Somnium Apostatae Iuliani Discussion

[Julianus Flavius]

Ok I'll do it mahself haha
I mean *famous last words* how hard can it be?

[Chelchal]

So, I just wanted to say...I was taken aback seeing the Avar Tarqhans quite specifically on sturdy looking steppe ponies, quite distinctive looking compared say, the horses used by Candidati. Really impressed by that level of detail!

[Deutschland]

I was just playing a campaign with the Visigoths and i must say they are waaay to easy. (355 campaign) one can simply overrun the Balkans and Italy. Alone with the money gift from Constantinople I can raise armies capable of conquering the mediterranean.

[morfeasnikos]

What a great mod..it has all perfect game play, perfect units, history....etc...bravo team

[Blatta Optima Maxima]

I was just playing a campaign with the Visigoths and i must say they are waaay to easy. (355 campaign) one can simply overrun the Balkans and Italy. Alone with the money gift from Constantinople I can raise armies capable of conquering the mediterranean.

Armenia seems pretty easy as well, tbh.

[Chelchal]

Sorry to get a little off topic:

I was reading some of the earlier discussions on this thread, as far back as three years ago where people were talking about how Julian sought to emulate Alexander by invading Persia. But from all his writings, he describes Alexander in the most negative light. In The Caesars and Julian's angry letter to the Senator Nilus Dionysius, Alexander is described as violent, a temperamental drunkard, and worst of all in Julian's eyes, a murderer of his own friends (Cleitus Melas, who saved Alexander's life at Granicus). In his letter to Themistius, Julian says no one benefited from the conquests of Alexander.

It's actually the Church historian. Socrates Scholasticus, who wrote during the 5th century that Julian imagined himself to be another Alexander. It's obviously not clear what Julian's final objective was. From the presence of Hormisdas, he probably intended to set up a rival puppet ruler as Trajan had done with a Parthian pretender.

I imagine he felt a successful military campaign would solidify his domestic rule and make him a less likely target for usurpers.

[Blatta Optima Maxima]

And give the Romans control of the silk route. And make a giant bulge in his purse. And spread western civilization to the barbarians (yeah, Alex had done that before, but the new dynasty was brutally eradicating any traces of Hellenic art, architecture and culture, so they needed some massacring).

[Bashar]

According to Goldsworthy in "How Rome Fell", Rome and Persia's wars were more large scale raids than campaigns of conquest. Apart from Armenia and upper Mesopotamia neither side really desired to hold onto land they could not garrison or supply let alone profit from in the long term. The lines of communication were too long for either side to Rome almost always weighed the costs/benefits of conquest and occupation versus the effort to do so. So this idea of spreading civilizations is not at all the point of either empire's military campaigns. They were launched to gain dominance and influence rather than ruling more territory. Plunder, treasures, slaves, and hostages were the immediate objectives for either side and used as bargaining chips in any consequent treaty. It is quite strange that Julian did not lay siege to Ctesiphon, because the Romans should have known that if the objective was to seize it they would need proper equipment and logistics to do so knowing that it could take time. However he knew that Shapur had a large strong force and Procopius's force was a diversion to draw the Sassanids away from the main thrust. No Roman emperor besides Trajan tried to hold onto lower Mesopotamia and beyond. Like all emperors Julian needed to win foreign wars for glory and more importantly securing his throne in the East by leading the soldiers who did not know him that he was worthy of the purple. Any ulterior motive is conjecture, if you look at any of the emperors who attacked the Parthians or Sassanids they may have sacked those cities but they were definitely not going to hold onto them without the ability to do so. but Julian's play acting the hero ended up getting him into an early grave, unfortunately. How could the Romans not know what it would take to sustain the campaign and take Ctesiphon if that was the objective? We're talking wars over four centuries.

[vampiric_canniba]

I would say that they didn't conquer and keep the lands, from a Roman perspective, that although Rome at the time of Julian, and even later, had the men to sufficiently garrison Persia, the sheer logistics and the fact that the men would come from all over the empire would leave the limes unmanned, and Julian's victory at Argentoratum still left many other German tribes, and the Goths were a threat to Thrace. Britain, Africa and Egypt would've been targets for local tribes as well, if their soldiers were needed to make up the numbers for an indefinite period, to conquer an enemy who rarely threatened more than Palestine and Armenia.

As well, we forget that Persia has borders other than to the west. Arabs to the south, Hepthalites to the north and Indians to the east were all real threats, that prevented the Sassanids from concentrating on the west, and should Rome have conquered Persia, these threats would remain, and would have a battle weary, depleted force, mostly militia from the cooler and wetter west, defending borders without the benefit of the Rhine's natural defences, or any of the other border's walls.

