Assuming the weapon is sighted properly yes, usually this is the case.Precise. Precision is a quality of the weapon. Accuracy is a quality of the man. An inaccurate man with a precise weapon is no better (probably worse) than an accurate man with an imprecise weapon.
However in popular conversation the terms precision and accuracy are usually interchangeable.
The major advance was the percussion lock. It increased firepower at least 25% (simply by eliminating most misfires), and heavy Minie balls caused havoc with Russian formations (rounds would pass through the front man and hit those behind, but that was the old .75 Minie, which is about twice the weight of the .577).
As for ROF, the Minie rifle took 17 drill movements to fire (the old flintlock 18). It's ROF was about the same, and it suffered several problems, mainly due to the poor quality of American balls (a worrying tendency was for the balls flange to sheer, converting the Minie into an instant "shotgun" for example, and it was much more prone to fouling when used with low quality powder).
British officers in the Crimea were writing home asking for breachloaders, to increase their ROF (as a point, the *effective* ROF of breachloaders and repeaters is about the same).
quote=ajm317;2734891]Assuming the weapon is sighted properly yes, usually this is the case.
However in popular conversation the terms precision and accuracy are usually interchangeable.[/quote]
You couldn't zero the weapons of the time, you had to zero the man to the weapon. However, most people don't make the distinction, it's true.
Last edited by Valus; April 03, 2008 at 02:46 AM. Reason: double post
A good article on US Cavalry during the Civil War compared with European Cavalry
From http://www.battlefieldanomalies.com/...experience.htmThe American Experience.
The legacy of the Revolutionary Wars (1775-1783) had left America with a small but well trained cavalry force with its own manual and school of horsemanship.[i] It gradually developed into a competent and professional arm of the service, seeing action in the early Indian Wars, and during the Mexican War (1846-1847). These experiences should be borne in mind when considering the way in which cavalry was employed during the Civil War, at first by the South, and later by the North.
Originally conforming to European cavalry traditions, the Americans soon realised that, owing to the vastness of the country and the diverse nature of the climate and terrain, it was impractical to continue to follow the style of cavalry tactics employed by European armies. Also, with the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, it soon became apparent that to train masses of recruits in the art of using the lance and sabre, while manoeuvring in squadron and regimental close packed ranks, would not be viable. The American cavalry commanders also saw that, with the introduction of the breech-loading rifle, all of these tactics would prove to be an exercise in pure madness, a lesson that the armies of Europe would take many more years to learn.[ii]
Both the North and South had a ready-made supply of men who had been brought up in the ways and skills of country craft and horsemanship. Many had to rely on their own initiative for their livelihood, as well as having a good knowledge of how to use firearms. But it was in the Confederate States in particular that these talents were more noticeable having, in the main, a more rural economy, which tended their men to having more of an aptitude for country pursuits and field craft.[iii]
The American Civil War also saw the potential for using cavalry against an enemy’s railroad system, and both sides used their mounted troops to good effect in cutting and disrupting rail networks by dashing and daring raids.
At the end of 1862 General Nathan Bedford Forrest’s Confederate cavalry was to show just what could be achieved by using raids at a time when the superior manpower of the North was beginning to tell. In December, Union General Ulysses Simpson Grant was making his first move towards the city of Vicksburg on the Mississippi River with some 40,000 troops, while General William Tecumsech Sherman, with another 32,000 more Union soldiers moved by river against Chickasaw Bluffs, just to the North of the city. On 20th December 1862 Forrest hit the railroad between the towns of Bolivar Tennessee and Columbus Kentucky with his 2,500 troopers, and at the same time Confederate General Earl Van Dorn with 3,500 cavalry wrecked Grant’s secondary base at Holly Springs Mississippi. Not content with what had been achieved by his first raid, Forrest now took his force even further afield cutting Grant’s only rail link to the North between Humbolt and Jackson Tennessee. He caused so much destruction to track, bridges and rolling stock far into Kentucky that Grant was forced to retire back to Holly Springs and abandon his campaign for want of supplies and communications.[iv] But the main factor of Forrest’s raids, which were to become even more frustrating to Sherman later in the war, was that he had managed to tie down thousands of Union troops in attempts to intercept him.
