Hitler's blunders: how Germany lost the war.

[Garbarsardar]

It is very easy, I know, to use the benefit of hindsight in order to reconstruct historical reality. In that sense it is very common to proceed with a mixture of selective attributions and omissions that magnify the role of one person.

History usually moves in "larger" contexts like this of geo-political and military correlations, social and cultural transformations and also the unseen interactions of powers that cannot easily be factored.

However and in the narrow perspective of an armed conflict such as WW2 it is very tempting to (or rather impossible not to) examine the decisions of an administration, incorporated in one man, that appear and proved to be erratic beyond doubt.

Many time in this forum I heard people calling Hitler an inspired military Leader or a great commander and I never really understood why.

Here is a list of the critical errors he made and led to the inevitable defeat of Germany in WW2:

1. Mourir pour Danzig ? (To die for Danzig?)

This was the title of an editorial published in the French newspaper "L'Ouevre" on May 4, 1939. The author was Marcel Deat member of the fascist Popular Front and later collaborator with the Vichy regime. The attitude of this piece encapsulates what Hitler was expecting from the Allies as a reaction to the invasion of Poland. It was not to be so. This editorial was a rather isolated case of pronounced unwillingness to go to war over Poland.
Hitler feeling secure after his four consecutive gambles (military re-occupation of the Rhineland, re-armament, Anschluss with Austria, the demise of Czechoslovakia) believed that the French and the Brits will not intervene again despite the assurances they gave to Poland. What Hitler was imagining was a quick victory over Poland that would poise Germany to struck at the arch-enemy to the East. What he failed to grasp was that Poland was a country too much. The Polish affair terminated any thoughts of appeasement and launched Germany in a war that was largely unprepared for. It is certain that Germany could not have withstand an allied invasion in the fall of '39 given the type and number of units stationed in the western borders. You can read here the whole statement of Paul Schmidt the German Foreign Ministry translator who was present at the delivery of the British ultimatum. Clearly not what Hitler expected.

2. The "miracle" of Dunkirk.

You can read more herebut I will give a brief synopsis. The Wermacht was poised and able to surrender and captivate the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France. The loss of the BEF would make the continuation of any military action very problematic for the British as they would lose all their NCO's and the majority of battle ready Officer's corps. The failure of the Wermacht to do so and at the same moment deprive the British Government from the only propaganda weapon it had can be attributed to the infamous halt order of Hitler before the (undefended) Dunkirk. Hitler was jittery about the whole campaign in the West concept. His chronic mistrust of the German Officers, coupled with his antiquated concepts (dating to the WW1) of tactics made him lost his nerve in multiple occasions. And while the stubbornness (verging on insubordination) of the likes Guderian permitted the tactical miracle that was the Fall of France, the strategic objective of ending the War remained a dream.

3. The road to Suez

Guderian, in his book "Panzer Leader" considers that "a couple of armoured divisions in '41" would had no trouble of reaching Suez. Well maybe not a couple and maybe with some trouble, but the truth remains that the British Empire did not have any means to seriously impede a German advance through north Africa. Hitler never grasped the importance of the mediterranean. Trapped in his fanciful dreams of starving England with U-boats and subduing the morale of the Brits by terror bombing, he failed to see the pathway (through Malta) probably that would bring the Brits to their knees. He opted instead for Sea Lion the planned invasion of the Isles; of course and since Germany could never match the British sea power he relied on air-power:

4. The Battle of Britain

Either as a prelude to an invasion or as a stand-alone action the BoB was catastrophic for the Luftwaffe and yielded no practical results. Instead of targeting airfields and/or related industry the campaign was focused on terror bombings. The RAF was never at risk of being overwhelmed and the force of the Luftwaffe was significantly depleted. And although Goering seems to be the culprit here there can be no contention that he was following Hitler's wishes.

5. Gearing up for war

It is a well documented fact that at least until the fall of '42 and essentially the winter of '43 through Albert Speer the German Economy and industry was never ready for war. The phrase total war was coined only after Stalingrad by Goebbels and it was reflective of Hitler's change of attitude. Of course it was too late.

