of the 19th century.

And no Lee is not my Great-Grandfather.

Napoleon was by no means beaten, if he could have smashed the Army of the Low Countries and the Army of the Lower Rhine he could have switched axes, and would have received major reinforcements.

Lee is frankly just a fairly competent General, statistically no better than Beauregard, AS Johnson or even Bragg (maybe Bragg...). What he had however was a relative advantage in troop quality (for example, in shooting, at Seven Pines Hooker's troops hit with 1 round in 350, the opposing Confederates with 1 round in 138, in a similar firefight a few years earlier the British hit with 1 round in 20).

Wellington OTOH is truly exceptional, and illustrates the problem with such comparisons. Unless we go to statistics, we can only say both generals were top of their leagues, we directly compare leagues.

[Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus]

You seem to be putting the cart before the horse.

The reason for dispersion (and the Spanish Army dispersed the the same manner, and they had no insurgent troubles, obviously) was that the army had to go where supply was. The Guerrillas, while a nuisence (sp?), were only a factor in the size of foraging parties etc.

The Guerrillas were a factor, but not a dominant one. The Spanish country and Wellington's Army were the dominant factors, with the Spanish Army also being a major factor.

That argument only holds true if the French could not concentrate at all. Which is just not true, or else they (Or the Allies) Would of never been able to fight a conventional war. The simple fact of the matter is, that without the guerillas activity. any sort of supply problem could of been handled, by train or otherwise.

[67th Tigers]

To quote a site you've quoted at me before (and I find terribly unbalanced generally):

" Napoleon seemed to ignore the food question.
The scattered state of the French army in Spain
rendered its situation desperate, and that
the slowness of Sir Arthur Wellesley saved it several times.

War in Peninsula In Peninsula the French met serious problems while the Emperor seemed to ignore the food question. In 1812 Marshal Marmont complained to Napoleon: "... the English army is always concentrated and can always be moved, because it has an adequate supply of money and transport. 7,000 to 8,000 pack mules bring up its daily food ... His Majesty may judge from this fact the comparison between their means and our's -we have not 4 day's food in any of our magazines, we have no transport, we cannot draw requisitions from the most wretched village without sending thither a foraging party of 200 strong; to live from day to day, we have to scatter detachments to vast distances, and always to be on the move ... Lord Wellington is quite aware that I have no magazines, and is acquinted with the immensely difficult character of the country, and its complete lack of food resources ... He knows that my army is not in a position to cross the Coa, even if nobody opposes me, and that if we did so we should have to turn back at the end of 4 days, unable to carry on the campaign ..."

To live, the French troops had to disperse and, once they were scattered, they were easy prey for enemy. Wellington writes: "The more ground the French hold down, the weaker will they be at any given point." The French marshals came to realise that large armies simply starved and smaller armies were defeated. French General Thiebault writes that the scattered state of the French army in Spain rendered its situation desperate, and that the slowness of Sir Arthur Wellesley saved it several times.

The French troops were known for their skills of extracting provisions locally - much to the annoyance of local population. Wellington: "It is certainly astonishing that the enemy [French] have been able to remain in this country so long; and it is extraordinary instance of what a French army can do. It is positively a fact that they brought no provisions with them, and they have not received even a letter since they entered Portugal. With all our money and having in our favour the good inclinations of the country, I assure you that I could not maintain one division in the district in which they have maintained not less than 60,000 men and 20,000 animals for more than two months."
"In contrast, the Allies, particularly the British, seem to have been peculiarly inept at surviving without plenty of supplies. Even in times of minor food shortages, indiscipline erupted on a vast scale. The British divisions went to pieces in the lean days after Talavera for example - and as late as the Waterloo campaign of 1815, we find Wellington commenting to his Prussian friends that 'I cannot separate from my tents and supplies. My troops must be well kept and well supplied in camp ..." (- Gates) "

-http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/cruel_war_in_Spain.html

[Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus]

To quote from that exact same page


'Spain was to be saved ... not by grape-shot, greybeards and grandees, but by a hardy guerillas and the sudden flash of the knife ... Even the basic force of 200,000 veterans which Napoleon was compelled to keep, year after year, in Spain would never be safe from the noon-day ambush and things that went bump in the night.'

