Was Napoleon actually any good?

[Your Lame Sister]

only a brilliant genius can conquer all of europe in just 10 years.

only a helpless retard can lose all of it in just 5 years.

it's kinda bizzare reading about napoleon, and seeing how he always had a failure after every succes he had, throughout his entire life, unlike other great generals (hannibal, saladin, pompey) which always had a string of successes followed by a string of failures. it's almost like it's two different people you're hearing about.

[Ledhead]

The metric system anyone...no? Well, to me that was the greatest thing he spread over the world!

[Opeth_Oz]

Whoever came up with the idea of burning Moscow to the ground was a genius.

I think the mad men the russians let out have been blamed for that historicaly?

[Il-Principe]

The battle of Austerlitz is still taught at every military academy. So anybody, who thinks that Napoleon is not the greatest general of modern times(an Englishman probably ) should provide some more evidence.

[boofhead]

A conqueror with an inferiority complex:

Napoleon complex

In the fields of psychology and psychoanalysis, Napoleon complex (or Napoleon syndrome) is a colloquial term used to describe a type of inferiority complex suffered by people who are short. The term is also used more generally to describe people who are driven by a perceived handicap to overcompensate in other aspects of their lives. This can sometimes go as far as to lead to acts of violence or will to dominate those that are larger than the short person.

Alfred Adler pioneered the psychological work on inferiority complexes, and used Napoléon Bonaparte as an example of someone whom he thought was driven to extremes by a psychological need to compensate for what he saw as a handicap: his small stature (although there is debate regarding the common assumption that he was of below average height).

[Centurion-Lucius-Vorenus]

Actually, Napoleon was somewhere in the range of 5 foot 6 inches to 5 foot 8 inches, average height for the time.

[powpow]

i really like a series of books called Sharpe
its about a British Rifleman in the peninsular war, it is largely historical with plenty of interesting pieces of fiction mixed in.

btw Wellington never lost a battle during the peninsular war, im not too sure about the 100 days campaign though

and (dont quote me on this cuz im not sure) Napoleon had terrible hemroids and that is believed to have been why he lost the battle at Waterloo
cuz it was exceedingly bad on the planned day of attack, so he waited and the allied armies conjoined and defeated him

he made plenty of mistakes, not just the Russian campaign, but also in leaving the command of his peninsular armies in the hands of his Marshalls, instead of comanding them personally
perhaps the peninsula war wouldve turned out differently

not only did Napoleon rise from the "gutter" but he also started out as an artilleryman (i think) and he would lead most attacks himself so as to raise the morale of his troops

but the British were better due to their clockwork musket volleys, as well as the fact that they were the only army in those times that drilled with live ammunition so as to become used to the crash of a musket volley

i hope most of what ive said is right
cuz otherwise ill feel like an idiot

to close, im not French, i dont hate the French, im Canadian, a western Canadian, and therefore have a healthy hatred for the French Canadians that infest my country and decide the vote for prime minister every election

[boofhead]

Actually, Napoleon was somewhere in the range of 5 foot 6 inches to 5 foot 8 inches, average height for the time.

Fair enough, though the always reliable wiki ( ) states:

Many historians have recently argued that, contrary to popular belief, Napoleon was not short as often depicted in popular culture. Although historians disagree on Napoleon’s precise height, it has been suggested that he was actually slightly taller than the average early 19th-century Frenchman.[23] Some historians claim the French emperor's height was recorded as 5 ft 2 in French units, corresponding to 1.68 meters or 5 ft 6 in Imperial units. A French inch was 2.71 centimetres while an Imperial inch is 2.54 centimetres.[24] The metric system was introduced during the French First Republic, but was not in widespread use until after Napoleon's death. However, other historians reject this claim, pointing out it is unlikely that Napoleon was measured with a French yardstick after his death, Napoleon was under British control on St.Helena, and was almost certainly measured with a British yardstick, which would suggest that the measurement of 5 ft 2 in is accurate.

If he was truly 5 foot 2 inches he would look ridiculous on a horse, like some kind of a one-armed, over-dressed circus midget.