6. Franco, Mussolini, Hirohito.

Despite the generous help Germany offered to Franco during the Spanish Civil war, Hitler never persuaded him to join the Axis. That would lead to the probable neutralization of Gibraltar and an Axis domination in the Mediterranean. Franco's distrust of the Axis had also to do with his opinions of Mussolini that he considered as inept and untrustworthy. For Hitler, Mussolini was much more of an obstacle than an ally. Not only he dragged Germany in the Balkan Campaign but he also failed to produce any gain at any level for the Axis. Hitler failed to control him, totally.
The same can be said about he Japanese. Hitler failed to make them declare war on the SU, thus freeing all the Siberian and far-east divisions for Stalin. Plus Hitler facilitated the Americans joining the Allies by declaring war after Pearl harbor. Not that the Americans would not eventually join but probably this would happen at a later and more convenient for Germany date.

7. Barbarossa.

Here, the series of errors is endless. From the merry-go round troop movement in '41 to the ill planned campaign in '42 to Stalingrad, to Kursk to the end. You can read my opinion and sources here, but it is very clear that Hitler lacked a Strategic Objective during the whole campaign in the East. More than his disastrous interventions on an operational and tactical level, it was the lack of a strategic plan that really deprived Germany of any chance of winning the war against SU. The usual answer of Hitler to the multiple dilemmas Wermacht faced (Moscow, Ukraine or the Caucasus being just one of those) was simply "EVERYTHING".
His lack of understanding for logistics, supply equipment tear and wear and troop morale brought Wermacht to a costly standstill both in front of Moscow and Stalingrad and ultimately lost them the war.

8. Rassenkampf (racial struggle/war)

After the initial success in invading the SU, Hitler failed to grasp the possibilities offered by two factors: the hatred of non-Russian minorities for Stalin and the relief of many Russians from the retreat of Soviet operatives. In both cases (although more in the second) what mattered was the belief of Hitler that the "slavs" were racially inferior and should be subdued or exterminated. That was reflected both in the commissar order but also in the treatment of both soldiers and civilians. Hitler failed to exploit properly the nationalism of Ukrainians by enabling them as Allies and the regional puppet representatives are a feeble excuse for the failure to set up a proper germanophile administration. Let us not forget that more than 30.000 Russians fought on the German side as HiWisin Stalingrad. Imagine how much the German would benefit both military and logistically (not having to chase partisans) by a co-operation of territorial and ethnic entities in the "liberated" SU.

[William the Bastard]

Good post Garb. Another great one to add to the others in your sig. I especially like number 6 as imho Hitler could have had a much more useful ally in Franco more so than Mussolini. With not just Gibraltar and the gates to the med cut off to British shipping but the ability to base more U Boats (As Churchill said the only real threat to the British mainland) at Spanish harbours would have been highly useful. I guess after all of the money, materials and men sent to help out in the Spanish civil war and the similarities of governance between the two nations (not the same but similar in ways) he thought it was a done deal.

The other aspect is that of Mussolini not actually needing to join the war at all. They were fighting alongside the British, French and Russians in the First World War and so they needn't have joined if they didn't want to (or if Mussolini didn't want to that is ). Instead they cowardly joined the war once the Western flank in France was well secure and mainly due to their covetousness of Egypt and to secure their Ethiopian empire (IIRC). In the end Italy could have been as well off as Spain after the war with it hardly affecting them. One could say it was pointless for them to have done so.

As I said great post Garb. Keep them up and your rep is in the post.

[Gelgoog]

hitlers biggest mistake was starting the war when he did. its said that he promised his generals he wouldnt start a war unitl 45' which would have given germany enough time to build up its arsenal to really charge through russia.

[issues]

Something I think you should add is Hitler's declaration of war against the United States, from what I've read FDR wasn't going to declare war against Germany even after Pearl Harbor because it was still "Europe's War" as seen by the eyes of most Americans at the time. Hitler conveniently doomed himself by declaring war on the U.S. which we ended up putting 90% of our effort into compared to the Pacific theatre.

[Farnan]

Great post Garb...

However you forgot a point, Hitler's hatred of Russians. Many Russians, especially at the beginning of the war were willing to join the Germans in the fight against Stalin. However Hitler was not willing to allow them to join in the numbers that were willing, and furthermore his actions towards the Russian people discouraged Anti-Stalinists from supporting him, as they found he was just as bad.

[Garbarsardar]

hitlers biggest mistake was starting the war when he did. its said that he promised his generals he wouldnt start a war unitl 45' which would have given germany enough time to build up its arsenal to really charge through russia.

