Total War Center Forums - Vestigia Vetustatis http://www.twcenter.net/forums/ Place for all the history buffs to discuss the full spectrum of history. en Sat, 21 Nov 2009 03:31:14 GMT vBulletin 60 http://www.twcenter.net/forums/images_bward/misc/rss.jpg Total War Center Forums - Vestigia Vetustatis http://www.twcenter.net/forums/ The Hippeis of Sparta http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311911&goto=newpost Thu, 19 Nov 2009 21:27:55 GMT Hello all. A couple of times I transposed, so to speak, some posts of mine from... Hello all. A couple of times I transposed, so to speak, some posts of mine from here on twc over to romanarmytalk.com. for a related topic of discussion. Well, a terrific discussion recently began over there, concerning the Spartans, which I responded to with my usual 'prolixity' :doh:. I thought I would reverse the trend and share my post over here. The upcoming quotes you will see are from the posters involved in the thread over on romanarmytalk.

The thread is here. The opening question reads, from the aficionado Paul Bardunias,

Quote:
What is the evidence that the Spartan Hippeis functioned as a Royal Guard as opposed to an elite unit that often fought in the vicinity of the King along the battle line?

Well, is there a distinction between Royal Guard and Royal Bodyguard? Great discussion, guys :thumbsup2. But I'm afraid all we ('we', now that I'll enthusiastically join in!) can do is not only confirm the frustrating, yet often tantalizingly so, lack of evidence, but convene with the often incompatible nature of the literature we do have - and in this case it comes from some of the major sources we know so well. We simply cannot be certain about the basics of the Spartan army's infrastructure before Xenophon's descriptions, aided by a snippet here and there from Diodorus and Plutarch, etc. I do agree about the issue of nomenclature - it does not carry a set meaning, and many terms can often be inter-changeable throughout the Greco-Roman historiographic tradition (mainly with weaponry and military units). Moreover, I agree that the Spartan royal bodyguards were originally mounted; Sparta may not have been a cavalry power, but the nobility of just about any state would ride on horses when moving around; it was always emblematic of the privileged, etc. After all, Herodotus and Thucydides do mention the '300 Knights'. Generally speaking, hippeis (singular, hippeus - ἱππεύς), is the Greek term for cavalry (as well as a term for one of the wealthier classes of a Greek polis, eg, the 'knights' being the second highest social class in Athens behind the pentekosiomedimnoi, the citizens who 'possessed land which produced...'; cf. Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 3.16.1, and Aristotle, Athenian Constitution, Ch. 7.4), similar in meaning and social status to the Roman equites (singular, eques) of the Equestrian Order (Ordo Equester). A general Latin meaning of any person mounted on a horse was equus, but in the context of 'cavalrymen' it carried a specific meaning of 'knight'. By the turn of the 5th/4th century B.C., the Spartan Hippeus, despite the remaining title, was a member of the Spartan Royal Bodyguard (cf. Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 6.4.14), and had nothing to do with hippeis in the sense of cavalrymen, or even men on horses. By contrast, the Macedonian hypaspistai and hetairoi were distinguished as elite infantry and cavalry under the reforms of Philip II and Alexander III of Macedon (a wider application in nomenclature and quantity was primarily Alexander's role to what his father bequeathed him: we read amid the great son's reign of asthetairoi, argyraspids, and somatophylakes, all comprising foot and horse of the Agema, the 'Royal Guards'), and the crème de la crème of both arms were part of the Macedonian Agema.



Above: this depiction of Spartan Hippeis ('bodyguards') comes from the work of Keravnos, one of twc.net's elite contributors. The laurel wreaths they wear atop their heads, however idiomatic, surely represents their established reputation (hence 'resting on one's laurels'). In the first test between the developing Macedonian army under Philip II against tough Greek hoplites in a set battle, fought in 352 B.C. off the Pagasitikós Kólpos, the battle involved Philip having his men wear laurel wreaths to signify their 'duty for Apollo' against the blasphemous Phocians and their allies; the Phocians had a few years prior appropriated the Delphic treasures (Apollo, of course, was the prophetic deity of the Delphic oracle, and he was always depicted with a laurel wreath on his head). Needless to state, such religious trappings to meet strategic ends was a part of Philip's cunning designs. But this was one main battle in which he displayed an Alexandrian resolve for total victory on the battlefield (it was in part certainly personal, as his opponent Onomarchus, the adept Phocian leader, had outwitted and battered Philip a year earlier in a skillfully laid ambuscade, exploiting catapults to stymie Philip and his men). Consequently, the Phocian army was crushed in one of the largest battles ever fought in Greece, while the Athenian fleet, now offshore to aid the Phocians, could only watch helplessly. Anyway, the full post by Keravnos, the thread, and wonderful amalgam of Spartan warrior classifications, shown in battle order no less, can be seen and read here.

Howard, I enjoyed your post over on my thread about Philip II of Macedon; indeed, it was an exudation of piecemeal writings which I had jotted down over time in my word documents, and certainly not easy to deal with in a discussion like this here; Paul's question is excellent because of his specificity - asking for the evidence which is scarce in direct identification, but, IMHO, pretty clear with extrapolations and emendations. However, I am loathe to arbitrarily do so without the support of professional scholarship, and even then make sure I feel it is cogent. Anyway, Howard, you mentioned that the Spartans were your favorite group, and your comments here reflect superior knowledge and deductive capacity (stock options will suffice if you haven't any liquid immediately available :laughter:). I am allured by the paradoxical element of Sparta, one that has attracted much moralizing in conjunction with the clear repugnant issue of her policy with her helot subjects. But Spartan military prowess was an organizational response to the reality of holding sway over a large population in an apartheid society. Amazingly hypocritical isn't it? The idea that the 'freedom' won against the Oriental 'despot' in 480-479 B.C. was spearheaded by the elite soldiers (the '300' serving around the Agiad king Leonidas I in the archetype plight of heroism in 480 B.C.; the figure is almost surely a coincidence, as Leonidas' men were seemingly too old to be the [i]Hippeis[/b]) of a state who basically perpetuated a modern interpretation of rigid strata and enslavement! The term utopia (οὐτόπος) denotes 'no place', (perhaps revealing an allegorical touch from Thomas More) has seeped into our basic delineation of a 'perfect' society, but the homonymy of [eu]topia seems more appropriate, as its derivative is the Greek εὖτόπος, or 'good', or 'well', 'place'. But between Plato and More, and Quakers and Shakers, etc., whatever distinctions should be applied, Sparta has come to represent the original utopia, and, naturally, it can never have been to signify anything analogous with liberal creativity and free expression. The connection was surely posited with a communal style, divorcing the concept from the practice, in Sparta's case one of hierarchical repression. The incredibly important legacy of Hellas needs no defense, and the two poleis who make the most noise amid the surviving historiography, Athens and Sparta, have handed us substantial traditions. Their governments were similar in that they were run by assemblies, but not so in an elective process, hence Athens being the traditional birthplace of dēmokratía.

Spartan society was simple, with the primary focus on obedience and war for 'self-preservation'. Only through their system of slavery could the young men be free from household, industrial, and pastoral duties to assiduously focus on their required military training and duties. Young Spartan boys were trained to be warriors; young Spartan girls were reared to be the mothers of those warriors. Athenian life should be what we all prefer - a creative cynosure. In Athens, one could receive a great education and pursue many kinds of arts or sciences, and serving in the army or navy wasn't compulsory (at least by law), an element which leads many, IMHO, to be misled that Athenians soldiers were not as good as those from other states (on land). The standing Athenian Hippeis (these were horsemen to the end, but only after they stopped acting as 'mounted infantry', as an early allusion from Herodotus suggests; cf. The Histories, Book 63.2) and Epilektoi (their crack footmen) were far from lacking in any martial prowess. It's no coincidence that the greatest scholars of ancient Greece were Athenians, and if not, came to Athens to pursue the advancement of their work. The fact we know of no Spartans by name (other than their kings and higher leaders of war; the term 'Lacedaemonians' seems to be inter-changeable quite often) illustrates the collective society for the whole. Forgive me. The point, basically? Here:

Paul Cartledge, The Spartans: The World of the Warrior-Heroes of Ancient Greece, pgs. 24-25,
"...The image or mirage of Sparta is therefore at least ambivalent and double-faceted. Against the positive image of the Spartans' uplifting warrior ideal of collective self-sacrifice, emblematized in the Thermopylae story, has to be pitted their lack of high cultural achievement, their refusal for the most part of open government, both at home and abroad, and their brutally efficient suppression for several centuries of a whole enslaved Greek people..."
Professor Cartledge does not deify the Spartans, nor demonize them. His balanced treatment with a topic many often neglect one overt aspect for the other (the Spartan warrior ethos and their reprehensible treatment of their helots) is what I feel we need from our tutors. There are many good books on Sparta, with Paul Cartledge the overall most reputable. I have seen works by the likes of Peter Connolly, Michael Whitby and Anton Powell (off the top of my head). But if you do not have or have access to John F. Lazenby's The Spartan Army, a paradigm of that very balance, you're missing out terribly. I hate to phrase it like that because the book is out of print, not readily available at bookstores and/or libraries, thus horridly expensive if one wants to buy it. I spent just under $20 (US) in photo-copying the whole book (15 cents a page x 112 pgs. + some trial and error; two pages could be fitted for one copy. The book is 211 pgs. without contents and preface); I had to obtain a special 'referral pass' to Columbia University's Butler Library (any infractions by me in the New York Public Library's system would have disqualified my visit!), after waiting a couple months for the book's return, to get a hold of it. One terrific feature of Lazenby's book is, his brilliant powers of deductive and inductive reasoning and analyses notwithstanding (albeit debatable with his final analysis), is that all the terms - 'hippeis', 'perioikoi', 'moroi', 'syssition', etc., etc. - are italicized, making a study, whether skimming along or a deep perusal, more streamlined. If anyone cannot obtain it and wants to, I'd be happy to do something along the lines of scanning pages, or even copying them to post or send somewhere. Anyone interested in the Spartan Army (its proposed organization, recruitment, training, and equipment) must have this book - even for the sake of becoming familiar with it so they can disagree with the hypotheses on a more thorough level. I'm using it right now as a my primary source for this post (and you all thought I may have been especially 'smart', eh?). If you have it, never mind - or let's use it, with others who have it, as a guide (as well as it's debatable issues regarding quantitative Spartan army strength). I Just had to run that by you directly, and for everyone else, as to my conviction. Lazenby's books offer the finest exegeses, if you will, on the great conflicts of the ancient world (Greco-Persian Wars, Peloponnesian War, and the first two Punic Wars).



Above: I live in New York City, close to Columbia University's Butler Library; I am not a student, hence cannot take anything from the library. I have yet to fail in finding some material I have looked for, whether journal articles or books (including Lazenby's The Spartan Army, and the pioneering works of William K. Pritchett). But when something is checked out, it's often not going to be back soon! I'm anxiously waiting for Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon, by John K. Anderson. It seems so fitting to me that my research 'sojourns', almost always involving ancient Greece and Rome, takes place in a marvelous building constructed in the tradition with Corinthian columns. Can you make out the names inscribed along the entablature of the building? Homer, Herodotus, Sophocles...

Speaking of powers of deductive reasoning:

Quote:
...Why three and why 300? It makes perfect sense if you think of the importance of the tripartite nature of the Dorian tribe. Although not referred to by many here - the Hylleis, Pamphyloi and Dymanes strata was still significant well into classical times. Although both kings' families were nominally from the Hylleis tribe - I think it would have been only fair and prudent to have equal representation within the Hippeis from each group. I assume the Olympic champions would have had guaranteed places when those selections took place.

Most quotes about them mention them fighting around their king. That's what a royal bodyguard does.

Ditto! Spot on! Great thinking, my friend. But perhaps 100 of them were allocated for separate duty at times, but the function almost surely wasn't altogether different (although the escort for Themistocles was obviously a unique assignment). The 300 Hippeis are one of the more elusive aspects of the Spartan socio-military set up. The belief that a corps d'elite of 300 picked young Spartans called Hippeis formed a royal bodyguard who fought with the king in battle, and in a separate formation no less, is fairly general in the ancient historiography, but hugely accepted amid modern academia (RAT not excluded!). The theory rests on a handful of remarks in ancient writers, of which the most explicit may begin with Herodotus, which Stefanos initially referred to:

The Histories, Book 8.124.1-3,
"...The Greeks were too jealous to assign the prize and sailed away each to his own place, leaving the matter undecided; nevertheless, Themistocles was lauded, and throughout all of Hellas was deemed the wisest man by far of the Greeks. However, because he had not received from those that fought at Salamis the honor due to his preeminence, he immediately afterwards went to Lacedaemon in order that he might receive honor there. The Lacedaemonians welcomed him and paid him high honor. They bestowed on Eurybiades [the nominal admiral in command] a crown of olive as the reward of excellence and another such crown on Themistocles for his wisdom and cleverness. They also gave him the finest chariot in Sparta, and with many words of praise, they sent him home with the 300 picked men of Sparta who are called Knights1 to escort him as far as the borders of Tegea. Themistocles was the only man of whom we know to whom the Spartans gave this escort..."
1The ancient Greek word for Herodotus' 300 'Knights' is ἱππέες.

Quote:
...The case is usually made indirectly. We know that the Spartan Kings did have a royal guard of some sort (100 "select men" according to Herodotus 5.56, who may be speaking of the early fifth century...

Absolutely, and of course you meant Book 6.56 of The Histories: '...when the armies go forth the kings go out first and return last; one hundred chosen men guard them in their campaigns...'. This was certainly an earlier time, where maybe only one hippagretes (we'll get to this function) was extant, or perhaps a couple who chose less than a hundred 'first ten-year classes' (cf. Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 4.5.14, in describing the orders given to the 'first ten year-classes' by their polemarch in the Battle of Lechaeum, fought in 390 B.C.) of young men. But maybe there were 300 Hippeis, and that Herodotus mentions 'a hundred picked men' who guarded the king on campaign in Book 6.56, yet mentions 300 of them in Books 1.67.5 and 8.124.3, could reflect a distinction between a 'Royal Guard' who fought 'about the king' in battle and a royal bodyguard in general (perhaps with the other Spartan king at the Court, etc.). In the Hellenica, Book 4.5.8, in writing of events in 390 B.C. in the Corinthian isthmus (Agesilaus II captured Oenoe, which is modern Oinoe, on the extending peninsula located on the north-western side of the Corinthian isthmus), Xenophon mentions the fully-armed δορυφὁροι of the king's 'body-guard' accompanying Agesilaus 'with all speed (kai hoi doruphoroi ta hopla echontes parêkolouthoun spoudêi), he leading the way and his tent companions following after him' (the 'tent companions' would have been the polemarchoi, etc.); Xenophon seems to be describing a particular group of soldiers, and in both this context regarding the 'spear-bearers' of the Guard, and that of 'the royal bodyguard, the so-called aides of the polemarch, and the others fell back under the pressure of the Theban mass' at the Battle of Leuctra (...hippoi kai hoi sumphoreis tou polemarchou kaloumenoi hoi te alloi hupo tou ochlou ôthoumenoi anechôroun...) in Book 6.4.14, it is quite likely that the king's body-guard was not completely the same, though probably part of at times, as the Royal Guard. Notice hippoi in the modern Greek lexica for the narrative of Leuctra; remember, the Spartan cavalry were already gone; they had 'speedily been worsted' (...hoi hippeis sunebeblêkesan kai tachu hêttênto hoi tôn Lakedaimoniôn...).