He would have been an even more ridiculous figure considering the following, which basically indicates that among other things, he may have been growing breasts and turning into a woman by the time of his death:

It has been suggested that Napoleon suffered from attacks of hemorrhoids so severe that they actually influenced the result at the Battle of Waterloo. In addition to scabies, the chronic skin disease neurodermititis (explaining Napoleon's penchant for prolonged baths), rages, weeping fits, migraines and dysuria (painful urination), a medical journal article in 1966 by Ayer proposed that all of these symptoms were the result of the parasitic disease schistosomiasis, (acquired during the Egyptian campaign of 1798). To round out these speculations, Napoleon's hormones have been implicated as having important roles in his personality. These include suggestions of hyperthyroidism, Foehlich's Syndrome (pituitary deficiency), hypogonadism, Klinefelter's Syndrome (an extra X chromosome) and, as a bonus, undefined latent homosexuality.

Even the much examined Adolf Hitler, with his condition of hemicryptorchidism (one undescended testicle), never rivaled the encyclopedic medical record of Napoleon.

Well, if he truly suffered from all these conditions, his achievements were certainly quite amazing.

[Lou5je]

Napoleon was very good at some aspects of rule and war, and not so good at others.

His administrative reforms and his effective use of the Grande Levées (mass mobilization), that had been developed during the French Revolutionary Wars allowed him to field armies that were much larger than most armies up until then. For example, the average large battle in classical times involved 60.000 - 80.000 men. Napoleon fielded 250.000 men.
Bonaparte combined this with a strategy that proved very useful during his early years. He would march his army faster than anyone expected and engage the enemy force while they were still getting into position for battle. This tactic of surprise attacks allowed him to seperate different parts of the enemy army from each other, and to then destroy them one by one.
The problem with Napoleon's particular brand of tactical genius was that the other European powers eventually started to adapt. They would keep their soldiers out of battle, retreating cautiously, until the French supply-lines were stretched very thinly.

Napoleon's downfall can be contributed to one factor in particular. A lot of the people who have posted in this thread consider the question from the viewpoint of a battlefield, commenting on how the French dressed their lines etc. The defeat of Napoleon lies in how he conducted his foreign politics.
None of the other powers in Europe had the forces or wherewithal necessary to defeat France. And the differences between Austria, Prussia, Russia and Britain were such that they failed many times at forming a front against France's might. Napoleon was a bully, annexing the Austrian Netherlands and all German Principalities east of the Rhine. The deposed German princes were told to secure themselves new holdings on the other side of the river, which resulted in chaos and division.
It wasn't until 1812 that Napoleon had irritated the other European nations enough to force them well and thoroughly into each other's arms. An example of this was the Continental System that Napoleon tried to impose on the nations under his control. it dictated that no continental European country was allowed to conduct trade with Britain - an effort on the Emperor's part to reduce the economic might of the English.

The Sixth Coalition marched into Paris.

In conclusion, Napoleon was very much a child of the Enlightenment. He was quick to adapt new ways of thinking and doing things, depended heavily on the concept of Reason and recognized ability over lineage in those he commanded.
His fatal flaw was his arrogance, which led him to some very unfortunate foreign policies. The famous Austrian politician Metternich, who was alive in Napoleonic times and continued to dominate European politics for quite a few years thereafter, put it all down to a 'Balance of Power', which had to be upkept in Europe. France, and Napoleon, had upset this balance, which forced the other countries to act in order to restore it.

[Odovacar]

About Napoleon 'turning into woman' 'being a midget' I wish to remind fellows to what Goethe and Hegel said:
"There are no heroes for footmen. But not because those are not heroes...but because these are footmen!"

[Darsh]

Napoleon was very good at some aspects of rule and war, and not so good at others.

