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Thread: the fall of the second French republic an essay

  1. #1

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    well i have been spending a huge amount of time doing essays on crap the last few weeks and that has hindered my thirty years war thing (it is so crap i almost screamed and tore by face off reading it today) So I thought i might as well post my last essay on the fall of the second french republic. Please note this is school work so any coment would be joyous taken. Well i hope you are entertained.........





    Assess the reasons for the establishment of the second empire by 1852

    In 1848 the Orleanist king Louis-Philippe was overthrown and a republic declared, however by 1852 this republic was itself overthrown by the then Prince-President Louis Napoleon who proclaimed himself emperor. Why he was able to replace the republic with such ease was due to a number of factors, namely the general indifference of the majority of the populace, the republics alienation of its key supporters almost from its birth, and factor of Louis Napoleon himself.

    The republic was not a particularly popular form of governance in France at this time it had been called for almost solely by the citizens who lived in the larger cities of France particularly Paris and Lyon, the rural population at this time who made up the majority of the population were indifferent to the whole system, this meant that the government had little support to call upon in times of crisis.

    The antipathy felt by the majority of the populace towards the republican system ensured that in the single legislative chamber only a minority of republican candidates were elected, in fact in 1848 had the supporters of the Orleans and Bourbon claimants been able to agree then the new constitution would probably have established a monarchy again. This meant that the majority of the government were only lukewarm in their support for the republic, this is further reflected by the fact the after the coup the government officials staid pretty much in the same positions. It could be argued that the sheer fact that the monarchists outnumbered the republicans in the assemblies doomed the republic to a short life span but that would be false as the two monarchist groups were more opposed to each other than they were to the republic; the groups supported the republic at this time as they lacked a mutually acceptable candidate for the throne, this compromise candidate turned out to be Louis Napoleon.

    This cuckoo in the nest problem was made far worse by the republic’s actions in the early stages of it’s foundation, the bloody June days where the new republic used troops to brutally crush the far left who had attempted an revolution in retaliation for the banning of the national workshops, turned much of the city based working class against it. The working class was the group that pushed for the republic and also had the most potentiality to gain from it, however the republics actions in the June days were more reactionary than the regime it had replaced, this disillusioned the working class and taking away the only natural support base the republic had, thus making the republic very vulnerable.

    The republic was almost from the beginning in a position of frailty, without friends willing to protest about its destruction, and full of potential mutineers, but that did not spell certain destruction for the republic, as the indifferent working class were still hostile towards the idea of a restored monarchy (Bourbon or Orleans) which the generally pro monarchy politicians including Thiers and Barrot supported. Just as the two pro monarchy groups needed a mutually supportable candidate; the working class and the anti republic political groups also needed a candidate who would appeal to both spectrums.

    In effect the republic since the June days had all the chemical components for the reaction (revolution/usurpation) but it lacked a catalyst. This catalyst came in form of Louis Napoleon. He was the nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte, the eldest surviving child of Louis Bonaparte (who was for a brief period king of Holland) and thus was the head of the Bonaparte house and heir to the glorious traditions left to it by his uncle. Though he was a pale imitation of his uncle, Louis Napoleon proved more than able to overturn the republic.

    He had secured his election as president via a combination of propaganda, skilful if unwitting manipulation of leading figures, his appearance as a candidate of order and the lack of a stain from the June days. He won by a huge margin and with a mandate as huge as his, he as a true Bonapartist would morally have to make plans to achieve his main aim, the restoration of the Bonaparte dynasty to their rightful throne; he from the beginning began to prepare for an eventual coup. Even more than the royalists in the assembly, Louis was the proverb able cuckoo in the nest. The factors that helped him secure his election also helped him gain the influence and power needed to crush the republic.

    Louis was probably the first leader to attempt to create a cult of personality using the now recognised methods. His image was plastered over France, medals and souvenirs of his uncle’s reign were spread to every corner, he undertook large-scale tours of the country allowing thousands to see him, and his literature was bought in huge numbers (due to artificially low prices) particularly his “Ideas des Napoleon,” and the “Extinction of pauperism,” these propaganda measures were stepped up after his victory and by the time of 1852 had garnered him a strong support base among the commons among whom he appeared to be genuinely popular. This idea is reinforced by the vast support he gained in the referendums which were used to add legitimacy to his coup and later his coronation.

    His isolation from politics (he was in Britain) during the June meant that he did not have the same association with the bloodshed as most other leading politicians had in the eyes of the Parisian working class. This meant that even the broadly republican Parisian worker felt probably more loyalty to Louis than to the republic by the time of 1852 coup, this is demonstrated by lack of protest that his coup caused in some areas the barricades were set up, but there was no serious threat to Louis from the working man.