On two occasions, we read of the respective numerical strength of morai being 'about 600', from Xenophon (in the famous victory of Iphicrates with his peltastai over a Spartan mora; Hellenica, Book 4.5.12), and 500 from Diodorus (referring to Agesilaus II's Boeotian campaign in 377 B.C.; Bibliotheca Historica, Book 15.32.1). Diodorus made much use of Ephorus, and the 500 figure he gives as denoting the numerical strength of a Spartan mora indeed corroborates Plutarch's figure attested to Ephorus as being 500 (Life of Pelopidas, Ch. 17, at the backdrop of the irregular clash at Tegyra, in 375 B.C.). Other enumerations from Callisthenes (700 in a mora), Polybius (900 men in a mora), and Photius (either 1,000 or 500 men in a mora) were from different times and, presumably, varying circumstances. Assuming that Diodorus obtained his figure of 500 from Ephorus, this can probably be sustained. But a larger picture is not very convincing:

Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 15.32.1,
"...Agesilaus led forth his army and reached Boeotia accompanied by all the soldiers, amounting to more than 18,000, in which were the five divisions of Lacedaemonians. Each division contained 500 men. The company known as Sciritae amongst the Spartans is not drawn up with the rest, but has its own station with the king and it goes to the support of the sections that from time to time are in distress; and since it is composed of picked men, it is an important factor in turning the scale in pitched battles, and generally determines the victory. Agesilaus also had 1,500 cavalry1..."
1Certainly mounted mercenaries, following his incursion in Asia Minor nearly two decades prior. Of note, the proportion of 'Lacedaemonians' to the total figure of 18,000 for the army seems too low; this is part and parcel to John F. Lazenby's arguments that Spartan manpower became as depleted as some of the sources' figures for some individual campaigns suggest (though he often doubles the given figures, which in turn may be a stretch, too); more so, it was Sparta's loss of her league's reserves which figured into her decline, not to mention the adaptive military genius of Epaminondas and Pelopidas.

OK. Here we go. Howard mentioned the Skiritai (or Sciritae) in the same manner Diodorus did (probably the other way round, chronologically :laughter:); the earliest literary mention of the Skiritai comes from Thucydides, who tells us of a division of 600 of them at the Battle of Mantinea of 418 B.C., in which they 'formed the left wing' of the Spartan army, a position to which in the Lacedaemonian army they have a peculiar and exclusive right' (History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 5.67-68). The left wing, of course, was the most threatened position of a hoplite phalanx; in a Spartan army, the crack troops were deployed on the right opposite the enemy left (presumably, their weaker spot before Epaminondas' discerning reforms). Thus, a proclivity for the opposing phalanxes to rotate counterclockwise was further aggravated by the each hoplite's natural tendency to close up on his right neighbor to gain more protection from the left part of the neighbor's hoplon (or aspis, to avoid that semantic debate for now!). That Thucydides is the first to mention them is almost certainly academically nominal; the homelands of the Skiritai on the northern frontier of Sparta were under Spartan hegemony centuries prior (a rebellion did occur in the early 360s B.C., following the rise of Theban martial dominance over Sparta, consequently freeing them from Spartan predominance). Xenophon tells us that the Skiritai were placed as night sentinels 'outside the lines', and that 'the enemy is watched by cavalry from positions that command the widest outlook' (Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, Book 12.2-3). However, at the time of the Persian Wars the Peloponnesians had no significant cavalry for such operations, hence the Skiritai (the city of Sciros was near Tegea) were probably charged with all the 'specialized' duties. Moreover, amid his hypotheses of comparing Asiatic and Greek war methods, Xenophon compares the role of the Skiritai utilized by the Spartans to how the Assyrians employed their subject neighbors, the superb Hyrcanian cavalry: they were spared 'neither in hardships nor in dangers' (Cyropaedia, Book 4.2.1).



Above left: an illustration from one Jim Carrozza (found here) of a light infantryman from Skiritis. Nice hat! The Skiritae were subject to Sparta but 'free', similar in social status to the more general Periokoi ('dwellers around'); they were all mainly farmers and merchants who lacked the full citizenship of the Homoioi (which included the vaunted Spartiatai). They lived in villages and towns in the less fertile land of the hills and coasts. They may have been part of the conquered people, but unlike the Heílôtes, they kept their freedom, and proved themselves often as hardy light troops. Right: a vase-painting showing a peltast (peltastēs, carrying his peltē, the light, crescent-shaped wicker shield which evoked their image so well), c. early 4th century B.C. (the image is from this good site).

Another interesting class of Sparta were the Mothakes, or Mothones (singular, Mothax), who were deemed inferior (socially) to the Homoioi, but brought up by wealthier patrons. The great Spartan mercenary Captain-General whom many of you know in the relevant history, Xanthippus, who wiped out the first Roman invasion army of Carthaginian Africa in 255 B.C., was probably a Mothax. Polybius states he 'had been brought up in the Spartan discipline, and had had a fair amount of military experience' (The Histories, Book 1.32.1), and Diodorus merely tells us he was a 'Spartan' (Bibliotheca Historica, Book 23.14.1). But they are not in accord as to Xanthippus' fate (compare Polybius, Book 1.36.2-4, in which he returned home, and Diodorus, Book 23.16, where we read of Xanthippus' betrayal by the Carthaginians in Lilybaeum (they gave him a leaky ship, hence he drowned at sea), followed a few years later by a grisly public murder of Marcus Atilius Regulus by the Carthaginians; Regulus was the able Roman consul who invaded Africa and met defeat at the hands of Xanthippis after a promising start (there are a few versions of Regulus' horrible torture in later annalists); Polybius does state that there was 'another account given of Xanthippus' departure', which he said he 'would endeavor to set forth on an occasion more suitable than the present', but we never read of it. Maybe he never got around to the 'more suitable occasion', or it's part of his lost works). Diodorus probably reported much Greek and Roman propaganda without really being aware of it, or simply not caring much about critical scrutiny, as the studious Polybius and Tacitus would have. But Diodorus was writing a universal history, and had to compress and epitomize as much as he could with deeply detailed works he drew from. Regardless, Xanthippus probably knew Hamilcar Barca and Sosylos, the 'Lacedaemonian' who tutored none other than Hannibal; Sosylos may have been one of the 'hundred or fifty soldiers' who came to Africa with Xanthippus to put the Carthaginian army on a better footing (this is loose conjecture, but Sosylos obviously wound up in the Carthaginian sphere of influence, and in a high position with the Barcids not unlike Polybius came to be, in his case being under the patronage of the Scipionic Circle). If so, it is significant that part of Sparta's military lore passed into the erudition of one of the greatest of battlefield commanders of all time (cf. John F. Lazenby, The Spartan Army, pg. 170). As with the likes of Pagondas and Timoleon, a seemingly great commander (Xanthippus) simply disappeared from the record.

Anyway, forgive the rambling :doh: The comments from Diodorus that the Skiritai had their 'own station with the king', and that they were an 'important factor in turning the scale in pitched battles, generally determining the victory' is almost certainly far too sweeping. Antony Andrewes (that's not a typo; that is how his last name is spelled), a terrific classical scholar mentioned by Howard, believed that Diodorus, as is common with his 'internal economy' (a description of some of Diodorus' summarized works by the late, great Nicholas G. Hammond), has telescoped Thucydides' reference to the Skiritai (History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 5.67.1) with one soon thereafter to the 300 'Knights' Hippeis (History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 5.72.4; cf. Andrewes, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Vol. 4, pg. 104). Diodorus also seems to be making generalizations derived from Xenophon's description of an exploit during Agesilaus II's same campaign (or at least of the same timeframe), near Tanagra (cf. John F. Lazenby, The Spartan Army, pg. 9):

Xenophon, Hellenica, Book 5.4.52-53,
"...it really seemed that Agesilaus' expedient proved a clever one, for though he led his army directly away from the enemy, he caused the latter to retire on the run, and while the enemy ran past, some of his polemarchs with their regiments nevertheless succeeded in charging upon them. The Thebans, however, hurled their spears from the hill-tops, so that Alypetus, one of the polemarchs, was struck and killed; but in spite of that the Thebans were put to flight from this hill also. Consequently the Sciritans and some of the horsemen climbed the hill and showered blows upon the hind-most of the Thebans as they rushed past them toward the city. As soon as they got near the wall, however, the Thebans turned about; and the Sciritans, upon seeing them, fell back at a faster pace than a walk. Now not one of them was killed; nevertheless, the Thebans set up a trophy, because after climbing the hill the Sciritans had retired..."
Thus, assuming Xenophon is more tenable, it's quite possible that, alternatively but with the same conclusion of emendation, Ephorus (uncritically followed by Diodorus) also wrote Skiritai, but meant the Hippeis - who would indeed be stationed 'with the king'.

Quote:
What is the evidence that the Spartan Hippeis functioned as a Royal Guard as opposed to an elite unit that often fought in the vicinity of the King along the battle line?...