It was during Sherman’s 1864 campaign against Atlanta Georgia that Forrest really excelled himself as an independent and intuitive commander.
‘His mere presence with a few thousand cavalry to the south forced Sherman to leave 80,000 of his 180,000 men he had with him to guard his line of communication to his main supply base at Louisville which lengthened as he advanced to 340 miles. Sherman had insured himself against temporary delays caused by attacks on his advance depots or minor damage to the railway immediately behind his main army. But Forrest, back at Tupelo in Mississippi, was nicely placed for a destructive raid on the northernmost sector of his railway which would cut Sherman off from his main base and in the long run bring his campaign to a halt…He (Sherman) therefore detached a mixed force of a further 10,000 under General Sturgis to hunt Forrest out of Tupelo and drive him to the west, out of harm’s way. At that very moment Forrest had set out to do just what Sherman most feared; and Sturgis did at least bring him hurrying back to save his base and troops he had left there. Though outnumbered by more than three to one, Forrest brilliantly concealed his weakness by moving through thickly wooded country, caught Sturgis at Brice’s Cross Roads with his cavalry and infantry widely separated and inflicted on him a smashing defeat. As Sturgis fell back to Memphis, he left 2,500 men -a quarter of his army- dead or wounded on the field; and Forrest got back to Tupelo having suffered no more than 500 casualties’.[v]
Although not on the scale of Forrest’s raids, the Union did succeed in diverting Confederate attention away from Grants second advance on Vicksburg when, in April 1863, General Benjamin Henry Grierson took 1,700 Union cavalry on a raid south of the city. This raid proved most beneficial to Grant as his forces crossed the Mississippi, but caused panic in the South, ultimately resulting in their president, Jefferson Davis trying to hold on to Vicksburg at any cost, while also attempting to support Confederate General Braxton Bragg’s forces in Tennessee. The real value of the raid therefore was in distracting and demoralising both the Confederate government and its General commanding Vicksburg, John Clifford Pemberton, at the very moment that Grant was manoeuvring to lay siege to the city.[vi]
It was the American generals who turned to an entirely new technique in their use of cavalry. A large force of mounted troops soon became a component of a lightly equipped force of all arms capable of operating against an enemy’s flank or rear. Speed, surprise and secrecy were the necessary elements in these operations. Used as a covering force the cavalry could mask the movements of a corps or an army, and it could also be used to threaten so many points simultaneously that the enemy were left guessing as to their true intent.[vii]
Perhaps the best example of how combined arms could be used to best effect came in the last year of the Civil War. At the beginning of 1865 General Robert E. Lee was being forced to stretch his dwindling forces further to his right, in order to cover the city of Richmond in Virginia. General George Pickett, the ill-fated commander whose division was decimated at Gettysburg, was detached by Lee from his position around Petersburg and pushed out to cover the Confederate right flank at Five Forks. It was here that poor old Pickett clashed with the Union cavalry under General Phil Sheridan.
On the 31st March 1865 Sheridan pushed out one of his cavalry divisions, commanded by General Thomas Casimer Devin, towards Five Forks. In torrential rain the Union troopers made steady progress, but Pickett had found a road that ran through thick woods towards Dinwidde Court House, which concealed his forces from the enemy, enabling them to manoeuvre around the Union left flank with the idea of cutting them off. In so doing Pickett managed to drive a wedge between Devin’s division and Sheridan’s other Federal cavalry.[viii]
Taking stock of the situation, Sheridan immediately organised his other divisions to meet Pickett’s threat, eventually causing the Confederates to pull back from Dinnwidde and form a defensive line less then a hundred meters from the Union position.[ix]
Meanwhile Grant, now in command of all Union forces, and present with the Army of the Potomac on Lee’s front, ordered Sheridan to assume command of all troops to be sent to operate with him, these included the Union V Corps under General Gouverneur Kemble Warren.