To conclude, neither side took enough to conquer each other fully because it would leave gaps in their other borders and would cost hordes of men, wealth and arms, and would likely end up in a war against new neighbours and partisans.

[Knonfoda]

It does always strike me as odd that, Julian's disparaging remarks about Alexander and no one profiting from emulating his eastern conquests, and the path he himself chose in going east and trying his luck against the Sassanids. If anyone has any information on this that may shed light on this matter it would be much appreciated.

And then again, even if this was just another expedition aimed at say sacking the capital, defeating a few armies and then retreating and imposing a humiliating treaty (like the one that would soon be imposed on Jovian) why oh why did he not prepare properly? Julian could be quite rash, but seriously, the Romans knew Ctesiphon, they knew it would not be easy to take, and would require time. Why didn't he take with him siege equipment? It was like they got to the walls, fought a large battle, won and then said right lads, time to turn back now. I don't understand how someone as apparently tactically and strategically able as Julian (as we observe from his wars in Gaul) could make such a foolish mistake.

[Blatta Optima Maxima]

It does always strike me as odd that, Julian's disparaging remarks about Alexander and no one profiting from emulating his eastern conquests, and the path he himself chose in going east and trying his luck against the Sassanids. If anyone has any information on this that may shed light on this matter it would be much appreciated.

And then again, even if this was just another expedition aimed at say sacking the capital, defeating a few armies and then retreating and imposing a humiliating treaty (like the one that would soon be imposed on Jovian) why oh why did he not prepare properly? Julian could be quite rash, but seriously, the Romans knew Ctesiphon, they knew it would not be easy to take, and would require time. Why didn't he take with him siege equipment? It was like they got to the walls, fought a large battle, won and then said right lads, time to turn back now. I don't understand how someone as apparently tactically and strategically able as Julian (as we observe from his wars in Gaul) could make such a foolish mistake.

He still had to defeat the cavalry army of Shapur, which was still at large. Had he besieged, it would have gotten pretty ugly on both sides.

[Julianus Flavius]

I just read The Caesars (hilarious read, by the way) and also noticed the way he spoke about Alexander. Perhaps Socrates Scholasticus' rendition of Julian's personality was just another piece of church propaganda to slight the person of an opponent? I mean, they could hardly have the citizens and soldiers, or, heaven forbid, a future Emperor, actually look on his works as anything more than folly.

[Joar]

It does always strike me as odd that, Julian's disparaging remarks about Alexander and no one profiting from emulating his eastern conquests, and the path he himself chose in going east and trying his luck against the Sassanids. If anyone has any information on this that may shed light on this matter it would be much appreciated.

I've recenly bought a book named "Age of Constantine" ( a part of The Cambridge Companion to the... series ), and in it there's a chapter about the relationship between Rome and Persia, and more especially the eastern ambitions of the Constantinian dynasty. Now I've only skimmed through it, but I'll report back.

[Chelchal]

It does always strike me as odd that, Julian's disparaging remarks about Alexander and no one profiting from emulating his eastern conquests, and the path he himself chose in going east and trying his luck against the Sassanids. If anyone has any information on this that may shed light on this matter it would be much appreciated.

And then again, even if this was just another expedition aimed at say sacking the capital, defeating a few armies and then retreating and imposing a humiliating treaty (like the one that would soon be imposed on Jovian) why oh why did he not prepare properly? Julian could be quite rash, but seriously, the Romans knew Ctesiphon, they knew it would not be easy to take, and would require time. Why didn't he take with him siege equipment? It was like they got to the walls, fought a large battle, won and then said right lads, time to turn back now. I don't understand how someone as apparently tactically and strategically able as Julian (as we observe from his wars in Gaul) could make such a foolish mistake.

He did take siege equipment if I'm not mistaken; that's how the Romans stormed the fortresses en route to Ctesiphon. On the other hand Ctesiphon must have been really heavily fortified itself, with its own array of war machines. Even though they heavily outnumbered the Amida garrison and were well equipped with siege equipment, it took the Persians 73 days and thousands of fatalities to take the fortress town. Constantius was repelled by the Persian fortifications at Bezabde. It's not clear how long the siege went for but the Romans seemed to have tried for about two weeks before giving up.

So for a heavily fortified capital like Ctesiphon, since the Romans failed to capture it by storm, they would have had to besiege it for weeks, probably months. I'm speculating, but I don't think it's outrageous that the city would be well provisioned, while the Roman supplies were tenuous to say the least. And of course the Persian field armies were still intact, so a siege probably wouldn't have made sense.

Julian bested the Persians tactically in ever major encounter, even the one were he was killed (the Persian commanders, the spahbod Merena and Nohodares were also killed), they won the war by cutting off his supplies and attacking his lines of communication with Arab raiders.