    His propaganda machine also continuously highlighted the claims of Louis to much more than a mere presidency and Louis himself never denied further ambition, but the fact remained that he was not taken as seriously by several politician who jumped on his bandwagon, believing they could easily manipulate the oddly proportion German accented amateur, who Thiers described arrogantly as a “Cretin.” This underestimation of his ability allowed him to take them by surprise in October 1849 when he threw out the Barrot ministry and replaced it with one under his domination.

    This combined with his methodical deployment of his own men into positions of power throughout France, meant that the assembly and most of the institutions of authority were firmly under his thumb, this gave him the capability to seize power at any time.

    Louis’s courtship of the lower classes was matched by a similar affair with the conservative and religious sections of society his support of the Loi Falloux and in 1849 his re-establishment of the Pope’s temporal power in Rome. This dual affair allowed him to win the support of the conservative ruling classes in addition to his following among the commons, he had successful united the disparate groups of France in a loose alliance provisionally supporting him.

    As previously mentioned the republic had the all the chemical ingredients for an overthrow but it lacks a catalyst, it is unlikely that any other figure apart from Louis would ever have been to serve as the catalyst as he alone could combine appearing to be a figure of order that would protect the property of the middle and upper classes, while still maintaining the respect of the working class. It is also unlikely that a credible rival candidate would have emerged to take Louis’s place as thirty years later the Orleanist and Legitimist factions were still at loggerheads 30 years later causing Theirs to remark that a republic was needed as it “divided us least.” But the reaction still needed energy to start it off; this was provided by the constitution.

    Louis had shown himself to a very able politician as he slipped into a position of ever increasing influence, however he had a very clear problem, at the end of 1852 his term of office was due to end and he could not stand again due to the constitution. It can be argued that Louis even after four years of consolidation still did not feel ready for a coup, due to the strenuous efforts he made to change the constitution via peaceful means, but he failed to gain the needed two thirds majority required to change the constitution. But that view fails to take in account the factor of Louis’s own personality he was not a particularly violent man and he had always advocated a monarchy that based its power on the support of the majority of the people. The failure of his constitutional attempts to increase his term forced Louis to embark on the path he took; it provided the energy needed to start the reaction.

    It is probable however that quickly after a second victory he would have used his renewed mandate to push for the establishment of an empire. If he had secured a change to the constitution through peaceful means, the republic still would have lived on for only a few more years at most.

    The republic fell as it lacked support from almost every section of community, there was no tears shed at its funeral, this lack of support left its institutions populated by lukewarm adherents, but mainly as it had the ill fortune of Louis Napoleon being able to provide a unique comprise candidate for all of society. The republic doomed itself in the December of 1848 with the election of Louis to President, the only possible rival was now captain and it is little surprise that he drove the steamship of the republic onto the rocks.
    Under the patronage of Boripavlovgrozny.
    Member of BWT.

  2. #2
    wilpuri's Avatar It Gets Worse.
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    I understand the revolution of 1848 was half accidental. Most of the rioters only wanted some reform, mainly the sacking of the premier at the time. Most were surprised when the king quickly abdicated and fled the country, so they basically got more than they had bargained for, and perhaps many did not like this turn in events. A great essay Dreamer.
    The common culture of a tribe is a sign of its inner cohesion. But tribes are vanishing from the modern world, as are all forms of traditional society. Customs, practices, festivals, rituals and beliefs have acquired a flut and half-hearted quality which reflects our nomadic and rootless existence, predicated as we are on the global air-waves.

    ROGER SCRUTON, Modern Culture

  3. #3

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    wilpuri you are correct Louis-Phillipe basicaly over reacted to what was a firmly (at first) middle class led revoultion all they want ed was an extention of the francise and with it an end to the stagation france was cut in, but with the abication of louis for a time the red republicians took over.

    I also i while ago had to summerise the long and short term causes for the fall the July monarchy, so here they are........ please note that this not an essay but notes.