Warren’s behaviour during the battle is another story. It was Sheridan’s, ‘…masterly demonstration of the power of a mixed force of all arms when intelligently employed,’[x] that is the real object of study. As McElwee says, ‘ His dismounted cavalry went over to the offensive and pinned down Pickett’s main force, while the infantry prised open the gap which had opened between Lee’s main army and his detached wing. By the end of the day Pickett’s force had been rolled up and dispersed in wild disorder and Lee’s main position rendered untenable.’[xi]
Concerning Sheridan’s use of a mixed force at Five Forks, Major Henry Havelock a British commentator, had this to say, ‘Had it been any European Cavalry, unarmed with “repeaters”, and untrained to fight on foot, that was barring the way -any Cavalry whose only means of detention consisted in the absurd ineffectual fire of mounted skirmishers, or in repeated charges with lance and sabre- the Confederate game would have been simple and easy enough.’[xii]
Havelock himself had won the Victoria Cross at Cawnpore in India in 1858, and although he was not in America to view the Civil War at first hand, he nevertheless understood by his studies of that conflict that what the American cavalry leaders had achieved were in complete harmony with his own conclusions on how cavalry should be handled, ‘ His final and fanatically held view was that in territory open enough to allow room for manoeuvre and in face of the rising fire-power of modern infantry and artillery “sabre cavalry” were totally out of date. He preached his conclusion with a fervid intolerance which, though it did no damage to his military career, made them totally suspect to higher authority.’[xiii]
As well as Havelock, another exponent of change in cavalry tactics came from the writings of the Canadian born, Lieutenant-Colonel George T.Denison. After the American Civil War Denison interviewed a number of Confederate generals who were living in exile in Canada. From these talks he concluded that, although there was a need to retain some cavalry units in their traditional role, fire-power should now be the main factor in the training of the mounted arm of the service, utilising the horse only for greater mobility.[xiv] His theories may not have been taken very seriously by most European powers, but he did win the first prize, offered by the Russian Grand Duke Nicholas in 1874, for his essay on the history of cavalry.[xv]
Even with the glaringly obvious fact that, after Borodino, Waterloo and Balaclava, cavalry could not, on their own, be expected to break well-formed infantry squares or overrun entrenchments, the armies of Europe still persisted in the old fashioned methods of dividing their mounted troops into light and heavy units, each trained in the skills of either the sword or the lance, and although the pistol or carbine were issued to both categories, these were considered as secondary to the use of cold steel.
The Prussians soon learnt their lesson regarding the poor showing of their cavalry during the war with Austria in 1866, but even allowing for their greater preponderance over the French in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, they still managed, albeit on a spectacular scale, to loose over half a brigade of cavalry when General von Bredow was ordered to charge the French infantry and gun line at the battle of Mars-la-Tours (16th August 1870). That the charge itself did indeed stabilize the situation for the Prussians is not in question, what it should have shown to all those who witnessed it, and to those who studied its effects thereafter, was that if all cavalry were now to be used as little more than suicide missiles, then some other means of utilising these expensive and well disciplined troops should now be seriously considered.
“The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.”
—Sir William Francis Butler
I found this particularly interesting (from TMWNN's post):
Concerning Sheridan’s use of a mixed force at Five Forks, Major Henry Havelock a British commentator, had this to say, ‘Had it been any European Cavalry, unarmed with “repeaters”, and untrained to fight on foot, that was barring the way -any Cavalry whose only means of detention consisted in the absurd ineffectual fire of mounted skirmishers, or in repeated charges with lance and sabre- the Confederate game would have been simple and easy enough.’[xii]
Havelock himself had won the Victoria Cross at Cawnpore in India in 1858, and although he was not in America to view the Civil War at first hand, he nevertheless understood by his studies of that conflict that what the American cavalry leaders had achieved were in complete harmony with his own conclusions on how cavalry should be handled, ‘ His final and fanatically held view was that in territory open enough to allow room for manoeuvre and in face of the rising fire-power of modern infantry and artillery “sabre cavalry” were totally out of date. He preached his conclusion with a fervid intolerance which, though it did no damage to his military career, made them totally suspect to higher authority.’[xiii]...