The passage from Herodotus, cited earlier, concerning Themistocles' escort of 300 ἱππέες reveals a task not akin to guarding their king in battle. But it's still moot. A passage from Thucydides is substantial, and the most vivid description of the Royal Guard's success in battle. But it is from Strabo (the Loeb Classical Library translation), citing Ephorus (who worked in the early-mid 4th century B.C.), from whom we may have the most direct mention, but not totally in answer to your query, Paul. But I basically agree with Howard that there was probably not a distinct function of an elite group who formed a Royal Guard which didn't primarily fight close to the king (again, there was perhaps a sub-group constituting the king's actual bodyguard per se).

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 5.72.4, at Mantinea, 418 B.C.,
"...the Mantinean right broke their Sciritae and Brasideans, and bursting in with their allies and the 1,000 picked Argives into the unclosed breach in their line cut up and surrounded the Lacedaemonians, and drove them in full rout to the wagons, slaying some of the older men on guard there. But the Lacedaemonians, worsted in this part of the field, with the rest of their army, and especially the center, where the 300 knights1, as they are called, fought round King Agis, fell on the older men of the Argives and the five companies so named, and on the Cleonaeans, the Orneans, and the Athenians next them, and instantly routed them..."
1The ancient Greek word for Thucydides' '300 Knights' reads ἱππῆς.

Uh-oh! Thucydides wrote '300 knights'. However, he does state earlier that a raised force of cavalry numbering 400 mounts, six or seven years before the Battle of Mantinea, was unprecedented; there is never a mention of Spartan cavalry in the works of Tyrtaeus. However, he doesn't quite tally with Xenophon, and anything not directly related to the events of the Peloponnesian War, the greatest of ancient historians takes on a secondary role. Thus the '300 knights' probably signifies the footmen who fought round the king.

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 4.55, following the famous Spartan defeat at the hands of Demosthenes and Cleon on the island of Sphacteria in 425 B.C.,
"The Lacedaemonians seeing the Athenians masters of Cythera, and expecting descents of the kind upon their coasts, nowhere opposed them in force, but sent garrisons here and there through the country, consisting of as many heavy infantry as the points menaced seemed to require, and generally stood very much upon the defensive. After the severe and unexpected blow that had befallen them in the island, the occupation of Pylos and Cythera, and the apparition on every side of a war whose rapidity defied precaution, they lived in constant fear of internal revolution, and now took the unusual step of raising 400 horse and a force of archers, and became more timid than ever in military matters, finding themselves involved in a maritime struggle, which their organization had never contemplated, and that against Athenians, with whom an enterprise unattempted was always looked upon as a success sacrificed. Besides this, their late numerous reverses of fortune, coming close one upon another without any reason, had thoroughly unnerved them, and they were always afraid of a second disaster like that on the island, and thus scarcely dared to take the field, but fancied that they could not stir without a blunder, for being new to the experience of adversity they had lost all confidence in themselves."
Strabo, Geographica, Book 10.4.18,
"...Lycurgus the Spartan law-giver, Ephorus continues, was five generations later than the Althaemenes who conducted the colony to Crete; for historians say that Althaemenes was son of the Cissus who founded Argos about the same time when Procles was establishing Sparta as metropolis; and Lycurgus, as is agreed by all, was sixth in descent from Procles; and copies are not earlier than their models, nor more recent things earlier than older things; not only the dancing which is customary among the Lacedaemonians, but also the rhythms and paeans that are sung according to law, and many other Spartan institutions, are called 'Cretan' among the Lacedaemonians, as though they originated in Crete; and some of the public offices are not only administered in the same way as in Crete, but also have the same names, as, for instance, the office of the 'Gerontes', and that of the 'Hippeis' (except that the 'Hippeis' in Crete actually possessed horses, and from this fact it is inferred that the office of the 'Hippeis' in Crete is older, for they preserve the true meaning of the appellation, whereas the Lacedaemonian 'Hippeis' do not keep horses1); but though the Ephors have the same functions as the Cretan Cosmi, they have been named differently; and the public messes are, even today, still called 'Andreia' among the Cretans, but among the Spartans they ceased to be called by the same name as in earlier times..."
1Bingo! The Spartan Hippeis were not mounted; however, Ephorus via Strabo is referring here to body-politics: the Cosmi was the body of chief magistrates in Crete, and here his usage of 'Gerontes' (the highest Spartan senatores of the Gerousia, comprising 28 men over the age of sixty) is being gauged for the chief magistrates of Crete. At the Battle of Leuctra, the opening narrative of the Hellenica indicates that something beyond the potential maladroitness of phalanx battles took place, and the Spartan ranks fell into disorder even before Epaminondas' novel 50-shields battle line plowed into their right (the Theban left was anchored by none other than the 300 members of the Theban Sacred Band under Pelopidas). Anyway, the Royal Guard were certainly on foot here in 371 B.C., and a few sentences before I pick up with Xenophon's text (upcoming, Book 6.4.13-14) he writes, 'the cavalry of the Lacedaemonians was exceedingly poor at that time'.

The references are scarce from Xenophon, to be sure of this: but inferences, depending on our vivid imaginations :shifty:, can come about. In Book 3.3.9 of the Hellenica, during the intense Conspiracy of Cinadon (399-398 B.C.), and in Book 6.4.14, amid the action at the Battle of Leuctra; unfortunately, we do not read that valuable nomenclature. Within these frameworks it would be quite revealing:

Hellenica, Book 3.3.8-9,
"...the ephors came to the conclusion that he [the informer] was describing a well-considered plan, and were greatly alarmed; and without even convening the Little Assembly1, as it was called, but merely gathering about them - one ephor here and another there - some of the senators, they decided to send Cinadon to Aulon along with others of the younger men, and to order him to bring back with him certain of the Aulonians and Helots whose names were written in the official dispatch. And they ordered him to bring also the woman who was said to be the most beautiful woman in Aulon and was thought to be corrupting the Lacedaemonians who came there, older and younger alike. Now Cinadon had performed other services of a like sort for the ephors in the past; so this time they gave him the dispatch in which were written the names of those who were to be arrested. And when he asked which of the young men he should take with him, they said: 'Go and bid the eldest of the commanders of the guard2 to send with you six or seven of those who may chance to be at hand.' In fact they had taken care that the commander should know whom he was to send, and that those who were sent should know that it was Cinadon whom they were to arrest. The ephors said this thing besides to Cinadon, that they would send three wagons, so that they would not have to bring back the prisoners on foot - trying to conceal, as far as they could, the fact that they were sending after one man - himself...
1Clever ruse, huh? We know nothing of this 'Little Assembly'; was it a translator's term synonymous with the Apella? It clearly wasn't the Ephoroi; perhaps a branch of the Homoioi, Hyperitai or Phylae - all upper-class political branches? Judging by the context, it could very well be the Gerousia, but wouldn't he have stated that? Mmmm. Whoops, there goes that nomenclature again!

2Hippagretês (plural, hippagretai); this is what Howard touched on - the 'choosers' of the Royal Guard were indeed known as hippagretai. This is where Xenophon can be tantalizing! Other than perhaps Book 6.4.14 in the Hellenica, he nowhere refers to the Hippeis by name. In his Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, however, he describes a system by which 300 young Spartans were selected on the basis of merit. The selection was made by three men called hippagretai, who themselves were appointed by the ephors. Each hippagretes selected 100 young men. The purpose of the institution was the encouragement of reaching the pinnacle of manly excellence, culminating with one's appointment to the Agathoergothoi (ἀγαθοεργοὶ; see below). It is not possible to be sure about Xenophon's meaning, but he alludes that the three hippagretai were over 30 years of age and the picked 300 themselves were men between around 20 to 30 years old. Xenophon does not state either here or in his Constitution of the Lacedaemonians (4. 1-6 or 13. 6f.), or anywhere else (AFAIK) that these 300 acted as a royal bodyguard; nor does he refer to them as Hippeis; I hope that his usage of the term hippagretai ('those who enroll the Hippeis') - which the Loeb Classical Library's translation clearly reveals - implies a self-explanatory issue, and surely pertains to the Hippeis we are perusing to identify! Of course, philology takes on a whole new ball game, with so much 'static' in each era's translations, etc.