Indeed. Especially since he thought there would be no war apart from a quick regional conflict with Poland; his miscalculation about the Francobritish intentions cost Germany the war in great part.

But even when he realised he is in a full blown war with the West that never took his mind of the East. Before he could hope to neutralise the British he already prepared Barbarossa deviating from the "one front war" that was the permanent German dictum.

Something I think you should add is Hitler's declaration of war against the United States, from what I've read FDR wasn't going to declare war against Germany even after Pearl Harbor because it was still "Europe's War" as seen by the eyes of most Americans at the time. Hitler conveniently doomed himself by declaring war on the U.S. which we ended up putting 90% of our effort into compared to the Pacific theatre.

I think I briefly mentioned that in the part on Japan. I think that the US was bound to take part in all fronts sooner or later but Hitler made that, sooner.

Great post Garb...

However you forgot a point, Hitler's hatred of Russians. Many Russians, especially at the beginning of the war were willing to join the Germans in the fight against Stalin. However Hitler was not willing to allow them to join in the numbers that were willing, and furthermore his actions towards the Russian people discouraged Anti-Stalinists from supporting him, as they found he was just as bad.

You are right, this was probably the single most important factor in the way Barbarossa developed after the lack of strategic objectives. So I will add it here and edit the first post.

8. Rassenkampf (racial struggle/war)

After the initial success in invading the SU, Hitler failed to grasp the possibilities offered by two factors: the hatred of non-Russian minorities for Stalin and the relief of many Russians from the retreat of Soviet operatives. In both cases (although more in the second) what mattered was the belief of Hitler that the "slavs" were racially inferior and should be subdued or exterminated. That was reflected both in the commissar order but also in the treatment of both soldiers and civilians. Hitler failed to exploit properly the nationalism of Ukrainians by enabling them as Allies and the regional puppet representatives are a feeble excuse for the failure to set up a proper germanophile administration. Let us not forget that more than 30.000 Russians fought on the German side as HiWisin Stalingrad. Imagine how much the German would benefit both military and logistically (not having to chase partisans) by a co-operation of territorial and ethnic entities in the "liberated" SU.

With not just Gibraltar and the gates to the med cut off to British shipping but the ability to base more U Boats (As Churchill said the only real threat to the British mainland) at Spanish harbours would have been highly useful. I guess after all of the money, materials and men sent to help out in the Spanish civil war and the similarities of governance between the two nations (not the same but similar in ways) he thought it was a done deal.

The other aspect is that of Mussolini not actually needing to join the war at all. They were fighting alongside the British, French and Russians in the First World War and so they needn't have joined if they didn't want to (or if Mussolini didn't want to that is ). Instead they cowardly joined the war once the Western flank in France was well secure and mainly due to their covetousness of Egypt and to secure their Ethiopian empire (IIRC). In the end Italy could have been as well off as Spain after the war with it hardly affecting them. One could say it was pointless for them to have done so.

I believe that too. As with the previous point, Hitler was clearly unable to realise that ideological considerations come second to practical ones.

Me, on the other hand have no such problems and Italy is conquered by the Wermacht, usually before France in HOI2

[Ummon]

And using messerschmidt jets as bombers, and Stalingrad defense, etc.

A lot, for sure.

He was mad, a lot mad.

[William the Bastard]

Me, on the other hand have no such problems and Italy is conquered by the Wermacht, usually before France in HOI2

The more I hear about that game the more I want to go out on a quest to find it. Next time I see it mentioned on another thread I am going to leave the house and get it then and there. Oh and Italy before France - This has been duly noted.

His miscalculation about the Francobritish intentions cost Germany the war in great part.

Who knew that the old rivalry between France and England (Britain as it was at this time) would be put on the back burner yet again. They were always traditional enemies and the Germans allies of the English (Prussia, Hessians and the current Royal Family to name a few points). Even today I believe as people we in Britain have more in common with Germany than with France.

[Sher Khan]

All in all, I suppose it was a good thing we were dealing with a fool of a leader.

[William the Bastard]

All in all, I suppose it was a good thing we were dealing with a fool of a leader.

A very good example of how a politician should not be in charge of when, where and how his nation goes to war.

[Fridericus Rex]

I apologise to you and my grandson for highjacking his membership on this forum. Previously, we intended to play only TW and enjoy the game.