...Even with the glaringly obvious fact that, after Borodino, Waterloo and Balaclava, cavalry could not, on their own, be expected to break well-formed infantry squares or overrun entrenchments, the armies of Europe still persisted in the old fashioned methods of dividing their mounted troops into light and heavy units, each trained in the skills of either the sword or the lance, and although the pistol or carbine were issued to both categories, these were considered as secondary to the use of cold steel.
The Prussians soon learnt their lesson regarding the poor showing of their cavalry during the war with Austria in 1866, but even allowing for their greater preponderance over the French in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, they still managed, albeit on a spectacular scale, to loose over half a brigade of cavalry when General von Bredow was ordered to charge the French infantry and gun line at the battle of Mars-la-Tours (16th August 1870). That the charge itself did indeed stabilize the situation for the Prussians is not in question, what it should have shown to all those who witnessed it, and to those who studied its effects thereafter, was that if all cavalry were now to be used as little more than suicide missiles, then some other means of utilising these expensive and well disciplined troops should now be seriously considered.
Last edited by ajm317; February 26, 2008 at 01:36 PM.
Fascinating, was Havelock (who was superb, see his combat record) at the battle? Five Forks is characterised by the most successful sabre charge of the ACW, Sheridan a cavalry force in a frontal sabre charge against 2 entrenched CS "brigades" (less than 2,000 bayonets?) and smashed them. Meanwhile, Fitzhaugh Lee dismounted his cavalry on encountering the infantry division attached to Sheridan and lost the firefight (as dismounted cavalry generally do).Concerning Sheridan’s use of a mixed force at Five Forks, Major Henry Havelock a British commentator, had this to say, ‘Had it been any European Cavalry, unarmed with “repeaters”, and untrained to fight on foot, that was barring the way -any Cavalry whose only means of detention consisted in the absurd ineffectual fire of mounted skirmishers, or in repeated charges with lance and sabre- the Confederate game would have been simple and easy enough.’[xii]
Havelock himself had won the Victoria Cross at Cawnpore in India in 1858, and although he was not in America to view the Civil War at first hand, he nevertheless understood by his studies of that conflict that what the American cavalry leaders had achieved were in complete harmony with his own conclusions on how cavalry should be handled, ‘ His final and fanatically held view was that in territory open enough to allow room for manoeuvre and in face of the rising fire-power of modern infantry and artillery “sabre cavalry” were totally out of date. He preached his conclusion with a fervid intolerance which, though it did no damage to his military career, made them totally suspect to higher authority.’[xiii]...
Cavalry should strike and run, mobility is their primary weapon. von Bredow managed to fix himself by fighting infantry (and winning), thus leaving himself exposed for a mounted counterattack at the sabre.The Prussians soon learnt their lesson regarding the poor showing of their cavalry during the war with Austria in 1866, but even allowing for their greater preponderance over the French in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, they still managed, albeit on a spectacular scale, to loose over half a brigade of cavalry when General von Bredow was ordered to charge the French infantry and gun line at the battle of Mars-la-Tours (16th August 1870). That the charge itself did indeed stabilize the situation for the Prussians is not in question, what it should have shown to all those who witnessed it, and to those who studied its effects thereafter, was that if all cavalry were now to be used as little more than suicide missiles, then some other means of utilising these expensive and well disciplined troops should now be seriously considered.