[67th Tigers]

To quote from that exact same page


'Spain was to be saved ... not by grape-shot, greybeards and grandees, but by a hardy guerillas and the sudden flash of the knife ... Even the basic force of 200,000 veterans which Napoleon was compelled to keep, year after year, in Spain would never be safe from the noon-day ambush and things that went bump in the night.'

As I've said, the page occupies the same position you seem too, the Brits were nothing to do with beating the French.

In this case, the "Guerrillas" were generally ineffective banditry (who attacked British and Spanish as much as the French), but did form effective large combat groupings if well led.

The food factor and guerrilla warfare have become conflated in peoples minds. The minds of the contemporaries were clear, it was lack of food that was the problem, and the Guerrillas were an annoyance.

The numbers are clear, in Summer 1811 the French had 400,000 troops in Iberia, of whom 70,000 were dedicated to Lines of Communications and fighting the Guerrilla, or roughly a fifth of the force. The remaining 330,000 men, were conventionally fighting the British-Portugeuse and Spanish Armies.

See Esdaile's Penininsula War for a good review of the current state of knowledge.

[Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus]

As I've said, the page occupies the same position you seem too, the Brits were nothing to do with beating the French.

No I do not hold to that belief. I believed that British were essential to victory in the peninsula, Bringing money, disciplined (At least in battle, See the sack of Badajoz) Soldiers and most Importantly, Leadership. The main gripe with the Regular Spanish army was that it's command was in utter shambles and no one could do a proper job of leading it in the strategical sense. Wellington fixes that problem.

In this case, the "Guerrillas" were generally ineffective banditry (who attacked British and Spanish as much as the French), but did form effective large combat groupings if well led.

We didn't name small groups of partisan fighters using Indirect and Fabian tactics after the Guerillas for nothing you know.

The food factor and guerrilla warfare have become conflated in peoples minds. The minds of the contemporaries were clear, it was lack of food that was the problem, and the Guerrillas were an annoyance.

The Food would not have been a problem, had it not of been for the Guerillas. It is an extremely simple thing to go to a village and fetch some bread. It is a much more complex thing to do that when Spanish peasants are armed and ready to ambush, torture and kill you then mutilate your corpse.

The numbers are clear, in Summer 1811 the French had 400,000 troops in Iberia, of whom 70,000 were dedicated to Lines of Communications and fighting the Guerrilla, or roughly a fifth of the force. The remaining 330,000 men, were conventionally fighting the British-Portugeuse and Spanish Armies.

A) And what were the activities of the '330,000' men fighting the Allied Armies ?

[67th Tigers]

No I do not hold to that belief. I believed that British were essential to victory in the peninsula, Bringing money, disciplined (At least in battle, See the sack of Badajoz) Soldiers and most Importantly, Leadership. The main gripe with the Regular Spanish army was that it's command was in utter shambles and no one could do a proper job of leading it in the strategical sense. Wellington fixes that problem.

We didn't name small groups of partisan fighters using Indirect and Fabian tactics after the Guerillas for nothing you know.

The Food would not have been a problem, had it not of been for the Guerillas. It is an extremely simple thing to go to a village and fetch some bread. It is a much more complex thing to do that when Spanish peasants are armed and ready to ambush, torture and kill you then mutilate your corpse.

A) And what were the activities of the '330,000' men fighting the Allied Armies ?

They didn't call irregulars "Guerrillas", that's a much later invention, they called them, in English, Partisans. However, the majority of the Little War was carried out by detachments of the Spanish Regular Army.

I suspect a read of "Fighting Napoleon: Guerrillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814" might be in order.

[Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus]

They didn't call irregulars "Guerrillas", that's a much later invention, they called them, in English, Partisans. However, the majority of the Little War was carried out by detachments of the Spanish Regular Army.

Thats because the Regular army was destroyed in '09 and alot of former regulars started forming these Guerilla bands.

They were by no means, a regular force. If anything, they were Irregulars who were comprised of many men with regular Backgrounds.