In reading this thread I thought it would be good to rectify some people's perception about a man they never met and yet they felt confident to make a final judgment on his psychological status ("he was mad").

I met him once as a 16 year old and did not find him deranged. Over the years I thought a lot about him and his handling of the war; and then, I had extensive talks with people that were able to make judgment on the war and Hitler - here are my thoughts:

Hitler was a brilliant military/political strategist. Possibly unmatched in modern history. One can argue that his gains were more political than military, but the fact that so much was attained for so little conflict shocked even the General Staff, which is how Hitler was able to gain so much dominance over them. They began to believe that he was the vanguard of a new military doctrine, and gave way to his calls. Despite the catastrophic shifts of the Panzer Armies in Barbarossa, which the generals suspected would destroy their chances, his call to hold the line during the 1st Soviet winter offensive saved the Wehrmacht from a total rout. He was unconventional, and the Generals grudgingly acknowledged that he was capable of "thinking outside the box".

The problem with Hitler's genius for military/political strategy, is that he lost the plot completely. In overall strategy he was in his element. But with the success came an arrogant belief in his destiny, which led to his increasing involvement in Operational and even Tactical planning. This ended up clouding his otherwise sound Strategic instincts. If Hilter had stuck to the big picture, and responded to Operational and Tactical challenges in only Strategic terms, the Wehrmacht may have ended the War in a more favorable position. Hitler made the error of planning Strategy around Operational factors.

This is reflected in the "Cornerpost" and "Festungs" directives. Self-destructive policy that robbed the Wehrmacht of any chance of establishing an "East-Wall". Also the economic and production decisions. Hitler would not focus on the Strategic direction for the Luftwaffe, for example. He starved Fighter production, in favor of Bomber. He neglected the development of Strategic Heavy Bombers in favor of Medium. Because of the fixation on "Blitzkrieg", and Tactical air support. Basically he would not focus on defensive needs. All projects that were inclined to emphasize Germany under Siege were hindered or canceled. Everything had to be about Attack-, Operational and Tactical success, rather than Strategic success.

The economic factor played it's part in distracting Hitler from his strengths. Germany only ever planned to wage a short War. It's industry and weapons productions were geared up for this. It is ironic that many less in depth sources proclaim that Hitler was constantly "wrecking" the German industry with "new pet projects". This is not really the case. He would be initially very enthusiastic, and devote much money and resources to development, but when the crunch came, and new designs were needed, he would delay, and hinder. Or limit production. Because Speer, who History would have us believe, was a genius, had his ear, and constantly reminded Hitler that changing Tank production from Pz-4 to Pz-5 and Pz-6, would lower monthly output drastically, and even when in full production more Mk-3's and Mk-4's could be made than Tigers or Panthers. Speer even lied to Hitler and declared that the Panzertruppen- "wanted lighter, faster tanks, like Shermans". Speer was a fan of the T-34 and M4, as they were cheap and easily mass produced. He was aware of Hitler's obsession with high production figures. This happened across the board - the BF-109 was never replaced by the far superior FW-190, the Type-7 U-Boat was never replaced by the better Type-9, and the excellent Type-21 was delayed and hindered no end due to it's production leading to a short term halt in immediate monthly figures. With the STG-44, Hitler again looked only at immediate results, and the stockpiles of 98K ammunition that would be "wasted". Some argue that Germany's tendency towards "superior technology" rather than "mass produced" cost it the war. Not so. Germany needed the technological edge. It was of little use to the Wehrmacht to produce 20,000 mediocre performance, medium tanks, with only around 2,000 crews to man them. Germany required to keep it's experienced troops alive, and capable of training replacements. This goes for aircraft, and U-boots also. The losses deprived the panzer, fighter, and U-boot arm of the crews to fight the war. What was not needed were masses of substandard weapons, which could only be manned by raw recruits, if at all, but the timely introduction of superior designs that would allow a vastly outnumbered Wehrmacht to face the waves of mass produced designs, which had plenty of Allied crews in reserve.


In short, Hitler moved out of Strategy, where he could shine, and confused Operations and Tactics with overall Planning. Hitler continued to attempt to fight a short Blitzkrieg War, long after it became an extended Siege. If Hitler had stuck to grand Strategy, he may have succeeded in saving the Reich, and he being remembered as a Genius. Stalin was the opposite. He began the War attempting to interfere in Operations and Tactics. When failure was apparent, he listened to his Generals, and stuck to Strategy.