Taking Up Tens of Thousands of Napoleons Soldiers (Inclunding the Young and Old Guard) Was of course, no big deal. I Mean, Its not like the Prussians were doing anything except having streudel. In fact, what really happened is a thind red line of british troops (Led by Sharpe, a figure so ep1c as to become one who has transcended fiction and has altered the laws of our dimension and enplaced himself in real history) Destroyed Hordes of French soldiers and by the end of the day had only the Remnants of French soldiers in front of them and the trifle of routed 'Foreign', allies behind them.
Please....
Now, as for the Op. Ridiculous Comparison, absolutely bloody ridiculous. But for the purposes of this thread, Lee was a far better commander.
“The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.”
—Sir William Francis Butler
The Old Guard was not on that sector of the field, but had been committed to a delaying action in the afternoon on the French right flank.
The "attack of the Guard" has made by the Middle Guard, the 1/3rd Grenadiers and 4th Chasseurs hit Halkett's depleted brigade and were defeated by a british countercharge, 4th Grenadiers and 1/3rd Chasseurs hit Maitland's brigade, who did indulge in a musketry exchange, while 2/3rd Chasseurs were hit by a flanking bayonet charge 52nd from Adam's brigade before they reached the line, then, after driving off the 2/3rd Chas wheeling at charged the 1/3rd Chas in the flank, starting to roll up the French, while the 73rd/30th (a composite battalion of Halkett's bde) wheeled and took the 4th Grenadiers in the flank.
2/3rd Grenadiers moved wide to the left to protect against British cavalry (and were uninvolved at the point of decision), Napoleon kept the Young Guard back as a final reserve.
The Dutch had a division in reserve that counterattacked frontally through Halkett, while the Brunswickers moved around the French right flank. Finally, as they broke, 2 British Cavalry brigades (Vivian's and Vandaleur's) were unleashed and rode them down.
Simply, they were halted by a short sharp counterthrust, then enveloped on both flanks while another heavy striking force (the Dutch) smashed their centre.
An assumption not supported by the actual battle of Five Forks (where dismounted cavalry fighting with the carbine were very roughly handled while mounted cavalry successfully charged with the sabre).
Conventional sabre cavalry continued to be useful on the battlefield right into WW1, although by this stage they were seen as a mounted fire unit
Last edited by Valus; April 03, 2008 at 02:48 AM. Reason: double post
What happened is that they were simply overwhelmed. With Virtually no artillery and cavalry support its a miracle they got as far as they did.
Wellingtons Accomplishments don't stand up very well to Lee's accomplishment's, Lee was constantly winning when he was outnumbered, While virtually every battle Wellington ever fought was with the Numerical advantage at his side.
Last edited by Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus; February 26, 2008 at 05:14 PM.
Monitor's iron? http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi...4.2006.00276.x
I found a quote from a southerner saying something like "I wish the federals would capture the cavalry their eating army rations and arent fighting." Although cavalry remained important it seems they were becoming more of a mobile strike force. General Bufords cavalry was able to hold off the advance confederates at Gettysburg with their new carbines while rienforcements were deployed.
As for trenches I believe trenches were used during the battle of the Wilderness and Cold Harbor. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cold_Harbor Rather sad battles and wars were evr fought this way the casualties were horrific.
Last edited by Red_Praetoria; February 26, 2008 at 05:54 PM.
Nor did Wellington have any great numerical advantage, about 250,000 French troops were in Spain. Busaco for example was a very similar force ratio to Gettysburg...
Ever hear of the Guerillas ? Furthermore ever hear of how they took up the attention of the vast majority of French numbers who were attempting to pacify a massive populist uprising. This not only disrupted supply lines as well as communications, it also ensured that the French could of never send more then around a 1/4 of the men they had in Spain.
Actually, I Know you know all this, Since I've informed you about this multiple times yet you choose to ignore it.
Remind me again what happened to Hannibal. Are you going to say that Wellington was better then him ?