[SeniorBatavianHorse]

Yes, my understanding is that Julian retreated from Ctesiphon not only because of the resources necessary to storm it but also because he was made aware that Shapur II himself was appraoching with the main Sassanian army. It made tactical sense to withdraw from the capital city as he would have been pinned between two forces. Also Procopius had not yet arrived with another 30,000 troops including the Armenians. This was a serious upset to his plans and one which sometimes gets overlooked in attempts to understand his actions. To this day, there is still no adequate explanation on why Procopius failed to advance as ordered down from the north of the mountainous regions.

Another factor is the supposed lacuna in the text according the to Penguin translation so that we are in fact missing a crucial part of the narrative here!

[Knonfoda]

He did take siege equipment if I'm not mistaken; that's how the Romans stormed the fortresses en route to Ctesiphon. On the other hand Ctesiphon must have been really heavily fortified itself, with its own array of war machines. Even though they heavily outnumbered the Amida garrison and were well equipped with siege equipment, it took the Persians 73 days and thousands of fatalities to take the fortress town. Constantius was repelled by the Persian fortifications at Bezabde. It's not clear how long the siege went for but the Romans seemed to have tried for about two weeks before giving up.

So for a heavily fortified capital like Ctesiphon, since the Romans failed to capture it by storm, they would have had to besiege it for weeks, probably months. I'm speculating, but I don't think it's outrageous that the city would be well provisioned, while the Roman supplies were tenuous to say the least. And of course the Persian field armies were still intact, so a siege probably wouldn't have made sense.

Julian bested the Persians tactically in ever major encounter, even the one were he was killed (the Persian commanders, the spahbod Merena and Nohodares were also killed), they won the war by cutting off his supplies and attacking his lines of communication with Arab raiders.

Thanks Chelchal. I've had to put my reading of Ammianus on hold at the moment, I had forgotten he had besieged other cities and fortresses on the way meaning he obviously took with him a siege train.

I knew the other army was still on the loose, but at some point Julian would have had to face it sooner or later.

Yes, my understanding is that Julian retreated from Ctesiphon not only because of the resources necessary to storm it but also because he was made aware that Shapur II himself was appraoching with the main Sassanian army. It made tactical sense to withdraw from the capital city as he would have been pinned between two forces. Also Procopius had not yet arrived with another 30,000 troops including the Armenians. This was a serious upset to his plans and one which sometimes gets overlooked in attempts to understand his actions. To this day, there is still no adequate explanation on why Procopius failed to advance as ordered down from the north of the mountainous regions.

Another factor is the supposed lacuna in the text according the to Penguin translation so that we are in fact missing a crucial part of the narrative here!

How many troops did Julian himself possess, do you know? And it seems that more than twice at least, the 'divide and conquer' tactic seems to have backfired on the Romans, as armies sent north had a tendency to not come down and aid their main force.

Also, the lacuna you say is missing, is that of a Penguin translation of Ammianus?

[SeniorBatavianHorse]

Yes, Hamilton's translation posits a 'considerable' lacuna Book 24.7 during the description of the conference convened to debate siege or withdrawal. He argues that a substantial portion is lost here and conjectures from reading Libanius that Julian was approached by embassies from Shapur offering a truce which he rejected and that he then went in pursuit of the Shahanshah while also hopping to effect a rendezvous with Procopius and Sebastianus, and the Armenians under Arsaces.

Not sure how many Roman troops remained with Julian but he was also supplied with Gothic and Saraceni foederatii. Somewhere between 30,000 and 60,000 are figures you might find in various sources.

[Knonfoda]

Damn... why do we always lose information at the most critical of moments?

Would have been interesting if he had decided to besiege it through the circumvallation method like Caesar at Alesia or those of Lucius Flavius at Masada... if they could storm Masada, they could storm anything.

[SeniorBatavianHorse]

Masada was within Roman territory. Ctesiphon was a major capital city, well protected and defended. The key issue I think was not Ctesiphon but the approach of the main Sassanian army under Shapur II. Looking at the larger picture here, Julian wanted to destroy the Sassanian empire and remove it as a threat the Roman territory in the Oriens. His main goal was to destroy Shapur II and replace him with his brother Hormisdas (I think - too late to check as about to do another 10 hour shift!). Therefore taking Ctesiphon was secondary to acheiving a knock-out blow against the reigning Shahanshah.

[Blatta Optima Maxima]

Exactly, while the enemy field army and their high command remained at large, Ctesiphon was not a primary objective, and laying siege would expose the Romans to devastating attacks from behind, see the battle of Vienna in 1683.