[Garbarsardar]

Fridericus Rex, it seems to me that your post actually serves to deconstruct your initial statement that

Hitler was a brilliant military/political strategist. Possibly unmatched in modern history.

You demonstrate in an excellent way his inability to differentiate between the concepts of Strategical/Operational/Tactical, his ignorance of logistics and his errors that lead to the collapse of the Wermacht.

What is left to justify the original statement?

1. The "hold" order during the first Soviet offensive

That was Hitler's standing order. He repeated it at every circumstance with catastrophic results (Stalingrad); you see he believed that undermanned and unsupplied units can automatically hold; he was lucky once. His intuition failed him since.

2. The pre-war gains with little cost.

I assume you have in mind Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Well, I acknowledged those "feats" in the first post. However it is exactly those feats that spent any currency he had towards the reluctant allies. And then, in the moment that really mattered, his final gamble failed. Not really brilliant.


As for his brilliant political instincts the failure to capitalise on his relation with Franco, his failure to control Mussolini and extract any help from the Japanese speaks volumes. Except if you consider the burning of the Reichstag as a brilliant political move, his failure to profit from the anti-Stalinist feelings of many Soviet subjects an achievement and the thuggery tactics he used with and against the SA a masterpiece of manoeuvre , I have nothing to add to this.

I met him once as a 16 year old and did not find him deranged.

As to the assertion by a poster that he was mad, if no other evidence are present it is indeed no better than this of a 16 year old child in front of the Fuhrer.

[Hans Kloss]

1. The "hold" order during the first Soviet offensive

That was Hitler's standing order. He repeated it at every circumstance with catastrophic results (Stalingrad); you see he believed that undermanned and unsupplied units can automatically hold; he was lucky once. His intuition failed him since

His famous “Standfast” saved his troop from disaster in Dec 1941

December 1941 — Moscow

http://www.germanwarmachine.com/oper...iminations.htm
http://www.germanwarmachine.com/oper...a/holdfast.htm

On 5 December, 1941 the German invasion of Communist Russia stalled at the gates of Moscow before a powerful Communist counter-attack that drove the German Army Group Center (AGC) back from Moscow. The fierce Communist onslaught threatened to shatter AGC, which retreated nearly all the way back to the lines it had occupied in 2 months earlier (Oct. ‘41) at the start of its drive towards Moscow. Hitler was enraged and issued his famous “Standfast” order on 18 December, then personally assumed command of AGC on 19 December, 1941. Such was the fragile condition of AGC that the next day (20 Dec. ‘41) Stalin widened the objectives of the Communist forces at Moscow to the encirclement and annihilation of AGC. Amidst these developments, the German Army High Command was paralyzed by senior commanders claiming a variety of debilitating illnesses, forcing Hitler to sack 35 army, corps and divisional generals. By inspiring his soldiers with a fierce resolve to match the intensity of the Communist offensive — even as their direct commanders were waivering — Hitler stabilized his front lines and saved AGC from disintegration. Indeed, Hitler's order was widely respected amongst the German soldiery for that reason. Stalin’s widened offensive failed to achieve a single objective, and finally broke up against the stiffened German lines on 7 January, 1942.

Verdict: Hitler was right

[Darsh]

Hitler was a poor general and many of the Nazi successes during the WW2 were due to the generals who didn't follow the orders of Hitler.
I think his "genius" was principally in the politic and the manner to use the propaganda.

[Garbarsardar]

His famous “Standfast” saved his troop from disaster in Dec 1941

While similar orders destroyed German troops in all other instances that were used like Stalingrad or the Baltics or Hungary. What does this tell you now?

Hitler was a poor general and many of the Nazi successes during the WW2 were due to the generals who didn't follow the orders of Hitler.
I think his "genius" was principally in the politic and the manner to use the propaganda.

Indeed, if not for the insubordination of Guderian the Panzers would probably be still at Sedan.

[Hans Kloss]

Hitler was a poor general and many of the Nazi successes during the WW2 were due to the generals who didn't follow the orders of Hitler.
I think his "genius" was principally in the politic and the manner to use the propaganda.