His administrative reforms and his effective use of the Grande Levées (mass mobilization), that had been developed during the French Revolutionary Wars allowed him to field armies that were much larger than most armies up until then. For example, the average large battle in classical times involved 60.000 - 80.000 men. Napoleon fielded 250.000 men.
Bonaparte combined this with a strategy that proved very useful during his early years. He would march his army faster than anyone expected and engage the enemy force while they were still getting into position for battle. This tactic of surprise attacks allowed him to seperate different parts of the enemy army from each other, and to then destroy them one by one.
The problem with Napoleon's particular brand of tactical genius was that the other European powers eventually started to adapt. They would keep their soldiers out of battle, retreating cautiously, until the French supply-lines were stretched very thinly.

Napoleon's downfall can be contributed to one factor in particular. A lot of the people who have posted in this thread consider the question from the viewpoint of a battlefield, commenting on how the French dressed their lines etc. The defeat of Napoleon lies in how he conducted his foreign politics.
None of the other powers in Europe had the forces or wherewithal necessary to defeat France. And the differences between Austria, Prussia, Russia and Britain were such that they failed many times at forming a front against France's might. Napoleon was a bully, annexing the Austrian Netherlands and all German Principalities east of the Rhine. The deposed German princes were told to secure themselves new holdings on the other side of the river, which resulted in chaos and division.
It wasn't until 1812 that Napoleon had irritated the other European nations enough to force them well and thoroughly into each other's arms. An example of this was the Continental System that Napoleon tried to impose on the nations under his control. it dictated that no continental European country was allowed to conduct trade with Britain - an effort on the Emperor's part to reduce the economic might of the English.

The Sixth Coalition marched into Paris.

In conclusion, Napoleon was very much a child of the Enlightenment. He was quick to adapt new ways of thinking and doing things, depended heavily on the concept of Reason and recognized ability over lineage in those he commanded.
His fatal flaw was his arrogance, which led him to some very unfortunate foreign policies. The famous Austrian politician Metternich, who was alive in Napoleonic times and continued to dominate European politics for quite a few years thereafter, put it all down to a 'Balance of Power', which had to be upkept in Europe. France, and Napoleon, had upset this balance, which forced the other countries to act in order to restore it.

"His fatal flaw was his arrogance, which led him to some very unfortunate foreign policies"
Do you know why he use this "unfortunate foreign policy" it was to secure France against the different coalitions, European monarchies had more fear ot the republican ideas than the "balance of power", Napoleon use continental system to destroy the economy of this worst ennemy: England because since Trafalgar he couldn't invade England.
The Russian invasion was not du in this ambition but by the fact than the Tsar don't respect his agreement on the continental system and continue to help England.

[Woad-Warrier]

Wellington > Napoleon

[Woad-Warrier]

i really like a series of books called Sharpe
its about a British Rifleman in the peninsular war, it is largely historical with plenty of interesting pieces of fiction mixed in.

btw Wellington never lost a battle during the peninsular war, im not too sure about the 100 days campaign though

and (dont quote me on this cuz im not sure) Napoleon had terrible hemroids and that is believed to have been why he lost the battle at Waterloocuz it was exceedingly bad on the planned day of attack, so he waited and the allied armies conjoined and defeated him

he made plenty of mistakes, not just the Russian campaign, but also in leaving the command of his peninsular armies in the hands of his Marshalls, instead of comanding them personally
perhaps the peninsula war wouldve turned out differently

not only did Napoleon rise from the "gutter" but he also started out as an artilleryman (i think) and he would lead most attacks himself so as to raise the morale of his troops

but the British were better due to their clockwork musket volleys, as well as the fact that they were the only army in those times that drilled with live ammunition so as to become used to the crash of a musket volley

i hope most of what ive said is right
cuz otherwise ill feel like an idiot

to close, im not French, i dont hate the French, im Canadian, a western Canadian, and therefore have a healthy hatred for the French Canadians that infest my country and decide the vote for prime minister every election

Canadians, Britain's offspring and true allies to the last I agree my brothers! Down with those bloody Quebec separatists!

Have you seen the television series? Jesus Christ, I've never seen so many boobs in all my life! Well...

[Juvenal]

Napoleon was very good at some aspects of rule and war, and not so good at others.

...effective use of the Grande Levées

...He would march his army faster than anyone expected

...seperate different parts of the enemy army from each other, and to then destroy them one by one.