[GreyFox]

For every French soldier Wellington's troops killed in battle, the Spanish guerilleros killed three or four. What the guerilleros couldn't do was take cities, while Wellington could.

The guerilleros were such a threat that the French needed to use a squadron of cavalry or battalion of troops to guard the messengers, and sometimes even that wasn't enough - Wellington sometimes received messages that still had the messenger's blood on it.

[67th Tigers]

For every French soldier Wellington's troops killed in battle, the Spanish guerilleros killed three or four. What the guerilleros couldn't do was take cities, while Wellington could.

The guerilleros were such a threat that the French needed to use a squadron of cavalry or battalion of troops to guard the messengers, and sometimes even that wasn't enough - Wellington sometimes received messages that still had the messenger's blood on it.

A very dubious statistic, what book was that published in? The author has perscribed all deaths from normal campaigning to "the Guerrillas"

This seems to be another case of subscribing Spanish Army successes to the Guerrillas too.

[Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus]

A very dubious statistic, what book was that published in? The author has perscribed all deaths from normal campaigning to "the Guerrillas"

This seems to be another case of subscribing Spanish Army successes to the Guerrillas too.

Tigers you are not one to talk about 'dubious statistics' with your 330,000 claim.

[67th Tigers]

Tigers you are not one to talk about 'dubious statistics' with your 330,000 claim.

Organised as (July 1811):

Army of the Centre (King Joseph Bonaparte): 25,000 men organised as a single Corps d'Armee

Army of the North (Dorsenne): 100,000 men organised into 3 Corps d'Armee (including an Imperial Guard Corps), I don't know their internal organisation, but this Army was in Navarre, and bore the brunt of the Guerrilla war.

Army of the South (Marshal Soult): 90,000 men organised into 3 Corps d'Armee (1st under Marshal Victor, 4th under Sebastiani and 5th under Girard)

Army of Portugal (Marshal Marmont): 58,000 men organised into 4 Corps d'Armee (2nd Corps under Reynier, 6th Corps under Marshal Marmont (vice Marshal Ney, recalled to France), 8th Corps under Junot and 9th Corps )

Army of Aragon (Marshal Suchet): 51,000 men organised as a single Corps d'Armee (3rd Corps)

Army of Catalonia (Marshal MacDonald): 30,000 organised as a single Corps d'Armee (7th Corps)

[Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus]

Organised as (July 1811):

Army of the Centre (King Joseph Bonaparte): 25,000 men organised as a single Corps d'Armee

Army of the North (Dorsenne): 100,000 men organised into 3 Corps d'Armee (including an Imperial Guard Corps), I don't know their internal organisation, but this Army was in Navarre, and bore the brunt of the Guerrilla war.

Army of the South (Marshal Soult): 90,000 men organised into 3 Corps d'Armee (1st under Marshal Victor, 4th under Sebastiani and 5th under Girard)

Army of Portugal (Marshal Marmont): 58,000 men organised into 4 Corps d'Armee (2nd Corps under Reynier, 6th Corps under Marshal Marmont (vice Marshal Ney, recalled to France), 8th Corps under Junot and 9th Corps )

Army of Aragon (Marshal Suchet): 51,000 men organised as a single Corps d'Armee (3rd Corps)

Army of Catalonia (Marshal MacDonald): 30,000 organised as a single Corps d'Armee (7th Corps)

And how many of these do you claim to serve at the front ?

[67th Tigers]

The Spanish had (1813)

1st Army (Army of Catalonia): 16,000 under Copons

2nd Army (Army of Valencia): 30,600 under Elio (the army had been smashed with over 17,000 captured in 1812 and had reformed)

3rd Army (Army of Murica): 13,000 under Duke del Parque

4th Army: 35,000 under Frere

Army of Reserve of Andalucia: 10,000 under Giron attached to Wellington

5th Army (Army of Estramadura and Castillia): folded into the 4th Army

6th Army (Army of Galicia): also folded into the 4th Army

Another 60,000 odd were directly attached to Wellington's main army, and another 20,000 to the British Sicilian Army

And how many of these do you claim to serve at the front ?