Not according to some authors.

Challenging previous accounts, Geoffrey Megargee shatters the myth that German generals would have prevailed in World War II if only Hitler had not meddled in their affairs. Indeed, Megargee argues, the German high command was much more flawed than many have suspected or acknowledged. Inside Hitler's High Command reveals that while Hitler was the central figure in many military decisions, his generals were equal partners in Germany's catastrophic defeat

http://www.kansaspress.ku.edu/megins.html

Hitler as a commander - our dismissive views are often biased which is hardly surprising after more then 60 years of portraying Hitler as a mad lunatic who essentially played at war like a child with toy soldiers.

From sources already quoted, few more examples of Hitler's military decisions.

September 1941 — Crimea


On 27 September, 1941 retreating Communist forces began a concerted counter-attack against the German Army Group South (AGS) in the southern Ukraine around Melitopol northeast of the Crimea. The German 22nd Infantry Division took heavy casualties, and its commander began talking about withdrawal. General Erich von Manstein immediately ordered that there would be no withdrawal. Then, he ordered a rapid counter-attack of his own. And he moved his headquarters closer the embattled front lines to make his presence felt amongst faltering Romanian units. The will and resolve of von Manstein drove the Communists into full retreat within a week, and by 6 October, 1941 the Germans had taken 100,000 prisoners, ruined 2 Communist armies, and driven headlong towards Rostov-on-Don.

This may well be the first German Standfast order of the German-Soviet War (1941-45). It was issued by the famous von Manstein, one of the greatest commanders of the whole war, and led to dramatic successes on the battlefield. By instilling his men with resolve and the will to fight, von Manstein stove off defeat and drove on to victory. This vindicates the Standfast order as an effective means of inspiring soldiers to fanactical resistance. We shall see that this is precisely why Hitler himself, perhaps noting von Manstein's example, issued Standfast orders in several key battles later on in the war.

Verdict: von Manstein (and, hence, Hitler) was right

______________________________________________

December 1941 — Crimea
The War File — Battlefield: The Battle for the Crimea (DVD)
http://www.germanwarmachine.com/oper...a/holdfast.htm

As the Battle of Moscow raged to the north, in December 1941 the Communists also began counter-attacks against German forces in the Crimea. And just as German field commanders were panicking before the Communist onslaught before Moscow, so too a German field commander (Lt. Gen. Graff von Sponeck) panicked before the Communist onslaught on the Kerch Peninsula in the eastern Crimea. Flanked by amphibious landings to his south, von Sponeck ordered his troops to withdraw with haste. His superior officer, the famed General Erich von Manstein, countermanded that order. But von Sponeck had already packed up his headquarters (HQ) and was out of radio contact. The hasty withdrawal of von Sponeck's men was an act of blatant cowardice that defied Hitler’s Standfast order (18 Dec. ‘41) and cost them most of their transport and heavy equipment. So when von Manstein ordered them to turn back and attack, they could only manage a show of obedience. Even without von Sponeck's military hardware, von Manstein was able to stabilize his lines without any further retreat.

Manstein relieved von Sponeck of his command. Hitler insisted upon a Court Martial. The court, chaired by Hermann Goering, sentenced von Sponeck to death. (This sentence was later commuted to 7 years in prison.)

That von Manstein was able to check the Communist counter-attack without von Sponeck's heavy equipment virtually proves he could have done so with that hardware. Therefore, von Sponeck's hasty withdrawal was clearly an act of abject cowardice that gravely hampered the German offensive for both military and psychological reasons. It is worth emphasizing that both Hitler and von Manstein agreed in their assessment of von Sponeck's actions.

In this case, the profound reputation of von Manstein again vindicates Hitler's Standfast orderes.

Verdict: Hitler was right

___________________________________________

Nov. 1942 - Feb. 1943 — Stalingrad
The War File — Army Group South: The Wehrmacht in Russia (DVD)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Stalingrad
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_First_Panzer_Army

On 19 November, 1942 a Communist counter-offensive (codenamed Uranus) began to encircle the German 6th Army in Stalingrad. By 23 November, 1942 the encirclement was complete. Both Hans Jeschonneck, head of the Luftwaffe, and Hermann Goering reminded Hitler of the successful air supply of the Demyansk and Cholm pockets a few months earlier. That airlift had delivered 270 tons per day (see above), and 6th Army in Stalingrad could survive on 300 tons per day. Over the advice of OKW, but with the assurances of Jeschonneck and Goering, Hitler ordered the 250,000 men of 6th Army to hold their ground.