OK. Here's possibly the 'main' passage from Xenophon which pertains to all this, Hellenica, Book 6.4.13-14,
"...Now when Cleombrotus began to lead his army against the enemy, in the first place, before the troops under him so much as perceived that he was advancing, the horsemen had already joined battle and those of the Lacedaemonians had speedily been worsted; then in their flight they had fallen foul of their own hoplites, and, besides, the companies of the Thebans were now charging upon them. Nevertheless,the fact that Cleombrotus and his men were at first victorious in the battle may be known from this clear indication: they would not have been able to take him up and carry him off still living, had not those who were fighting in front of him been holding the advantage at that time. But when Deinon, the polemarch, Sphodrias, one of the king's tent-companions, and Cleonymus, the son of Sphodrias, had been killed, then the royal bodyguard1, the so-called aides of the polemarch, and the others fell back under the pressure of the Theban mass, while those who were on the left wing of the Lacedaemonians, when they saw that the right wing was being pushed back, gave way..."
1Here at Leuctra, to reiterate, the Spartan cavalry had just been vanquished, thus the 'royal bodyguard' were clearly infantrymen, as told to us by Thucydides at Mantinea, and Ephorus (through Strabo), in a more general sense. The ancient Greek word for Xenophon's 'royal bodyguard' is ἱππεῖς.

As for the institution of the 300 figure for the Royal Guard, we read in Xenophon's Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, Book 4.3-6,
"...The Ephors, then, pick out three of the very best among them. These three are called Commanders of the Guard [hippagretai]. Each of them enrolls a hundred others, stating his reasons for preferring one and rejecting another. The result is that those who fail to win the honor are at war both with those who sent them away and with their successful rivals; and they are on the watch for any lapse from the code of honor.

Here then you find that kind of strife that is dearest to the gods, and in the highest sense political -- the strife that sets the standard of a brave man's conduct; and in which either party exerts itself to the end that it may never fall below its best, and that, when the time comes, every member of it may support the state with all his might. And they are bound, too, to keep themselves fit, for one effect of the strife is that they spar whenever they meet; but anyone present has a right to part the combatants. If anyone refuses to obey the mediator the Warden takes him to the Ephors; and they fine him heavily, in order to make him realize that he must never yield to a sudden impulse to disobey the laws..."
The ancient Greek word denoting Xenophon's 'Commanders of the Guard' is ἱππαγρέται - houtoi de hippagretai kalountai.

Herodotus wrote, The Histories, Book 1.67,
"...those Spartans who are called 'Well-doers'1, discovered it. Now the 'Well-doers' are of the citizens of the eldest who are passing from the ranks of the 'Horsemen,' in each year five; and these are bound during that year in which they pass out from the 'Horsemen,' to allow themselves to be sent without ceasing to various places by the Spartan State..."
1Agathoergothoi (ἀγαθοεργοὶ). Herodotus' 'Horseman' (why quotes, if not for an elemental meaning?) are probably the same as Thucydides' 'Knights' (History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 5.72.4).

So, from Herodotus we get 'Horsemen' ('Knights' in The Histories, Book 8.124), and the eldest five men of the Hippeis (an assumption) become members of the Agathoergothoi, a body of retired members of the Royal Guard who now serve the State in a special function.

Oh, and with regards to the thread's title over there:

Quote:
Originally Posted by PMBardunias
Hippeis, not Hippies

I also agree that the Hippeis were not Hippies; despite the similarity in lexemes, the sēmantikós behind our discourse here on an ancient Spartan army classification is pretty far removed from counter-cultural youth movements which originated in the San Francisco area in the late 1960s. The etymology is not even close; Hippies comes from Hip or Hipster, the latter being a term to identify the jazz ultra-enthusiasts of the 1940s. I'm not... getting off topic am I? :laughter:

OK. What did I accomplish? Probably just more perturbation!

Food for thought.

Thanks, James K MacKinnon :)
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]]> Vestigia Vetustatis Spartan JKM http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311911 American War Hero and veteran of the Blitz has died http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311881&goto=newpost Thu, 19 Nov 2009 18:21:46 GMT 5 Days ago, Colonel Lewis Millett died in his home. Colonel Lewis Millett who... 5 Days ago, Colonel Lewis Millett died in his home. Colonel Lewis Millett who served in the Canadian and US Army and helped train the Royal Thai Army is one of America's greatest war heroes.

Quote:
Lewis L. Millett, 88, a career Army officer who was briefly and somewhat misleadingly court-martialed for desertion during World War II and went on to receive the Medal of Honor for leading a bayonet charge during the Korean War, died Nov. 14 at a veterans hospital in Loma Linda, Calif. He had congestive heart failure.

Col. Millett, who sported a red handlebar mustache, cut an audacious and unconventional path during his 35 years of military service. He led daring attacks in two wars and was instrumental in starting a reconnaissance commando school to train small units for covert operations in Vietnam.

He also was an Army deserter. He later said he had been so eager to "help fight fascism and Hitler" that he left an Air Corps gunnery school in mid-1941 -- months before the U.S. entry into World War II -- to enlist with the Canadian army and go overseas. He manned an antiaircraft gun during the London blitz before rejoining the U.S. Army, which had by that time declared war and apparently was not being overly meticulous in its background checks.

As an antitank gunner in Tunisia, he earned the Silver Star after he jumped into a burning ammunition-filled halftrack, drove it away from allied soldiers and leapt to safety just before the vehicle exploded. Not long after, he shot down a German Messerschmitt Me-109 fighter that was strafing Allied troops. Col. Millett, who was firing from machine guns mounted on a halftrack, hit the pilot through the windshield.

He had fought his way through Italy, participating in the campaigns at Salerno and Anzio, when his paperwork caught up with him. A superior officer told him that he was being court-martialed for his desertion to Canada and that his punishment was $52. He also received a battlefield promotion for fearlessness in combat.

His letters back home were unfiltered epithets aimed at the chain of command. "Letters were censored in World War II, and the next thing I knew I was standing before the battery commander," he told the journal Military History. "He told me that the War Department had ordered three times that I be court-martialed. They finally did it to prevent someone from really throwing the book at me later. Then a few weeks later they made me a second lieutenant! I must be the only Regular Army colonel who has ever been court-martialed and convicted of desertion."

During the Korean War, he received the military's highest awards for valor, including the Medal of Honor and the Distinguished Service Cross, for two bayonet charges he led as a company commander in February 1951.

"We had acquired some Chinese documents stating that Americans were afraid of hand-to-hand fighting and cold steel," he told Military History. "When I read that, I thought, 'I'll show you, you sons of :wub:es!' "

He was awarded the Medal of Honor for leading a charge up Hill 180 near Soam-Ni on Feb. 7. When one of his platoons was pinned down by heavy fire, he placed himself at the head of two other platoons and ordered the men to charge up the hill.

According to his Medal of Honor citation, he bayoneted several enemy soldiers and lobbed grenades in their direction while rallying his men to fight. Grenade fragments pierced Col. Millett's shin, but he refused medical evacuation.

"Despite vicious opposing fire, the whirlwind hand-to-hand assault carried to the crest of the hill," the Medal of Honor citation read. "His dauntless leadership and personal courage so inspired his men that they stormed into the hostile position and used their bayonets with such lethal effect that the enemy fled in wild disorder."

Charles H. Cureton, director of Army museums at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, said that Col. Millett's intimidating, close-combat bayonet charge was "very unusual. By the time you get to the Second World War, the range of lethality of weapons is such that a bayonet charge is very hazardous."

Lewis Lee Millett was born Dec. 15, 1920, in Mechanic Falls, Maine, and grew up with his mother in South Dartmouth, Mass., after his parents divorced. After his Korean War service, he went through Ranger training at Fort Benning, Ga., and was assigned to the 101st Airborne Division as an intelligence officer. He later was sent to Vietnam as a military adviser to a controversial intelligence program called Phoenix, which killed thousands of suspected Viet Cong and their sympathizers in an effort to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure in towns and villages.

He said he retired in 1973 because he was convinced that the United States had "quit" in Vietnam. He championed the return of U.S. prisoners of war from Vietnam and then worked as a deputy sheriff in Trenton, Tenn., before settling in the San Jacinto Mountains resort village of Idyllwild, Calif., across the street from an American Legion post.