Errr, all of them. This isn't a Clauswitzian mob everyone together and go for it....

[Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus]

Errr, all of them. This isn't a Clauswitzian mob everyone together and go for it....

I had no idea, Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre and most of southern Spain was adjacent to Portugal and western Spain.

[Eric]

Okay, let's modify this scenario. The battlefield is Fredericksburg, with Lee occupying Marye's Heights as he did in history. Instead of that bloody idiot Burnside and the brave, but out-generalled, Army of the Potomac, we have the brilliant Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, with his Anglo-Iberian Army of the Penisula from the time of Vitoria. It numbers around 80,000 men (52,000 British, 28,000 Portugese) against Lee's 72,000 men. To level the playing field technologically, both sides are uniformly equipped with smoothbore percussion lock muskets and smoothbore cannon. Wellington has the same goals as Burnside, but will go about achieving those goals differently. Like at Vitoria, Wellington's army is organized into a series of columns for the attack. They are listed in the order of battle:

British order of battle:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Commander: Lieutenant General (local General) the Marquess of Wellington

Right Column: commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Rowland Hill
Cavalry:
1st Brigade: commanded by Major General Victor von Alten: 14th Light Dragoons and 1st Hussars, King’s German Legion
2nd Brigade: commanded by Lieutenant General Fane: 3rd Dragoon Guards and 1st Royal Dragoons

Infantry:
2nd Division: commanded by Lieutenant General William Stewart
1st Brigade: commanded by Colonel Cadogan: 1st/50th, 1st/71st and 1st/91st Foot Co 5th/60th Foot
2nd Brigade: commanded by Major General Byng: 1st/3rd, 1st/57th Foot, 1st Provisional Battn. (2nd/31st and 2nd/66th Foot) and Co 5th/60th Foot.
3rd Brigade: commanded by Colonel O’Callaghan: 1st/28th, 2nd/34th, 1st/39th Foot and Co 5th/60th Foot.
Portuguese Brigade: commanded by Brigadier General Ashworth: 1st and 2nd/6th, 1st and 2nd/18th Portuguese Line and 6th Caçadores.

Portuguese Division: commanded by Major General Silveira, Conde de Amaranthe.
1st Brigade: commanded by Brigadier General de Costa: 1st and 2nd/2nd, 1st and 2nd/14th Portuguese Line.
2nd Brigade: commanded by Brigadier General Archibald Campbell: 1st and 2nd/4th, 1st and 2nd/10th Portuguese Line and 10th Caçadores.

Spanish Division: commanded by Major General Morillo
Artillery: commanded by Major Carncross
Beane’s Troop Royal Horse Artillery
Maxwell’s Battery Royal Artillery
2 Portuguese batteries under Major Tulloh

Right Centre Column: commanded by the Marquess of Wellington
Cavalry
1st Brigade: commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Sir Robert Hill: 1st and 2nd Life Guards and Royal Horse Guards.
2nd Brigade: commanded by Colonel Colquohon Grant: 10th, 15th and 18th Light Dragoons (Hussars)
3rd Brigade: commanded by Major General William Ponsonby: 5th Dragoon Guards, 3rd and 4th Dragoons
Portuguese Brigade: commanded by Brigadier General D’Urban: 1st, 11th and 12th Portuguese Dragoons.

Infantry:
4th Division: commanded by Major General (local Lieutenant General) Lowry Cole
1st Brigade: commanded by Major General William Anson: 3rd/27th, 1st/40th, 1st/48th, Provisional Battn. (2nd and 2nd/53rd Foot) and Co 5th/60th Foot.
2nd Brigade: commanded by Major General Skerrett: 1st/7th, 20th, 1st/23rd, and Co Brunswick Oels.
Portuguese Brigade: commanded by Colonel George Stubbs: 1st and 2nd/11th and 1st and 2nd/23rd Portuguese Line and 7th Caçadores.