...The defeat of Napoleon lies in how he conducted his foreign politics.

...His fatal flaw was his arrogance

An excellent set of points from Lou5je (even if he does turn out to be a Bourbon).

The Nature of French Armies

Napoleon created the Corps system for controlling large forces. Each Corps was a mini-army consisting of all arms and was strong enough to fight independently until other forces could be brought up. While the Allies were limited to Divisions, they were obliged to field either small armies that were overwhelmed, or large armies that were outmanoeuvred.

French armies employed large numbers of skirmishers who would keep up a continuous harrassing fire on the enemy and mask the manouevring of the French attack columns.

Napoleon organised artillery into large mobile formations that would supply the battering ram to weaken enemy battle lines and allow his more flexible formations to close, break the enemy line and defeat his forces in detail.

French Cavalry, although often inferior man-for-man to that of the Allies, was employed in massed formations that provided a battle-winning punch.

French armies were not tied to a slow cumbersome supply apparatus as were the Allies (including Wellington). On campaign they lived by "forage" (stealing), which meant they were always on the move.

French armies were made up largely of conscripts. Experienced or trained troops used skirmish, line, column and square formations, untrained troops were restricted to skirmish and columns.

The Decline of Napoleon's Fortunes

Napoleon's ability to make war effectively declined steadily from a high point in 1805 to the disasters of 1812,13 and 14. The Grand Armee of 1805 was highly trained, flexible and well-led. As the years went by the quality of the troops declined. By 1809 he was forced to compensate for the poorer quality of his infantry by using simpler battlefield formations and more massed artillery. For example MacDonald's assault at Wagram. By 1812 (Borodino) he was no longer able to decisively beat an Allied army in one battle.

By 1813, Napoleon no longer had a clear superiority over the Allies. His troops were mostly newly-raised and had lost the training advantage. The Allies had (almost accidently) found an answer to Napoleon's method of winning a campaign with a decisive battle by agreeing to retreat whenever Napoleon was present, and attack when he was elsewhere.

The Allies now used the Corps system and mass conscription. Allied troops were motivated by the same Nationalistic fervour that fuelled the famous French Elan. Allied commanders could now successfully engage Napoleon's Marshals.

Napoleon was a genius and a great leader, but he failed to adapt to changing conditions. He was unwilling to make the political and diplomatic compromises necessary for a lasting peace and he underestimated the increasing competence of his enemies. He always seems to have believed that total victory was possible, and as time went on he was prepared to take bigger and bigger gambles based on his confidence in his own abilities.

Napoleon also lacked trust in his own subordinates, discouraging them from acting independently. Some of his best generals (Davout and Eugene) were actually kept out of the decisive theatre of war in 1813 and 1814.

Waterloo and all that...

Napoleon's final defeat at Waterloo was precipitated by his final gamble that committing his last reserve would break Wellington's army. He had nothing left to commit to counter the attacks by Ziethen and Chasse and the French army collapsed. An earlier Napoleon would have withdrawn as soon as Bulow appeared, but Napoleon the statesman required a quick victory in order to be able to deal with the Austrians before the Russians could assemble their armies.

[Gary88]

i really like a series of books called Sharpe
its about a British Rifleman in the peninsular war, it is largely historical with plenty of interesting pieces of fiction mixed in.

yeah, the tv series with sean bean as sharpe is awesome, especially harper and his 8 barrel gun

[felicissimus]

Hmm..Napoleon won at first exploiting the minuses in the old Europe warfare and the disconsent among the Royal Courts .He lost shortly after that because he tried to establish a system incompatible with democracy or normal order -he was shooting everybody that disagreed,sequestered private property and destroyed existing culture .That is why people from that time on rightfully started hating the french .Though nobody hated France of the Old Regime ,but most definitely everybody in Europe admired and copied it.

Read Madamme De Stall "Memories " she was persecuted by Napoleon and had to flee in Russia and Britain .She says he was the first on european continent to have established secret police for 24 hours watch on the "unreliable " and turned the freedom into a type of latin america dictatorship .Therefore his place was not in Europe and the history rejected him .