    Long and short term causes of the fall of the Orleans (July) monarchy

    Long term:

    The lack of legitimacy:
    The old Bourbon monarchs could claim to be the rightful government when Louis was returned to power in 1815; Louis-Philippe though a member of the royal family had only a tenuous claim to the throne in terms of inheritance, (descended from Louis XIV’s brother) the Orleanist monarchy was in truth a compromise designed to keep France united and to protect the wealthy property owners. This made it hard to justify the system to the French people and also gave it little natural authority,

    The numerous opponents and the hostile press:
    The press under Louis was remarkably free and highly critical of him, as most of the papers, were owned by people hostile to him and his regime, (republicans or rival monarchists: legitimists who supported the Bourbons or Bonapartists) This meant that every mistake made resulted in a media frenzy, and he was constantly attacked for his weak foreign policy, and the worsening living conditions of the poor. Over the year the number of opponents grew until most of France was indifferent to his reign.

    Louis-Philippe’s own personality and behaviour:
    By 1848 Louie was 70, and set in his ways he talked constantly and was very indecisive. His one-sided conversations made him highly irritable to younger men, and his inability to either give a straight yes or no answer also frustrated them, this also made his public appearances far less effective and added to the discounted about his rule as many young thinkers were alienated by the old man.

    Also his behaviour, which was more fitting for a middle class merchant than a king of France, this meant that the hostile press was constantly ridiculing him, lowering his reputation among the populace.

    Ineffective foreign policy:
    Louis-Philippe’s foreign policy was a disaster which left France isolated and fairly weak this angered many Frenchmen as France had traditionally been the most powerful nation in Europe. Louis was justifiably fearful of provoking the other great powers of Europe, this meant that France had little success, and had been forced into a shaming climb down over the Memhet Ali affair, (where the pasha of Egypt supported by France tried to expand his influence into the rest of the ailing Ottoman Empire.) This meant that the hostile media constantly highlighted the failure, and harked back to the successful polices of the republic and the Bourbons. This constant highlighted failure helped to alienate many sections of the populace who wanted a bold successful foreign policy

    Unwillingness to reform political system:
    Louis-Phillips during his reign managed to alienate many of his natural supporters among the middle classes by his refusal to consider a widening of the franchise. At this time there was strong support for a lowering of the age at which the vote was received (but still keeping the minimum tax level) but Louis saw no need for this as he already had comfortable majorities in chamber so he did not feel a need to concern himself. This helped to disillusion many of the middle classes, which the monarchy relied on to populate their support base.

    Short term:

    Worsening living conditions of the poor due to the increasing industrialisation:
    The ever increasing industrialisation of France brought with it the traditional problems associated with it, the poor lived in over crowed slums and worked long hours; the conditions were so bad that the average life expectancy of a poor worker was 25 years. This clearly caused resentment among the lower classes, which was further aggravated as Louis true to his Lasses-faire beliefs made no attempt to help the poor. The conditions became even worse after 1846 as France went into a recession making many poor people unemployed and causing the price of bread to double forcing many French workers to subsistence level, this made the already growing discontent particularly vocal.

    Economic crisis:
    In 1846 France entered an economic recession where thousands became unemployed and with two successive failures of crops forced many to the brink of starvation, this clearly made people desperate and so more willing to support the republicans and the legitimists.

    The Firing of troops into a peaceful protest:
    In 1848 the government banned a collection of meetings being used by radical republicans to attack the government, this spawned some public protests, and one of these marches came under fire from the army killing 80 and wounding many more. This caused the simmering resentment to change into active rebellion and barricades were erected in many places.

    The lack of support from the National Guard and Louis’s unwillingness to use the army:
    Louis saw the National Guard as the main prop for his regime but the bound of personal loyalty he had developed with them had become far weaker, as his age prevented him from reviewing and spending time with them. This meant they were rather lacklustre in their suppression of riots and protests; this helped to badly weaken Louis’s morale, which led to his unwillingness to continue the fight and meant the army was never called in to stop the protest though they would have probably been more than able to and there loyalty at the time was certain.
    Under the patronage of Boripavlovgrozny.
    Member of BWT.

  4. #4

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    Oh well i was looking back though old posts and noticed this thread and as i have jsut finished an essay on a similiar topic i felt the need to share...


    Did the liberalisation of the second empire come from some conviction of Louis Napoleon or was it merely expedient to his aims?

    In 1852 with the accession of Louis Napoleon to the throne and empire he had long considered his by right, France entered into a period of authoritarian and personal rule, however over the thirty year reign of the “third” Napoleon the shape of his empire changed and warped slowly until in 1870 the “unashamedly authoritarian” empire as Randell describes it was replaced by a new “liberal empire” that was ushered into the French consciousness in the time old Napoleonic method; the referendum.