Stalingrad was named after Joseph Stalin, and the Communist dictator could not afford to lose the city. The propaganda value motivated Stalin to ultimately deploy 1.7 million men to the Stalingrad area. These men were, therefore, not available to drive west from Stalingrad towards Rostov-on-Don, which would have cut off all of Army Group A (AGA) which was even then driving towards the oil fields of the Caucasus. Indeed, AGA's drive towards the "oil juggular" of the Communist state was the raison d'etre of the whole German 1942 summer offensive (Operation Blue). In fact, it was so important to the German anti-Communist war effort that Hitler had assumed personal command of AGA from September to November 1942. (Note also that Hitler wisely returned tactical command of AGA to his generals on 21 November, 1942 when the Communist counter-offensive began encircling 6th Army in Stalingrad.)

By holding out in Stalingrad until early February 1943, instead of abandoning the city in late November or early December 1942, 6th Army gave AGA two (2) additional months to achieve its critical strategic objectives. Indeed, Hitler authorized AGA to abandon the Caucasus on 27 January, 1943 when it became clear that 6th Army in Stalingrad was on the brink of collapse. Therefore, the sacrifice of 6th Army: (1) secured the vulnerable flank of AGA during its drive towards the Caucasus; (2) afforded AGA two (2) additional months to attempt the critical conquest of the Caucasus; (3) allowed AGA to evacuate back to European Russia at the last possible moment.

At the cost of a single army, Hitler aggressively pursued every possible path to victory in the Caucasus, and preserved an entire Army Group.

(Furthermore, Hitler's choice of 6th Army to sieze and hold Stalingrad was itself well considered. In 1941, Hitler wisely avoided miring his Wehrmacht, geared for speed and mobility, in urban battles. This is why he did not order AGN to take Leningrad, but only to besiege it. Hitler's aversion to city battles was amplified by the heavy casualties the Communists inflicted on 6th Army during the capture of Kiev in September, 1941. Therefore, in 1942, 6th Army was Hitler's only army with urban combat experience. This reveals that Hitler's allocation of the Stalingrad objective to 6th Army was well considered.)

Verdict: Hitler was right


_________________________________________________________


Oct. 1944 - May 1945 — Courland Peninsula


In September 1944, AGN was driven from its line near Narva on the Baltic Sea. It retreated to the Courland Peninsula. From October 1944 through to the end of the war, Hitler repeatedly denied requests to evacuate the Courland Peninsula. In fact, Hitler reinforced the pocket with the Kriegsmarine.

However, Hitler had legitimate strategic reasons for keeping 26 divisions in the Courland Pocket. Admiral Doenitz, commander of the German Navy, needed the Baltic Sea as a training ground for his U-Boat crews. The German Navy was developing and deploying a new class of extremely powerful U-Boats, the Type XXI, that could potentially turn the tide of war. And Doenitz urged Hitler to maintain the Courland pocket in order to guard the Baltic Sea and contain Communist naval operations in that theatre. Importantly, containing Communist naval operations was also vital for the naval evacuation of German civilians from East Prussia and the Baltic region.

The Courland pocket was well serviced by the Kriegsmarine, who not only brought in reinforcements, but also evacuated the wounded as well as particular units recalled to Germany. Indeed, AGN (renamed Army Group Courland (AGK) from January 1945) survived intact until the end of the war.

In maintaining the Courland Pocket, Hitler acted on the good counsel of his head of the German Navy, Admiral Doenitz. Banking on the Type XXI U-Boat may have been a desperate gamble, but it was a sound a well-advised gamble given the extreme circumstanes. We also emphasize that, although individual field commanders requested evacuation of their units, other German military commanders urged the opposite position based upon larger strategic considerations. As overall Commander-in-Chief of the German Nation, Hitler was duty bound to make decisions that accounted for those strategic concerns.

Verdict: Hitler was right

Hitler's decision to gamble all his reserves in failed counterattack in Hungary (March 1945 Operation Frühlingserwachen ) can all be seen in context of trying to retake few remainig oilfields

[Ummon]

In reading this thread I thought it would be good to rectify some people's perception about a man they never met and yet they felt confident to make a final judgment on his psychological status ("he was mad").