His first marriage, to the former Virginia Young, ended in divorce. His second wife, Winona Williams Millett, died in 1993. Survivors include three children from his second marriage, L. Lee Millett Jr. and Timothy Millett, both of Idyllwild, and Elizabeth Millett of Nevada; three sisters; a brother; and four grandchildren.

A son from his second marriage, Army Staff Sgt. John Millett, died in the 1985 airplane crash in Gander, Newfoundland, that killed more than 240 U.S. service members returning from a peacekeeping mission in the Middle East.

Reflecting on his career, Col. Millett once told an interviewer: "I believe in freedom, I believe deeply in it. I've fought in three wars, and volunteered for all of them, because I believed as a free man, that it was my duty to help those under the attack of tyranny. Just as simple as that.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/17/AR2009111703929.html ]]> Vestigia Vetustatis Future Redleg Officer http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311881 Coolest dynastic CoA http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311871&goto=newpost Thu, 19 Nov 2009 17:45:15 GMT The house of Bonaparte Image:... The house of Bonaparte
]]> Vestigia Vetustatis orko http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311871 U-48 and the sinking of City of Benares http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311821&goto=newpost Thu, 19 Nov 2009 08:57:25 GMT U-48 was propably the most successful submarine in WW2. However, they were not... U-48 was propably the most successful submarine in WW2. However, they were not heroes in my eyes.
In a convoy the U-48 attacked, the submarine sank a ship, the City of Benares, carrying civilians and children. 77 children were drawned.

Wikipedia claims that the captain couldn't tell that there were children on board.

However the Germans could NOT award him the iron cross when he returned from that patrol. ]]> Vestigia Vetustatis alhoon http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311821 Roman Emperors. Your Favorite. http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311790&goto=newpost Thu, 19 Nov 2009 03:10:55 GMT I was wondering which Roman Emperor the people of TWC liked. I personally... I was wondering which Roman Emperor the people of TWC liked.


I personally like Vespasian. Not only for the Colisseum, but he seemed like a real down to earth fellow. I think he would prefferred to watch a football game(American or European ect.) than watch an Opera. Also a very fair emperor by getting rid of Nero's "Golden Palace"

So, who is your personal favorite?

EDIT: Rep for that long list of Emperors is welcomed :P ]]> Vestigia Vetustatis Celsius http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311790 What Are the Most Successful Heists In History of the World? http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311711&goto=newpost Wed, 18 Nov 2009 20:22:47 GMT I'm curious about this. ]]> Vestigia Vetustatis asianboy http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311711 where to find good battle documentaries http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311659&goto=newpost Wed, 18 Nov 2009 15:57:16 GMT i was just wondering if anyone knows of good documentaries detailing specific... i was just wondering if anyone knows of good documentaries detailing specific battles. if possible, ones that use computer graphics or even animation to give a better sense of scale than the quick close up shot of the 50 or so live actors they could afford to try to represent 50,000. i've seen those history channel ones called "decisive battles" that used rome tw and really liked em. wondering if there are others out there similar??? thanks. (or just any good war documentaries you might suggest.) thanks again. ]]> Vestigia Vetustatis thunec http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311659 Your ideal military system using pre gunpowder technology only. Read the first post before posting please.. http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311611&goto=newpost Wed, 18 Nov 2009 10:18:41 GMT This is just something to be a bit silly. I thought it would be fun since this... This is just something to be a bit silly. I thought it would be fun since this is a site about Total War games just to have this mental exercise.
It is the Middle Ages and before gunpowder technology, you can choose the year. All other pre gunpowder war technology is available. You have a state which is currently at peace, you wish to update your military and will create and train units required making your ideal military to supersede your old one. You can be any country in any year within the conditions mentioned. It does not have to be Europe but remember gunpowder was used from different points in history in different places. What unit types would you have, how would you recruit and support them, based on whichever country you have chosen, how would you instigate the process of replacing the old military?

Feel free to post discussions on someone’s military system. Do not directly quote their first post as this should be the person’s only post regarding the military system they wish to create. A person may edit it as many times they like. Also that person may discuss their own or other’s military systems in this thread.
Do not become offensive to each other and feel free to make constructive posts or ask questions regarding the systems posted. If the post is long post it in a spoiler please.
I will post my structure in a later post. ]]> Vestigia Vetustatis G-Megas-Doux http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311611 The revials of The French Monarchy.. http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311580&goto=newpost Wed, 18 Nov 2009 06:56:17 GMT Ok, so in school you learn that in 1789 the people of France overthrew the... Ok, so in school you learn that in 1789 the people of France overthrew the Absolute Monarchy and ancient regime. Really All you learn about is the Storming of the Bastille, Executions of the Royal Family and the formation of the Republic under that joke Robespierre. You are drilled with how the French love liberty an freedom, and then Napoleon shows up.
Luckily as a history major Ive recently learned alot more about the minute details of the French Revolution and the issues leading to it. But what I cant understand is how the French could following the execution of Louis xvi :executed:, Napoleon could become Emperor. Louis XViii can become King, Napoleon can become emperor for 100 more days, Louis XVii can be king agian, Charles X can be overthrown and his cousian Louis Phillipe can suceed him. But after all this is overthrown and a "republic is formed" followed by Napoleon III becoming Emperor... How and why did this happen and suceed? I know Napoleon tookover kinda like Julius Caesar and The bourbons were restored thanks to Tallayard. My question is more like the mindset of the ppl. How after there revolution the French could except these violations to there efforts?
I mean i love the fact that after the loss of the Franco Prussian war and collapse of the Second empire, the Bourbons were nearly revived AGIAN, and through republic means. I know there was a conflict with the canidate Henri chambord and the fleur di lise vs tricolour, and it never happened. But how was all these restorations and take overs even possible? can some on enlighten me cause I love learning about the Monarchies ]]> Vestigia Vetustatis littlejim13 http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311580 Biggest cities http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311298&goto=newpost Mon, 16 Nov 2009 22:13:02 GMT Hey guys! :) Currently I am modding my game of Stainless Steel, and I would... Hey guys! :)
Currently I am modding my game of Stainless Steel, and I would appreciate any help in telling me what were the biggest and most populous cities in the time frame from circa 1080 to 1500, in Europe particularly.
I know that Fes, Cairo, Baghdad, Constantinople, Cordoba, Tabriz were the most popolous in the middle east, but I am not really good with European history, so please help me here. :)
Thanks ]]> Vestigia Vetustatis burningsoul http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311298 Conquest of Granada need help http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311243&goto=newpost Mon, 16 Nov 2009 17:31:03 GMT I am writing an essay on the subject but cant find any good contemporary... I am writing an essay on the subject but cant find any good contemporary writings about the treatment of the moors or the state of the country after teh invasion can anyone help? ]]> Vestigia Vetustatis Optimus Marcus Ulpius Traianus http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311243 The use of Shield on back? http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311237&goto=newpost Mon, 16 Nov 2009 17:05:58 GMT I can understand carrying one's shield on one's back, and using it in battle. But I see many pictures and game models where the people just carry shield on their backs and fight instead with, most usually, a two-hander weapon.

My questions are:

1. How common was this practice?
2. What practical was this? Was it used to protect rear attacks and arrows? Could shields have been too heavy as to affect movements?

Cheers ]]> Vestigia Vetustatis Kawee http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311237 The truth about crusades and islam http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.php?t=311220&goto=newpost Mon, 16 Nov 2009 15:20:20 GMT An excellent article on the crusades, their modern, often wrongful reception... An excellent article on the crusades, their modern, often wrongful reception and islam.