    The reasons are behind this progression have long been disputed by historians though it is clear from a detailed look and study of Napoleon’s character that this progression was something he believed in. Some of Louis’s harsher critics (of whom there are many) claim that his liberalisation was merely an attempt “by the emperor to buy off increasing opposition and hence extend the life of reign,” this view however relies on assumption that every dictator hangs onto power at all costs and does not really give Louis’s own character into enough significance.

    Most historians consider Louis Napoleon to be a dictator. However it is important not to apply modern perspectives upon this term. Louis was certainly an authoritarian in the first 18 years of his reign but he made no attempts to progressively crush civil rights or set up a totalitarian state that we these days associate dictators as doing. Indeed during this period the majority of the world’s nations were dictatorial in nature, of the four great powers of Europe at the beginning of his reign only Britain had a parliamentary system, the great personal fiefdoms that made up the Habsburg and Romanov dynasties empires were just as draconian and dictatorial as Louis Napoleon in their method of governance.

    Louis had long before his coronation or even his election as president, had shown an interest in the lot of the poor. His books mainly written during his incarceration in Ham fortress stressed his interest and desire to help the working class, the most famous example of this being the “L’ Extinction du Pauperisme.” He is also well known as being a supporter of Saint Simoen who advocated the gradual improvement of the material well being of the poor. These two details can be used to demonstrate a genuine interest in the poor, which lends credence to the idea that Napoleon himself supported the liberalisation process.

    Also Napoleon was never a violent man and though he demonstrated a willingness to use force against his opposition in the immediate period after the coup, he never appeared to be very brutal in his methods, and he quickly pardoned many of the arrested to the point by 1857 only 1800 of some 24,000 people arrested during the coup were left to be pardoned by the general amnesty he instituted. His dislike of violence was strengthened later in his reign by the Italian campaign, in which both emperors learnt to their cost their inability at warfare. This can be used to argue that his temperate was not really suitable nor in keeping with a man who intends to rule by force alone. Which then indicates a like hood that napoleon would accept others opinions, and thus again be more likely to accept and want a liberalisation of the regime.

    Plus the personal commitment to the liberalisation had to be present giving the state of Louis’s “cabinet” of advisors, the only man who advocated a process of liberalisation was Louis’s half brother the hugely able Duc de Morny. He died in 1865. The fact that liberalisation continued helps to how the personal commitment of Louis, who created the liberal empire with out his half-brothers aid in 1870, despite the hostility of most of his chief ministers.

    Many historians hostile towards Napoleon point out that during his reign opposition increased pretty much in line with the liberalising movements of the regime, but it fails to point at that this increase in opposition never came close to really being in a position to overthrow the regime, the army was loyal and the vast majority of the countryside supported him, this made his situation fairly safe, despite the strength of the republicans in the cities. This makes the idea that Louis was forced into instituting the changes more unlikely, as he would not accept a weakening of his position unless he either felt to was necessary to prevent the collapsed of his empire or if he believed in it.

    Also the increase in opposition can be argued to merely demonstrate an increasing willing to accept opposition, as there was already a fairly large number of republicans in the inner cities which was where republicanism was almost slowly located. Also opposition became more prominent during the liberalisation process as he cancelled censorship, opposition is natural in a liberal governmental system and Louis was clearly aware of this and so was also clearly willing to tolerate this and accommodate other’s views in his governmental system. This is shown by his appointment of the well known republican Oliver as his prime minister. This willingness to promote a man so clearly against his own principles helps show his natural liberalism.

    Further more it has to be mentioned that even in his regime’s authoritarian period the empire was always far more liberal than it’s continental rivals, Bismarck’s Prussia, and the hereditary empires of the Habsburg and Romanov dynasties, for the simple reason of it’s foundation. Louis secured his regime though a national referendum and Louis always maintained that the key to his right to reign was the support for the people. This is directly in contrast with the attitudes of the Tsar and the Habsburg crown to them power came from god not from the mere temporal forces, subjects were expected to serve and in return the lord would obey god’s laws and protect them. Louis though he did believe loosely that his power came from right of birth, however accepted that loyalty was something to be earned not to be expected. This made him far less naturally inclined to hold onto absolute power.

    Louis liberalised his regime as he believed it is was needed to make to make France stronger, but he certainly if it would have weaken him he would not of instituted the changes. The fact remains however that he never really weakened his regime hugely by becoming more parliamentary; he had the support of the peasants who made up the majority of population which meant that he had comfortably large majority in the chamber, the peasants made a “formidable army,” as one leading republican once said, which coupled with the support of the church, provided a safety net to insure his regime never fell into the infernal pit of republicanism.
    Under the patronage of Boripavlovgrozny.
    Member of BWT.

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