I met him once as a 16 year old and did not find him deranged.

I may answer with a series of complicated data ranging from suggestion, authority figures, cultural climate, characteristics of adolescence, mirror neurons, and point after point going more and more metaphysical.

I will simply add though, that the rest of Germany didn't find him deranged as well. Jung did postulate an interesting explanation of this (he was accused of being a Nazi, go wonder).

Explanation: Germany, by the time, was a bit mad itself. We might discuss this on an appropriate thread.

[Perkele]

2. The "miracle" of Dunkirk.

You can read more herebut I will give a brief synopsis. The Wermacht was poised and able to surrender and captivate the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France. The loss of the BEF would make the continuation of any military action very problematic for the British as they would lose all their NCO's and the majority of battle ready Officer's corps. The failure of the Wermacht to do so and at the same moment deprive the British Government from the only propaganda weapon it had can be attributed to the infamous halt order of Hitler before the (undefended) Dunkirk. Hitler was jittery about the whole campaign in the West concept. His chronic mistrust of the German Officers, coupled with his antiquated concepts (dating to the WW1) of tactics made him lost his nerve in multiple occasions. And while the stubbornness (verging on insubordination) of the likes Guderian permitted the tactical miracle that was the Fall of France, the strategic objective of ending the War remained a dream.

Well actually, this is sort of a myth. The order did not come from Hitler, but from the 'german generals(Von Rundstedt I think)'..Hitler merely confirmed it.

3. The road to Suez

Guderian, in his book "Panzer Leader" considers that "a couple of armoured divisions in '41" would had no trouble of reaching Suez. Well maybe not a couple and maybe with some trouble, but the truth remains that the British Empire did not have any means to seriously impede a German advance through north Africa. Hitler never grasped the importance of the mediterranean. Trapped in his fanciful dreams of starving England with U-boats and subduing the morale of the Brits by terror bombing, he failed to see the pathway (through Malta) probably that would bring the Brits to their knees. He opted instead for Sea Lion the planned invasion of the Isles; of course and since Germany could never match the British sea power he relied on air-power:

Not invading Malta was a serious mistake, hwoever it is debatable whetever a couple of armoured divisions would have made a difference in North Africa. First of all supply issues, and secondarily the British did have reserves nearby...for sure Indian units would have been railed in should there be danger of Suez falling.

4. The Battle of Britain

Either as a prelude to an invasion or as a stand-alone action the BoB was catastrophic for the Luftwaffe and yielded no practical results. Instead of targeting airfields and/or related industry the campaign was focused on terror bombings. The RAF was never at risk of being overwhelmed and the force of the Luftwaffe was significantly depleted. And although Goering seems to be the culprit here there can be no contention that he was following Hitler's wishes.

Even if it had not focused on terror bombing, it would have failed. And as such, it was a big mistake.


6. Franco, Mussolini, Hirohito.

Despite the generous help Germany offered to Franco during the Spanish Civil war, Hitler never persuaded him to join the Axis.
[/QUOTE]

What makes you think he would have joined the Axis had Hitler tried to persuade him?

[mocker]

What makes you think he would have joined the Axis had Hitler tried to persuade him?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spain_in_World_War_II

[Garbarsardar]

Well actually, this is sort of a myth. The order did not come from Hitler, but from the 'german generals(Von Rundstedt I think)'..Hitler merely confirmed it.

Well, actually no at least according to Frieser

Hitler attempted to halt the advance at least twice before that fearing counterattacks and the "vulnerable flanks" (because he could not grasp the concepts of war of movement). And although the actual order originated with Runstend there is no doubt under who's pressure he gave it. Furthermore it is telling in what lengths Hitler went later to justify that order. If he had not gave it he would simply blame it on the "Generals" as he did countless other times.

Not invading Malta was a serious mistake, hwoever it is debatable whetever a couple of armoured divisions would have made a difference in North Africa. First of all supply issues, and secondarily the British did have reserves nearby...for sure Indian units would have been railed in should there be danger of Suez falling.

A couple is Guderian's expression from his book Panzer Leader. I already said in the OP that a couple would not be sufficient but had Hitler understood the importance of a Mediterranean strategy, I'm sure that more than a couple could be spared and supplied.