Light Division: commanded by Lieutenant General Charles, Baron von Alten.
1st Brigade: commanded by Major General Kempt: 1st/43rd Foot, 1st/95th Rifles (8 Cos), 3rd/95th Rifles (5 Cos) and 3rd Caçadores.
2nd Brigade: commanded by Major General John Ormesby Vandeleur: 1st/52nd Foot, 2nd/95th Rifles (6Cos) and 1st Caçadores.

Artillery: commanded by Major Augustus Simon Frazer
Ross’s, Gardiner’s and Ramsay’s Troops, Royal Horse Artillery
Sympher’s Battery, King’s German Artillery.

Left Centre Column: commanded by Lieutenant General the Earl of Dalhousie.
Infantry:
3rd Division: commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Picton.
1st Brigade: commanded by Major General Thomas Brisbane: 1st/45th, 74th, 1st/88th and 3 Cos 5th/60th Foot.
2nd Brigade: commanded by Major General Colville: 1st/5th, 2nd/83rd, 2nd/87th and 94th Foot.
Portuguese Brigade: commanded by Major General Manley Power: 1st and 2nd/9th, 1st and 2nd/21st Portuguese Line and 11th Caçadores.

7th Division: commanded by Lieutenant General Lord Dalhousie.
1st Brigade: commanded by Major General Barnes: 1st/6th Foot, 3rd Provisional Battalion (2nd/24th and 2nd/58th Foot), Brunswick Oels (7 Cos)
2nd Brigade: commanded by Colonel William Grant: 51st, 68th, 1st/82nd Foot and Chasseurs Britanniques.
Portuguese Brigade: commanded by Major General Le Cor: 1st and 2nd/7th, 1st and 2nd/19th Portuguese Line and 2nd Caçadores.
Artillery: commanded by Major Buckner
Batteries of Cairnes and Douglas.

Left Column: commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Graham.
Cavalry:
1st Brigade: commanded by Major General George Anson: 12th and 16th Light Dragoons
2nd Brigade: commanded by Major General Baron Bock: 1st and 2nd Dragoons, King’s German Legion

Infantry:
1st Division: commanded by Major General Kenneth Howard
1st Brigade: commanded by Major General Kenneth Stopford: 1st/Coldstream, 1st/3rd Guards, Co 5th/60th Foot
2nd Brigade: commanded by Colonel Collin Halkett: 1st, 2nd and 5th Line Battalions, 1st and 2nd Light Battalions, King’s German Legion.

5th Division: commanded by Major General Oswald.
1st Brigade: commanded by Major General Hay: 3rd/1st, 1st/9th, 1st/38th Foot and Co Brunswick Oels.
2nd Brigade: commanded by Major General Robinson: 1st/4th, 2nd/47th, 2nd/59th Foot and Co Brunswick Oels.
Portuguese Brigade: commanded by Brigadier General Spry: 1st and 2nd/3rd, 1st and 2nd/15th Portuguese Line and 8th Caçadores.

Independent Portuguese Brigades:
Independent Brigades:
1st Brigade: commanded by Brigadier General Pack: 1st and 2nd/1st, 1st and 2nd/16th Portuguese Line and 4th Caçadores.
2nd Brigade: commanded by Brigadier General Bradford: 1st and 2nd/13th, 1st and 2nd/24th Portuguese Line and 5th Caçadores.

Spanish Division: commanded by Colonel Francisco Longa:

Artillery:
Dubordieu’s and Lawson’s batteries Royal Artillery

Army Artillery: commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Dickson
Webber Smith’s troop Royal Horse Artillery
Parker’s battery Royal Artillery
Arriaga’s battery Portuguese Artillery.

Many may think of Wellington as a solely defensive general, even though many of his battles were offensive (Argaum, Assaye, Duoro, Salamanca, Vitoria) and he showed a solid grasp on the offensive. At Vitoria, the battle from which we are taking his forces in this scenario, Wellington led a massive, well-coordinated attack in four columns attacking from three different directions, almost destroying the French army. At Salamanca, he hit the French with a series of heavy attacks in oblique order, he routed 40,000 men in 40 minutes.

So, can Wellington succeed where Burnside failed?

[Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus]

Wellington will wait for the Prussians until he dies of old age or they somehow swim across the atlantic.