Quote:
Ibn Warraq


Tu Quoque
On Islam and the Crusades


Often, when I am criticizing crimes inspired by Islamic extremism, I am interrupted by the remark that Christianity was once culpable of similar abuses. That Christianity may have been intolerant in the past, however, does not make criticisms of Islam’s present-day intolerance any less valid. Also, Islamic intolerance is an immediate danger, whereas Christian intolerance is generally a historical phenomenon and no longer a threat to civilization. And Christendom’s crimes were recorded by Christians themselves—a stark contrast to our politically correct climate, in which many, especially Muslims, are reluctant to criticize Islam.
Still, one might point out Christianity’s historical shortcomings in order to avoid demonizing Islam alone. But this principle should work both ways: we should also avoid demonizing Christianity and be prepared to point out Islam’s shortcomings. In December 2008, Boris Johnson, mayor of London, presented a biased BBC program on the Crusades that laid the blame for them entirely on Christians. The program pointed out that after expelling the Moors from Spain, Christians converted a mosque into a church—an act of “vandalism.” However, it failed to note that the Crusades were a reaction against over 300 years of jihad and persecution of Eastern Christians, during which Muslims destroyed hundreds of churches and converted many others into mosques, including the magnificent Byzantine church Hagia Sophia.
Consider the situation in the Holy Land 100 years before Pope Urban II’s call in 1095 for a crusade to liberate it. It was part of the territory ruled by the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim, whose cruelties Christian and Muslim historians alike recorded. Fourteenth-century historian Ibn al-Dawadari tells us that al-Hakim destroyed the Church of Saint Mark in al-Fustat, Egypt (on the outskirts of modern-day Cairo), which Christians had built in defiance of a law forbidding new church construction. The al-Rashida mosque arose not only over the ruins of Saint Mark’s but also over Jewish and Christian cemeteries, surely an act of vandalism. But the height of al-Hakim’s cruelties was the destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which, according to Muslim sources, began in September 1007. Also known as the Church of the Resurrection, this was possibly the most revered shrine in Christendom—considered not only Golgotha (or Calvary), where the New Testament says that Jesus was crucified, but also the place where he was buried and hence the site of the Resurrection. According to historian Moshe Gil, al-Hakim ordered that the Church of the Resurrection be torn down “to its very foundations, apart from what could not be destroyed or pulled up, and they also destroyed the Golgotha and the Church of Saint Constantine and all that they contained, as well as all the sacred gravestones. They even tried to dig up the graves and wipe out all traces of their existence.”
A new generation of Western medieval scholars has tried to rectify misconceptions about the Crusades. Historian Jonathan Riley-Smith has pointed out that “modern Western public opinion, Arab nationalism, and Pan-Islamism all share perceptions of crusading that have more to do with nineteenth-century European imperialism than with actuality.” Muslims, in particular, have developed what Riley-Smith calls “mythistories” concerning the putative injuries that they received at the crusaders’ hands. This is not to deny, of course, that the crusaders were responsible for outrages, including what is sometimes called the First Holocaust—the massacres of Jews that began in Worms on May 18, 1096, and continued into Mainz, where the Jewish community, one of the largest in Europe, was decimated. It is rather to say that the Crusades are misunderstood on multiple levels.
For one thing, they were not exclusively concerned with combating Islam. Pagan Wends, Balts, and Lithuanians; shamanist Mongols; Orthodox Russians and Greeks; Cathar and Hussite heretics; and those Catholics whom the Church perceived as its enemies—all were targets of the broader mission to extirpate heresy.
Nor were the Crusades “thoughtless explosions of barbarism,” as Riley-Smith accurately characterizes their reputation today. They had a sophisticated underlying rationale, elaborated theologically by Christian nations threatened by Muslim invaders who had managed to reach into the heart of Europe—from central France in the eighth century to Vienna in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They were a response to the desecration of Christian shrines in the Holy Land, the destruction of churches there, and the general persecution of Christians in the Near East. A Crusade had to fulfill strict criteria for the Church to consider it legitimate and just. It had to be waged for purposes of repelling violence or injury, with the goal of imposing justice on wrongdoers. A Crusade was not to be a war of conversion but rather a rightful attempt to recover unjustly seized Christian territory. And only a recognized church authority like the pope could call for one.
Most crusaders would have laughed at the prospect of material gain. In fact, crusading became a financial burden as the costs of warfare increased. The Crusades were far more concerned with saving not only Christendom from Islam, but also the souls of the crusaders themselves. Many believed that, by taking part, they would redeem their sinfulness.
It’s commonly believed today that modern Muslims have inherited from their medieval ancestors memories of crusader violence and destruction. But nothing could be further from the truth. By the fourteenth century in the Islamic world, the Crusades had almost passed out of mind. Muslims had lost interest, and, in any case, they saw themselves as the victors. The Muslim world did not renew its interest in the Crusades until the 1890s, but now it saw them through a Western prism. Western imperialist rhetoric, infused with a tendentious reading of crusader history, gave Muslims the false idea of a continuing Western assault, while the novels of Sir Walter Scott encouraged the myth of the culturally inferior crusaders confronting civilized, liberal, and modern-thinking Muslims. Many Arab nationalists believed “their struggle for independence to be a predominantly Arab riposte to a crusade that was being waged against them,” as Riley-Smith notes. “Since the 1970s, however, they have been challenged by a renewed and militant Pan-Islamism, the adherents of which have globalized the Nationalist interpretation of crusade history.”
Thus the spectacle of modern Islamists invoking the Crusades. As Osama bin Laden wrote: “For the first time, the crusaders have managed to achieve their historic ambitions and dreams against our Islamic umma, gaining control over the Islamic holy places and the Holy Sanctuaries, and hegemony over the wealth and riches of our umma.” The battle, according to bin Laden, is between the people of Islam and the global crusaders.
In trying to make sense of their humiliation under Western imperialist powers, aggrieved Muslims have come upon an ingenious but false interpretation of history that sees their nineteenth- and twentieth-century exploitation as a continuation of the medieval Crusades. Such a reworking of history enables them to cast contemporary events, such as the war in Afghanistan and the American presence in Iraq, in an anti-Western light, making the West and the Crusades a convenient scapegoat for the shame and dishonor that Muslims have experienced for decades. Their distorted reading of history gives Islamists both a cause for grievance and a justification for their sense of superiority—since Muslims did, after all, succeed in expelling the infidels from Islamic lands.
Ibn Warraq is a senior fellow at the Center for Inquiry Transnational and the author of five books on Islam and Koranic criticism, including Why I Am Not a Muslim.
http://www.city-journal.org/2009/19_4_snd-tu-quoque.html

German translation in spoilers.
Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 
Tu QUOQUE - über den Islam und die Kreuzzüge
Von Ibn Warraq