[Tony83]

Concerning Napoleon's use of the corps d'armée system

The first general to consider organising an army into smaller combined-arms units was Maurice de Saxe, Marshal General of France, which he describes in his book Mes Réveries. Dying, at a relatively early age 1750, prevented him from trying his ideas out.

It was another Frenchman, Victor-François de Broglie, who put the ideas into practice. He conducted practical experiments in the Seven Years' War, and even though the war was not a success for the French, the divisional system was.

During the French Revolution the divisional system was employed and the revolutionary government came to the same conclusion about it as the previous royal government and the French army was henceforth organised into divisions.

Divisions made armies more flexible and easier to manoeuvre. Under Napoleon the divisions were grouped together into corps, because of their increasing size. His military success spread the divisional and corps system all over Europe because, by the time the Napoleonic Wars had ended, all armies in Europe had adopted it.

[Juvenal]

Ironically, Wellington didn't hold with the Corps system, and didn't really use it. Wellington's armies were always under his direct personal control. It is amazing that he could cope with so many subordinates.

At Waterloo the Anglo-Allied army was notionally divided into three corps: I (Prince of Orange), II (Lord Hill) and Reserve (Wellington). But in practice Wellington commanded the divisions directly.

Lord Uxbridge, who commanded the cavalry, was officially second-in-command, but Wellington refused to confide in him. When Uxbridge asked Wellington for his plan of operations he is said to have replied "Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?"

[Tony83]

Ironically, Wellington didn't hold with the Corps system, and didn't really use it. Wellington's armies were always under his direct personal control. It is amazing that he could cope with so many subordinates.

At Waterloo the Anglo-Allied army was notionally divided into three corps: I (Prince of Orange), II (Lord Hill) and Reserve (Wellington). But in practice Wellington commanded the divisions directly.

Lord Uxbridge, who commanded the cavalry, was officially second-in-command, but Wellington refused to confide in him. When Uxbridge asked Wellington for his plan of operations he is said to have replied "Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?"

And there I think you've outlined the main difference between Wellington's and Napoleon's approach to fighting a battle. Wellington was into the micro-management of his forces; positioning individual battalions and batteries when he deemed necessary. Whereas, Napoleon was very much the big-picture strategy man, leaving that sort of tactical thing to his, usually, more than capable subordinates.

However, as his 1814 campaign, defending French soil and heavily outnumbered, proved, he was not without his own particular expertise in the tactical arena when the need arose.

[Odovacar]

Hmm..Napoleon won at first exploiting the minuses in the old Europe warfare and the disconsent among the Royal Courts .He lost shortly after that because he tried to establish a system incompatible with democracy or normal order -he was shooting everybody that disagreed,sequestered private property and destroyed existing culture .That is why people from that time on rightfully started hating the french .Though nobody hated France of the Old Regime ,but most definitely everybody in Europe admired and copied it.

Read Madamme De Stall "Memories " she was persecuted by Napoleon and had to flee in Russia and Britain .She says he was the first on european continent to have established secret police for 24 hours watch on the "unreliable " and turned the freedom into a type of latin america dictatorship .Therefore his place was not in Europe and the history rejected him .

Partially true, because Europe really hated Napoleon. I mean, aristocrats and ancien regimes hated the 'homo novus' in him, the poor little soldier of yesterday who became an emperor, and a quite arrogant one.
This was a blasphemy for their own world, a real revolution.

However, youths in Europe begun to hate him when they saw him becoming a tyrant, a traitor to the revolution. Remember, Beethoven's Eroica originally was being made to praise him, then Beethoven changed the title.
Under french occupation the intellectuals in Germany turned from entlightenement supporters to nationalists, and conservative governements won their support easely.

His Secret police was due to his police minister, the feared and hated Fouché. Fouché started as a jacobinist, and he made his connections during the Revolution.

However, in France because of the royal centralisation there were traditions of monitoring and secretly arresting people, these traditions were reinforced by the revolution, which continued centralisation in France.