Wenn ich Kritik an den Verbrechen übe, die durch den islamischen Extremismus inspiriert wurden, werde ich oftmals von der Bemerkung unterbrochen, dass das Christentum früher einmal ähnlich schuldhaften Missbrauch betrieben hat. Dass das Christentum in der Vergangenheit intolerant gewesen sein mag, macht jedoch die Kritik am gegenwärtigen Islam nicht weniger gültig. Außerdem ist die islamische Intoleranz eine unmittelbare Gefahr, während die christliche Intoleranz in der Regel ein historisches Phänomen und nicht länger eine Bedrohung für die Menschheit ist. Und die Verbrechen der Christenheit wurden von den Christen selbst dokumentiert – ein starker Kontrast zu unserem politisch korrekten Klima, in dem viele, vor allem die Muslime, nicht gewillt sind, den Islam zu kritisieren.
Dennoch könnte man darauf hinweisen, dass das Christentum historische Defizite hatte, um ein alleiniges “Feindbild Islam” zu vermeiden. Aber dieses Prinzip sollte für beide Richtungen gelten: Wir sollten auch vermeiden, das Christentum zu dämonisieren und bereit sein, auf die Mängel des Islams hinzuweisen. Im Dezember 2008 präsentierte Boris Johnson, der Bürgermeister von London, eine einseitige BBC-Dokumentation über die Kreuzzüge, die die Schuld dafür ganz allein den Christen gab. Diese Dokumentation wies darauf hin, dass nach der Vertreibung der Mauren aus Spanien, die Christen eine Moschee in eine Kirche umgewandelt hatten – ein Akt von „Vandalismus.” Sie vergisst allerdings darauf hinzuweisen, dass die Kreuzzüge eine Reaktion auf den über 300 Jahre lang anhaltenden Jihad und der Verfolgung von Christen der Ostkirche waren, währenddessen die Muslime Hunderte von Kirchen zerstörten und viele andere in Moscheen verwandelten, darunter die prächtige, byzantinische Kirche Hagia Sophia.
Wir müssen die Situation im Heiligen Land betrachten, 100 Jahre vor dem Aufruf von Papst Urban II. zu einem Kreuzzug im Jahre 1095 um es zu befreien. Es war ein Teil des Territoriums, das beherrscht wurde von dem Fatimiden Kalifen al-Hakim, dessen Grausamkeiten, christliche und muslimische Historiker gleichermaßen dokumentiert haben. Ibn al-Dawadari, ein Historiker aus dem vierzehnten Jahrhundert, erklärt uns, dass al-Hakim die Kirche des heiligen Markus in al-Fustat, Ägypten zerstörte (am Rande des heutigen Kairo), die die Christen gebaut hatten, trotz eines Gesetzes, das neue Kirchenbauten untersagte. Die al-Rashida Moschee entstand nicht nur auf der Ruine der Kirche des heiligen Markus, sondern auch über jüdischen und christlichen Friedhöfen, das war sicherlich ein Akt von Vandalismus. Aber die Spitze von al-Hakims Grausamkeiten war die Zerstörung der Kirche des Heiligen Grabes, die nach muslimischen Quellen im September 1007 begann. Auch unter dem Namen Auferstehungskirche bekannt, war dies möglicherweise das am meisten verehrte Heiligtum der Christenheit – das nicht nur als Golgatha angesehen wurde (oder Kalvarienberg), wo nach dem Neuen Testament Jesus gekreuzigt wurde, sondern auch der Ort, wo er begraben wurde und damit der Ort seiner Auferstehung. Nach dem Historiker Moshe Gil, ordnete al-Hakim an, dass die Auferstehungskirche abgerissen wurde, “bis zu seinen Grundfesten, abgesehen von dem, was nicht zerstört werden oder hochgezogen werden konnte, und sie zerstörten auch den Golgatha und die Kirche des Heiligen Konstantin und alles was darin enthalten war, sowie alle heiligen Grabsteine. Sie versuchten sogar, die Gräber auszugraben und löschten so alle Spuren ihrer Existenz aus.”
Eine neue Generation von westlichen Gelehrten für das Mittelalter, hat versucht, Irrtümer über die Kreuzzüge zu korrigieren. Der Historiker Jonathan Riley-Smith hat darauf hingewiesen, dass “die moderne westliche öffentliche Meinung, der arabische Nationalismus und der Pan-Islamismus, alle eine Wahrnehmung der Kreuzzüge hätten, die mehr mit dem europäischen Imperialismus des 19. Jahrhunderts, als mit der Wirklichkeit zu tun haben.” Muslime vor allem hätten etwas entwickelt, was Riley-Smith als “Geschichtsmythos” bezeichnet, die die vermeintlichen Verletzungen betreffen, die sie durch die Hände der Kreuzfahrer erhalten hätten. Man kann natürlich nicht leugnen, dass die Kreuzfahrer für Ausschreitungen verantwortlich waren, einschließlich dessen, was manchmal auch als das erste Holocaust-Massaker an den Juden bezeichnet wurde und in Worms am 18. Mai 1096 begann, und sich in Mainz fortsetzte, wo die jüdische Gemeinde, eine der größten in Europa, dezimiert wurde. Man kann eher sagen, dass die Kreuzzüge auf mehreren Ebenen missverstanden werden.
Zum einen waren sie nicht ausschließlich mit der Bekämpfung des Islam beschäftigt. Heidnische Wenden, Balten und Litauer, schamanische Mongolen, orthodoxe Russen und Griechen, katharische und hussitische Ketzer, und diejenigen unter den Katholiken, die von der Kirche als ihre Feinde wahrgenommen wurden – sie alle waren Ziele der umfassenderen Mission, die Ketzerei auszurotten.
Zum anderen waren die Kreuzzüge keine “gedankenlosen Ausbrüche von Barbarei”, wie Riley-Smith ihren Ruf heute genau charakterisiert. Sie hatten ein ausgeklügeltes grundlegendes Prinzip, theologisch erarbeitet von christlichen Völkern, die von muslimischen Invasoren bedroht wurden, die es geschafft hatten, in das Herz Europas vorzustoßen – von Zentralfrankreich im achten Jahrhundert bis nach Wien im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert. Sie waren eine Reaktion auf die Schändung der christlichen Stätten im Heiligen Land, der Zerstörung der Kirchen dort und der Verfolgung von Christen im Nahen Osten. Ein Kreuzzug musste die strengen Kriterien der Kirche erfüllen, um legitim und gerecht zu sein. Er musste zum Zwecke der Abwehr von Gewalt oder Verletzungen geführt werden, mit dem Ziel der Unterwerfung unter das Recht für Übeltäter. Ein Kreuzzug war kein Krieg zum Zwecke der Bekehrung, sondern eher ein rechtmäßiger Versuch, sich zu Unrecht beschlagnahmtes, christliches Gebiet zurückzuholen. Und nur eine anerkannte kirchliche Autorität wie der Papst konnte einen Kreuzzug ausrufen.
Die meisten Kreuzritter würden bei der Aussicht auf materiellen Gewinn gelacht haben. In der Tat stellten Kreuzzüge eine finanzielle Belastung dar, da die Kosten des Krieges anstiegen. Die Kreuzzüge waren weit mehr nicht nur mit der Rettung der Christenheit vom Islam beschäftigt, sondern auch die Seelen der Kreuzfahrer selbst. Viele glaubten, dass sie durch die Teilnahme, von ihren Sünden erlöst würden.
Man nimmt heute allgemein an, dass die modernen Muslime von ihren mittelalterlichen Vorfahren die Erinnerungen an Gewalt und Zerstörung der Kreuzfahrer übernommen haben. Aber nichts könnte weiter von der Wahrheit entfernt sein. Seit dem 14. Jahrhundert waren die Kreuzzüge in der islamischen Welt fast in Vergessenheit geraten. Die Muslime hatten ihr Interesse daran verloren, und in jedem Fall sahen sie sich als die Sieger an. Die muslimische Welt erneuerte ihr Interesse an den Kreuzzügen nicht vor den 90er-Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts, aber sah sie jetzt durch ein westliches Prisma. Westliche, imperialistische Rhetorik, durchdrungen von einer tendenziösen Lesart der Kreuzfahrergeschichte, gab den Muslimen die falsche Vorstellung eines kontinuierlichen westlichen Angriffs, während die Romane von Sir Walter Scott den Mythos der kulturell minderwertigen Kreuzfahrer förderten im Gegensatz zu den zivilisierten, liberal und modern denkenden Muslime. Viele arabische Nationalisten glaubten, “ihr Kampf für die Unabhängigkeit sei eine überwiegend arabische Replik auf einen Kreuzzug, der gegen sie geführt wurde”, wie Riley-Smith feststellte. “Seit den 70er-Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts jedoch wurden sie durch einen erneuten und militanten Pan-Islamismus in Frage gestellt, deren Anhänger die nationalistische Deutung der Geschichte der Kreuzzüge globalisiert haben.”
So beschwört das Schauspiel der modernen Islamisten die Kreuzzüge herauf. Osama bin Laden schrieb dazu: “Zum ersten Mal haben die Kreuzfahrer ihre historischen Ambitionen und Träume gegen unsere islamische Umma erreicht, sie gewannen die Kontrolle über die heiligen Stätten des Islam und die Heiligtümer und die Hegemonie über die Fülle und den Reichtum unserer Umma.” Nach bin Laden ist es der Kampf zwischen den Menschen des Islam und den globalen Kreuzfahrern.
Indem man versucht, einer Erniedrigung unter den westlichen imperialistischen Mächten einen Sinn zu geben, haben benachteiligte Muslime auf eine geniale, aber falsche Interpretation der Geschichte gesetzt, die die Ausbeutung des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts als Fortsetzung der mittelalterlichen Kreuzzüge ansehen. Eine solche Überarbeitung der Geschichte ermöglicht es ihnen, aktuelle Ereignisse, wie den Krieg in Afghanistan und die amerikanische Präsenz im Irak, zu erklären, indem sie den Westen und die Kreuzzüge zu einem bequemen Sündenbock für die Schmach und Schande machen, die die Muslime seit Jahrzehnten erlebt haben. Ihre verzerrte Darstellung der Geschichte gibt den Islamisten sowohl eine Ursache als auch eine Begründung für ihr Gefühl der Überlegenheit – da die Muslime letztendlich erfolgreich die Ungläubigen aus den islamischen Ländern vertrieben hatten.
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